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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF T I E  
STATE OF IDAHO. Pd AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Mary Killills Soignicr. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
W. Kent Fletcher. 
1 
1 Case NO. GV* QC 0905785 
) 
1 COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 




Comes now the plaintiffMary KillinsSoignier, through herattorney ofrecord, andcomplains 
and alleges against defendant W. Kent Fletcher as follows: 
At all times relevant, defendant W Kent Fletcher ("Fletcher") was an attorney at law duly 
licensed by the State of Idaho w ~ t h  ottices foithe practice of law located in Burley, Idaho. 
COMPLAINT A N D  Dl MAND FOR J U R Y  TRIAL. I 
OOOOl.3 
I I 
At all times relevant, an attomey!client relationship existed between defendant Fletcher and 
Zachary A. Cowan ("Cowan"). 
Ill 
Prior to his death, decedent Cowan was a beneficiary of the L.eonardaA. Cowan Trust which 
beneficiarystatus was scheduled to terminate by the terms of the trust on November 7.2003, to wit, 
decedent's fiftieth birthday, at which time portion of the trust assets were to be conveyed to Cowan 
outright. As found by the magistrate court In the Matter of the Estate of Zachary A. Cowan (Cassia 
County Case No. CV-2006-1234), the trust was formally terminated on March 4. 2005. Upon 
termination of the trust and by its terms, a substantial portion of the trust assets was conveyed to 
decedent Cowan prior to his death in 2006. A copy of the trust is attached hereto as Exhibit I .  
IV 
In May of 2005. decedent Cowan retained and instructed defendant Fletcher to prepare a last 
will and testament. Included in Cowan's instructions was the direction that property owned by him, 
which had previously been subsumed in trusts in which he was a beneficiary. be devised to plaintiff 
Mary Killins Soignier. Defendant Fletcher prepared the aforesaid testamentar); instrument which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit 2 and incorporated herein by reference. 
v 
In drafting decedent Cowan's last will and testament (Exhibit 2). defendant Fletcher 
negligently failed to ascertain that decedent Cowan held no interests in tnlsts and the last interest 
held was in the Leonarda Cowan trust which interest terminated as early as November 7. 2003 (the 
decedent's fiftieth birthday) or as late as March 4, 2005 (the Final Release and Discharge of the 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY 1-RIAL - 2 
truster). two months errrlier. 'That is, defendant F'lctcher drafted a will (fzxhihrt 2)  in which 
decedent's bequest to piailitiff Soignier, i.e.. "beneficial interest in trusts", would be frustrated 
because the Leonarda Cowltn 'Trust had been terminated prior to tfccedcnt's execution it€ the will, 
Further, defendant Fletcher negrigently failed to advise decedent Cowan that upon his death 
there were no trust interests, as such, to be conveyed and that Cowan's testamentary intent vis-a-vis 
plaintiff Soignier, as set forth in the will authored by Fletcher. would he frustrated 
As a proximate result of defendant Fletcher's negligence as aforesaid, the probate court 
ruled, in pertinent part, on September 18, 2007, as follows: 
Mr Cowan signed a "Final Release and Discharge" agreement on 
March 3, 2005. His beneficial interest share in the corpus of 'The 
Leonarda A. Cowan Trust was delivered over to him. The Trust was 
terminated. 
At the time of his death, Mr. Cowan did not hold or possess any 
interest in any trusts. 
After such review, it is evident the affidavits do not provide the Court 
with any factual insight regarding how the existing facts, as applied 
the testator's Will, evidences any ambiguity. Therefore, this Court 
does not find a latent ambiguity in regards to the testator's intent. 
The fact that the testator did not have an interest in any trust at the 
time of his death does not create a conflict with his intent towards the 
American Cancer Society. His stated intent towards each beneficiary 
is clear, and his stated intent regarding Ms. Soignier does not come 
into direct conflict with any other portion ofthe Will. 'Therefore, this 
Court concludes that Ms. Soignier has failed to demonstrate the Will 
contains a latent ambiguity. 
As a further proximate result of defendant Fletcher's negligence, the probate court ruled that 
COMPLAINT A N D  DEMAND FOR J U R Y  TRIAL - 3 
plaintilfsoignier take nothing under the will and that decedent Cowan's estate "should bc given to 
the American Cancer Society". 
V1II 
A s  a proximate result of defendant Fletcher's negligence, he breached his duty to plaintiff 
Soignier. a named beneficiary under the will. to properly execute decedent's will so as to effectuate 
the decedent's intent as expressed in the will (Exhibit I), all to  plaintiff"^ damage in excess ofthe 
jurisdictional minimum of the District Coun. 
IX 
Plaintiff has been required to retain the services of Ellis. Brown & Sheils, Chartered, to 
prosecute this action and is entitled to recover sums as and for reasonable attorney's fees incurred 
herein. 
Wherefore, plaintiff prays for relief as follows: 
I .  For compensatory damages in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of the District Court; 
2. For costs of suit and reasonable attorney fees: 
3. For such other and further relief as the court and jury deem appropriate. 
Dated this 25"' day of kfarch. 2009. 
Attorney for plaintiff 
C O M P I A I N I  AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4 
000016 
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury in accordance with the pro~isions of Rule 38(b) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Attorney for Plaintiff \ 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY I-RIAL - 5 
000017 
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(A) au %%us&- aha13 pay to or mly far the " 
beqorit sf ZAIGASF 'PYRI aa mu&-& thr net b a m  OF 
TBV8T I as' lkusbra, in taptr discnrtion, d m  
noaassazy o r  d..irablo for t&r p r & p r  hasla,  axmaxt, - Pnd -of ma&& b&iJa?qf, prooided .uch 
pay!nu&s az incab nh.Ll ao+3 px- m TXOUSARD m- 
($5,Ct00.00) fo hny g i v ~  CaSU%Ua y s o r r  
iii)  ha zmmtsu a h u ~  pay t o  or apply For r~lo 
benorit oP LljFg ~U~NTES 80 a ~ r h  or the n m E  Lnosnnr o?! 
TB.WS2 I an tho hrust.es, in thrir Qircrstion, d m  
nacos8a.q or dlariixable for tha propor haalth, sagpoxt, 
ckza and akFaCs- or such.bearticirucy, prrrrideri such 
gaymeats ot incame sha3.l n o t  axcaed PrPII l'EOUaAtn) DOLLAS 
($3, ooo,oo) in sny g i v a  ckl- p(1tf 
(fii) The Trcurteert @hall skly to or nm;~fy 
for the bureiit of EZ!l% ggadB2 so amoh crt tar nr% incar. 
of XsZUell I u thr !cmateor, in d?lrcratido, d s e ~  
I n=*saaV d ~ i r a b l a  for fhr, 2mpoc -?A, eupgort, 
c a r *  end nai.nkanaaer 02 aueh b-tSa111.ry1 pzwidkd euch 
pirmb of &all not -ad FIVS T i i O U s m  WW 
(5stooO.Qo1 hi WY qivm catan- y e w ;  
(iv) bdLmcr or fbr Wt irrmas of %XIST 3 
not paid or &U.M ss &do- g-id.d .aeh y-, 
shell br irm=maala- and aMad to d a i g b l .  Vpcm thr 
daath oi *a of Zrh* brpttipfarlcre' na;med f;r* thl. 
sabar&cm 4.2(01, tbs Z m d b u  aball tmuf11: h-op 
* 
W S T  I to TRUST 1l (as pnrcridrd b swb68&ion 4 .z(d) ) 
onm-thimS (1/3) ai thr vatu, o f  r-inksg -+ss in 
TRUQT I (an than c d f u ' c e d ) .  . lbhu XTusbesra, la ae l r  
discxetion, h 3  cbaPsr Prb;Cch surta +o tcnruiss. PpM 
tho h t b  ar  u or thr boar+icirrri.o fa thia 
-ion 4.2(13) ,  the' ae&tn os * ~ l t 0 5 ~  X ,  a5 ttran 
c0arrr1M.d~ ishall be -Fartad to !PIitST XI. 
(d) 22r. w-aa -1 sGtsbr,ieh a -t 
ahare, duigar td  TIWSZl a, tn caaeirt: OZ tba hdlanca 02 tbs 
crust estate r- after satief action oil thp prnvf sFons arl 
Srction 4 . 1  of taio wt Agxemmab sab*uct%On* [al 
through (c) of thf* Section 4.2. 120 TrusCses all hold, 
=-tar and distribute the assets of PB~ST a ae a eaparcte 
trust aa hareinalter provided. 
t i )  a tha avant thrt the r iusCasrs sari, 
~ C X A X Y  COB;LRt &&ill have mwiv& the W e o r ,  and prior 
ta t b  ti30 Vbea be shall have atOkFnOd thr agr oi F i i f y  
Y-, +he -aa will pay to oz apply z+o r bbarwfit 
Of t3.0 TXWhYras  && S M  U*9Mty mucpnt (70*J o i  tho 
m t  o i  WET XI, garter-annually or at lnom 
gr.ga- ht-6. lh additfoa, tbo ~ 0 0  ahau pay 
to 0% awly for the banefit of thr Trustpzea oPid aon MI 
EUcb 02 the prfruEiga2, oi m T  IL' (but nut in w;cooss or 
amanW 5-t [ l o l l  o f  tha prlaoipal as trurn 
~ a s t i t u t t w ~ )  as the in arir d~scretion; 4- 
mc*a@ury tor  ths F r a u  health, NOPQ*, ear. and . 
mahtcmauaa OX thO -Truutar*u B(L$& adll. Ilra Trtmtees 
sihaI.1 pry Co or apply tot: the bonptit of 'J!xuskcrz16 ai-, 
~~~, o r h r r ~ ' i f . h r s h a l l n o t r t u u z  
,170 living, d i r t y  parpat (30a) oz 811112: hcxam af 
TXDST XI Quatt~ramro6t iy  or it imajre rmqamt i n m s .  
X n  bddft ia,  the l%~&+ra ulmll, pay to or apply t o r  the 
F t u u Z t  ot  tho hostor's aaid n i w a  clo muah of k b  
p r  o f  rBaST II (We not - i n  -rr of tbLfp 
per- C 30+1 of. the grhcipaL m thw corrPtitu%ad) as 
the Truataero, in mix discretion, dwa naceaeuy i o t  the 
progar hpiltb, sugport, c a r s  end me;intananc* of the 
hTuharla saia niaca. 
(ii) Hhar the Trwtor'a son, ZsCBBXY C O W ,  
ohall a t t a b  tho rga o#! ti= y m s ,  %'RUST XI shall 
twainate, and s m t y  parcams (lo*) 02 M a  txu& ~ s t a % o  
o f  ERU6T XZ then on hurd sha l l  re diskxfhttlard to tha 
!L%&sa~'s said son outright and trre of tgurt, sad th- 
psrcant (301) r t t  ths eutata o f  AT XI than an 
hurCl .hall be dL&ibutad to Tmskm?8s 'nfwa, 8AXmU 
BSlZXE XZLLER, cnxtrl@~t and frpr of trut. (Phl Txustblll 
shall bavo b i ~ f a t i o n  t o  chaare tha MS& tO be ; 
diatrizruted to MQ. 
(U) ~ h r  .&& t h ~  mustor's' aan, 
CVWAU, sim1.1.~ yrFctr to atiaininq age of ti- 
y-, liavhs then. Living ioouo, the 7!SWt.ss r ~ l  
dleibnea tho fmtim~ trast mta--0 of 'PPnST IS thaa on - 
hnaa seventy percent ( lo*)  to tbr than livlng iaaue at 
ZAC%ZUW m., bg right 02 rogrpa.z)tacian, frlrc of Trudc, 
th* pmant (30.~)+o thrr m o r l a  n i w ,  
immn~ a i  p~opi-, 6, ia tbl) t ha t  a s  
muswr#s nplcl niece net a l.tvl.ng 8% %Em Ute oi 
any d i s t r $ , b u t i o n  pursuant to t h i s  
aubporaqraph 4.2 (d) (iii) , hor share or the txnsi: e s t a h  
or TRUST XI ~ w i  be t o  her m i i ~ ~ n g  b s u e  
by right 02 Zsprru1~1tation f ~ a r  of tm&. 
(iv) In thr e m t  that: !iSAaQRY CCIWAW shall die 
prior ta actaflllag tha age of Zifty years, vitnout livlzrg 
issue, the Trustees 6t1ipall dlrtrfbutr tha antire wt 
estate o f  TRUST 11 to  S m  EZL851?1 irsa of trust 
urci it aha S'hrTl not be li-ring a t  tha datm of 
asL-i!atlon, thr +a~& h t a  s k i a l l  be diskxibutad to 
tha l iv ing issue oL smma EELEEi EXZiXE by ri&t of 
rnpresant*tfon, frao or wt. 
4.3 If, at the time of tha ~ r l s  bath, or at any 
latar tiatP BWSOZ1 fU2.l dt.+ribUtf~~ 0% t h e ' m t  eEhC8,  
CDWAN, tW?nRA XssLZlm XBTdLER and all of! Cbrir tsar aro docwied,  
ins w other  dbpaaltion o f  the hn;st eatntta i s  dFnct*d h-.in, 
the uruar -tats, or t h  Bortion of It. than -iaing, 3uZ1 
th6tey)oa br d.i.atributod to  on* o t  nrozo chkiW.a chosra Fa Wan 
dLncmkUon 03 ths mta~b ,  subject to tLu liai+rtioo on mch 
didc=r+iw at: mch witf~li be -rid eltiol), a ~ i  -i& in 
Soctioa 170 of tbe In te rn4  P.ev-m 6 aL 19116- .- 
4 .C Any prwisiono. of a hvfft w-t t o  -6 
'wmimuy notviumaadiq ,  Lri th* rv.rrt that any olar t r  of trurr* 
helU p-wmt to tha proylsiona of tbSe part .W-t k e  
&t-able to's )ka&ioi&y MdU, th. sgr of ~ - a i a a  (71) 
y-xs, +- Tr-%oum -1 retalu CUED. u8* t fO  in a further tamst for 
benefit o f ,  PUCIS bsneficikty. Thr 'huoteos ahdl1 pay t o  or . , 
apply for tho benaflt of suoh -c lc i~=y  eo nrpCh o f  thd a& 
be-, &* ~=incfpw. o+ tLe tZurr UFCat- zta the Trunk-, f n  
their bi*cration, doem ==nary, rac the ?rope  hodlth, assport, 
&t-ce oad education ot lr(l~h ~ i c i a r y ,  s e a r  taRttg . . 
into a@wusf, to tbr e m t  tar l 9 ~ 1 , ~ t . e ~  dorm groper, cay income or 
other reeoutcsa of such ban&icfaxy outside this t m s i ,  Xnovrr t o  
'f'F.Wtees. When gUCb hanaficiary ~ttsins the age of hraaty-one 
(23) Y-s, the Rustaa xhall dlgttibtatr tcJ ~ u c h  b s r ) . f i a i q  the 
i._nthe kmsk 83tatu thmn hold for his or her b a n i i t .  fro* ot 
tXlmt. If a ~ c h  blk~~~S ic iary  -1 &ib b4$!01~1 f~t ( l iv*  c0mploC1 
&ahpution of the tnzot e~tata set aaido fox U s  hl h a  banpi i t  
bs?amadar, tha hurrtPori  Bhrrll  dl8tZibUta the balanoo o i  the truar 
estate to suah p ~ r ~ c a o  ax o a t i t l o r r ,  and an N& to= taa 
condttiona, dthar outright or i a  m, ao bsnoiieiary shall 
dr*ignar+r in hi8 os her last Rill acraitccd f o  probate by a court of 
sUAP~~&U~*  j U X i a & o t l r  O E ~ G $ ~ ~ Q  # j  to -8 Of 
appoi.n%aank. In Uio *clpnf i+t wch .bensriciary #hall, f a i l  t o  
*-is* such p o w  of! appeintment, thn t h o e m  stud1 bL*ClzSlauta 
b a l m  at. tbd t n m t  u 6 t l l t  to th.. tbn living ~ B U O  0; pry3r 
bonsfioiuy, by ri@t ol: &wwrnta+i~a, or ,  in a br+anlt * 
*&asaof, to t h s ~  +hem Living bsue of t2m parmts frcnr *a spch 
bsneiiailuy nrs d a c m d r d ,  by right ot raaruerstatioa. 
'URaWkli skovxazm 
5.1 Lf tha aharr or s.parate k t  hrld for any fnoama 
. b&afioiay of a tr;rs+ held ~-t &sto han, a t  any &, in 
t h ~  o g ~ o i  of tha V ,  a $air -at VBLUL so. law, in 
a d a t i o n  to rbo wets o i  adminlstratioa -&real. that conthuaaca 
e3 the txust punmwt t o  i t s  t.mrs riLl &fat or substantially 
hspair the a a t . ~ T ~ t  02 a s  porgossa of the  t r u s t ,  the 
L - - i s s t a ~  MY, in tboir (Uscr~tien, hut s o  not m p i r e d  to, 
'ecaxiaate mch L x  rJld, reqardlsss of  the aqs 02 such 
bsmf i - iuy ,  Qf8l;ibute the prinefpsl and ony tacruad or 
und.irrtributad 140011~e thuaof  to a& ban&icisry, or hL, 9~k'6im, 
conearvator. OX o t b a ~  riilualary. 
S , l  Ohlass Khanax taminatad fa sceo3durca w i t h  ocher 
provisions hereof, trust haLd b4ta1~der  &lt t e t ~  
.hrmty-one (21) yssss e a t  the dea* of tbs lant rrurvivmt a i  tbr 
t a x  tb. 'Pnu%ar'o aieca, SIIMIEUI E m  xlmm., acrid these or 
tba issue of Z3LCEARY or S X m R a  J$IIXEX ZCSLGS whc a m  living 
at the dauth of the l!rs&.or. U;1 princiml and rmdirGibatad 
incame o f  any t m n t  so .(arminartad &L be distributed to tho then 
booloo b r a r f i ~ i e ~  of tbat trust in the propolctian~ irr w h i c h  t h e y  
' *  
are, at the t h e  o f  t rmfna t fon ,  iatitld tn roealve the i-a. 
5 .3  Tbr X r c u t m s s  m y  ~ u t h o r i c r  .& use of %uatorRs - 
residence lout& on san ARtcuiiq Iload, Caznel, Wrli fomis,  and the 
' f u m i m  and Snxd.hLyls tharwf, m t  muah t b .  for su& parin&, 
and on such t e m ~ ~ ~  and +t iom ka thm 2mutirrs may dekrtliaa, by 
any 01: thb f o L 1 0 ~ ~ :  6- COWllll ZUld his f a ~ ~ S y ,  I%UW?A ETLEKH 
ICmLER ahd brc rnsfsy, aIld'sARmzr=g czwma azrrP hi. t d 1 y . .  At any 
time +t IA5amz C E U ~  b, w t b g  aa a w t s a  or W s  must 
agra*att bo is banaby spcoi$icdLLy axatko~irod ta ~ t a i n  skid  
rcsidance and fta iSunitura and furaish.tncp as assatn 02 ths trust 
as-, s m g a m d ~ ~ s  01 19y ~ o s o u  tho t r u s t  or its bureficiariae xmy 
s u Z X e r  by v i m  o r  said retantloa, t o  occupy said rolridencs urd 
u t i l i z e  itrc S t w a  turnl&hgs.ror hi8 p u ~ o n a l  use aad t&i: 
of other mambars of his f d l y ,  an& is raliavrrad of the rtffact o f  
m y  ma a l l  provlrrlona oz icw ro*lddhg ; m t a e  from d d -  
w i t h  t%a aasats of c trust estata for his parrtom account and 
rrr*liaing any gsirr or profit -ham 5ucb daalk~qa, as ach p r ~ ~ i ~ i o n s  
of lav rslatr t o  d d  f u i d e n e s .  
I -z1m ar mixncrg;arrts 
6 The iut-st of o*ch h-iiclarg Fa t$o w 
psfnaipal 02 sag trasrt held pornuurt huretcr abalZ be fr- f m m  the 
S'2n-1 0s lnt-- o f  m y  sx.ditw Of meti b 8 n r f i a i q  apd 
l kC?W tha C & e  02 bluding any i%v of bush b a % e i i d f q .  
Tba intarear of 8aih bomzic* $hall not ba wzbjPcr to 
a+=trrct=-%, ~ - t lm, ,  q s m i m h a ~ ~ ~ t ,  e l a h  wUnq trosl proeesdhgs 
in DamkzwCcy or slly othe 2- oil lglrl sr. o&tUIxr 3.q  .)l.i*. 
!Elm h** at .a& brru+icluy 'balL not ba sW'c.ptib1. to 
C ' .  
&ifigation aLlanatioa and any attampk to antfoipate ar 
'trmrfer a tr&t W c a r u t  8 W  bp vu$d md inntfaativo. 
7 . 1  Trust hwm aPP prfncipfi)dl &strfbntahLr to a 
ben*fichw & be paid btrec;ff.y tu a bula;dfciary or may bm ipplird 
to a'' 'baa~fiel~ry~s u * and 'hpllol&t a s  the &tr~ d- 
appmprlatr . Bny bmaeilicfary who i m  bcaw~itatad tat- -fllnru, 
age 0" 0 t h ~  c- mzry h A  the a d  p ~ ~ n c i p a 2  to v h ~ k  ha i s  
~ t f t l o d  applied t~ hirr b8naflt. Illc- or prFncipal dietribratable 
t o  er b-ficiaxy mi& aey be aubf.ct .to rvocution ar Larry when 
received by me lmnslliciary may be agp1i.d ta such b e n o t i c i a r y * ~  
bulomit. tny ou& applicat3oa ai! hcanm or prinoipal ahall be rmdp 
on such O C C E S ~ ~  W in such c h m a ~ o z  rs the !Pru8tba dam aehrfsable 
asd may inclufh pavpwnt to a b~neZ&atary p w U y  o r  t o  o'chther 
perrfons d agpropriste by tbe Tmataos. The +ra+lpt oP Use 
b e n . ~ C i c i a x y  at e a r  ~WBOPLI to Wo* bistributfra, f?, mdp ahail b* 
a c m q l r t e  diueiwtg* o t  tLir lXtwZ8ut n~pauslbllities. 
far tnurt, accapatiaq, +u aad a U  ,othmx e s o s .  pta %%us-, 
" r 
dwam be oqda1 ta that h z u t l a  mpsa ioa l rh  con*iiautioa 50 
' L A W T O  t x r ? m w ~ a T  
9.1 %hi8 CZU.t i s  lYlQ LI). &irornfn anQ .MI.' br 
g-, ooluctrud d' -~rd ameudiag. to  ~alifora*fa l a w  
wen tbouyh a&&.nistdlrrd d8rVh.G. The Ca3,ifsnrFa lxwvb applird 
sh8U not iadLudo any pkitxtiplu ex laws ralating to  coatlhha or 
&laic* of laum. 
Such cccmt  &aLl be made vhea v t e d  by the Trustor. m 
~CGOUO+&%~ truJt bmne inky ba distributad. X l  brneiioiwipr 
entitled to an aclcoonW ah rfnora, th&t c c ~ ~ ~ k b g  bhali b. 
cielivuud to their p a r a t s  or gnadian. 1f banaiicikiaa antitzsd 
t o  an accauating are LunplcltrtPa, thntr 8aoou.n &b g ahall be 
d e I . i v 6  to theix ~anrr~stor, quatdLrn ar the d o n  car* far 
such beneficiary. 1Jal.s. the aGosontFng is objectad to in  writing 
irix+y-fivr ( 65 )  &ye qtfw mailill~j. ke tbo ~ M O P I  to vhum the 
a-oMUng is ta ba rsndermd (except eccpuathge rmduod to tha 
) the a m *  sM1 hr &uu;p iinaZ and cunclw~vo in 
srrpoct to all - k x a n s a d ~ ~ ~ ~  dhe losd  in M1 hawuaktns.  Th.. 
I 
accauntiag 0ba$1 be binding an persons i $ t u ~  in the tnrprr, 
blading beneficfsriu vbo ars not 1r;nawr or who are not y*t born. 
C 
YO bPlUIziciEury .&img FLL. oon~uzXC?kL~ with tho 'ENpt(H. shall ha- 
'the POT t~ al tm or 8amad t b ~ k m m t  by a~fIOVilf of LR account*. 
a, th. %mstafrr, a f  tha txw& h-. .. . . 
L1.2 an the &a*, ruipat ioa  or incapacity O f  
U X o ~  I .  CaWAti, LWR7lHCX CmMXti shall ssrra 8s tha solo Trwtsa 
hasetandex. am the Qaatb, resignation or incapacity of  WInmtt?I33 
death, rrsignation or iacapacity of :altbu .A. COXM Or 
ROaKgP, &lNJHOoKW, a t  a tfols vhon LWRlmC8 (IBAI;XB 18 not s w i n g  no c 
Trustam bez~undar, the WaWB FaRaO m, W.A. shrll asrve aa 8 
Trustee, or M the sole T r u s f a e  heraunhar. 
11.3 Y o r  Qurp08oJ 09 the inta-zpr*tatiun 05 tf l is tzrusc,  
the h c a ~ c i t y  of humtor ,  or oi a %%U1~t88 to s u v e  as 
Z2unt08, nhall bo -clUs%valy eakablishod try the vrittPa 
oortificat~on or  YO ( 2 )  pwei(;m att&;dfag -or or 
Trus tee  tbat 5ucb Trustor er x m d ~  is usable t o  m s ~ g e  h i s  otm 
af ta i rs  or thorn of tbr trust. 
11.4 A amwtw& aey r u l g n  by, gi- writton notice oL 
t e s i s ~ a t i o n  to a l l  of tpl -t in- brPBiicieriea or' eh& 
guarrztans o r  by filing tba appmpriaqe pstitibn w i t h  the &uis , 
jurirdickion war th. trum. I11'Ch4 o i  ruignation,  
the r a s i r m ~ a g  w t . o  e~ cosoay u u ~ t  -tats t2 the 
docriqmtoa swcs~oor - 
11.8 xo band shall be reqtxfxed OL any 'Rsutaa mmad 
berafn. 
11.6 XO puocewar Tmustee &all bh ob2igatad to nrrr-ar.lne 
or r r v t r w  thr aoaopatr, w e n t  or of  uq prrvioru, TrUStOB. 
A hVstara W l  lm ~ n s t b l o  m y  f o r  his ovn acts or Oatsaions 
Uaiah axe g r w m l y  nsgligortt ar made L1 bad faith. 
2.z-7x0 a anring viCb ua* - pbaZ b q u k m  
concsrnFng tha v~lidtty oZ any aetl.om of eueh Tw8taoa. 
! 
11.8 %a !Prusbari may rocaive riaasanable co~lpaaaatLan aad 
xoiaburaamant f a t  aYgcns-a. 90cp ~ 0 1 9 m t i o n  anC r e ~ u m e m e n 2  
for uepsnats -11 be paid Z m  md mb&1 be a progar.orgsnse of 
the Wt. 
P Q m  OF TIrd .l'sm-. 
12.1 Tha T N s t a o ~  S W l  have, w i t h  mqmct to a l L  
Pro , V h t h ~  ~1 o? V-, Yhi~h m y  at W uTY( held 
htrrctundas, including any propmy hald lor a &or, memar 
eonstitutbg principal or a-ulatod h o p r e ,  the toilwing povora 
riqhts, vhlah may h aan:icud in the %%u&aea4 b i c d i o a  a t  
any tfmO nna from tlal CO Cfme auring th41 c o n ~ C 8  of any tzzU5.t 
herounder and =ti1 ochraL dlaixtbqticus 05 &I proputy: 
a To rstain any paxt  9f tbm trunt praperty coining 
tat0 thetr pauuorr*icrn, Zor maah' 1- oz cLnrP aa tPay may 
t 
da~ln WWhab+e mad viaoot diversf fiation. 
(b) To vote, and to give prprina tD v&, any 
m 
securlrlee having voting k i e t s ,  +a pay any arausmm%t laviod 
upon utook and to uaniar any r%gbt or option +o 
aubsaiptioa, c~nvansion or othsmiro mothieh nay at any t i m a  
attaatt, bat- o r '  bs gfvsvl to r;hr huldua oz ury s-, 
bond., usPrlti.o, or erthu imtmmes irL nay natura th6-f 
ionairrg p e t  of thr tnut estata. 
( 0 )  To join in any plan ot lacoo, awrtrJago,  
consolidation, conrbLurUon, rscrganization, bissolution, 
iorecloaurs, oi apitaAircatlon, or o t h v  caanga of 
o C r u d u r r  st any cprpacation, trust, cr oxganiaatien, ex the 
proparty or asset6 tburaof i to deposit bonds, &oaks, cV 6- 
sacuritiee he ld  by that w i t h  any protacxtiva o r  similar 
~ d t t b o ,  trad to trrYce uul hold nay nusuritiert i5auaQ h 
uonneation tborovith and to pay any asmaumantn tbmmdmr. 
(d) To ' o o x c 8  m y  m&qapa or dead of tnuC or 
p l d q s  held hikmmdw and to purchase at my sale thprrundar 
cny proper ty  suhjeut Wareta. 
and to make loas aad a&anwauatr, arcurd or unrreaurmd, t o ,  
the exeoaar OX other repmwmtativr 02 ths Trustor's atfiretr. 
(L) To wmagr, s ~ p t x o l ,  643 at pfglis mr privafO 
sale tor cash or on exedifS, citner u$tl or withput notlei, to 
cemey, ecmBange, partition, , 8ubUivFdr, mnrtgago, 
SdQdQP, *1"4.0, M X d  X ' O P A h l  to -0 0&.0~1i %O 1- fW . . 
bx3wS w l k h b  or rrtuxiizlg beyond tho ~ t l o n  o f  aoy';rud, 
for  any puqmer, hclwlfag r x p l o n t i o n  tos and rrParal o i  ill1 . 
gas or oil, aad to ante into uay covenants or a w a n t r  
relating to propazCy ao laad or .ny inrpmv.lauat8 wht& nay 
then oz thu*aftar h. eraate4 theraccl. , 
($1 TO -r, maksat t  ta a r b i ~ ; t r ~ L o n .  r e L ~ a a r  
aria or uithout aonsldsraUon, ar uthawfu ad$turt; claw in 
favor ca agaj.net any trust: to ~ i t u t e l  wmpmsi*.~, 
defend aOtioM and -. 
(h) To.carry mcb auranca  aa tba Tnu$teua may 
deem advisable as an e x p a a  of tbe trostr- to pay prsninrss mul 
othsT a e a b a m ~ t a  on any lifa i.nmmmcd caatrkct Wch ray at . . 
kny t h e  b* held hersunder. . . 
(i) To invat and rainvat any prop6uty he3.d 
heraundar, including accumulatad incon-, in sudh emaunts and 
in each pzoperty , re& or perclonal , as mat Tzustaas fihtll dem 
tit and p r o w .  
PUrpoae, won Poch tannr uld, cwditioao ss thi Truvtsur may 
a@- propor, ~ n d  to abligaw the erast ltw rspnyMnt) to 
ancmpbor aqy oi! tru t r r u t  property by tortqaga, dud at trtlnt, 
pladqe, or othemisr. 
(k) Zb hold any proparty Sa thek nrnrs aa 
h'uatnes, or in Ohr Tzustee8 OM uamen, or in the amsaa 02 
*a w . c u t  aontnca, ar G i s t a r c 4  such that 
title shall pss by d e l i v ~ .  
, .. 
(1) TO wcounqrel aad corpw~to or other agm& 
Ma to pay t2ranr 4 reaaahabXr cmqmsatimr fo a d  on advice or 
wuneu incur. no 1m;tlity i& ~g a n i o n  t a m  ox 
i!man A t  to 'e a~pio.; 
(01 . ihLtT10~t,t0 the ap;;utia tlrat.th=S coludlldatioo 
.,&all .not dspUoy the sepaxattr iburtity of tha trt~St., t o  
~ o ~ a 1 i d a t . 1 ,  fox PWBO o f  admjliiatzattoa and InveatQaat, 
thr p r q q  of ulo aevaxpl b-ruts ~ t r d  hanky and to 
alrocora ondivided i a t m w ~ t a  in eolidatpd rund to tha 
srr . ra l  Crusts. 
fa) To buy, eaU. end t m d e  in saaurikiui of any 
natuxr, l;aeLuding optloas, 8hort st i les,  on w i n ,  cnd for 
auch purgoaes t o  maintain ~d Dperatq wfn a c c ~ ~ r l b  with 
brakRz-6, and t o  pledge ong a m x i t i a s  held or ~ & ~ a d  
&ern vith 6Uch kakawa u saeurity io~  l a w  end acivcylclse. 
( 0 )  To do aL1 suQI aetr, -6 aLL s u c h ~ n  
a d  rax=oZa- IJI -Eh TS-t.s bM privilagas, dLth~ugh llatthet 
specifiaally h e x b b f a r e  ~rontiond nar oDniv~rd tllom by 
raw w i t h  rslatloa to nueh p~pp- w if tlls absolute -m 
'&u-t - tn =OM.Ft+an t h m r a l i t h  to *far i n to  (UIY 
c w ~ ~ n t s  or agrranwtn b- the .- e&ate. 
12.2 ZS, e a t  emmCLtatibl? ' w i t h  'oar 'amath*r, th.; 
Tlruatees srr un8bla to agrae vlth o w  mwtltw regarding azry m n t t u  
~neoting . ~ u  a w m t i m  m: dis=*ts~n thr &to, 
dedeioa of  teDmm% h. cowm, Whilo rrhr ia  sarvhg as =re, - 
shall  gctvam. L B O & ~ ~  A. WWW rjhall sbvise ttra Z r m t w  serving 
'bur, in tnnritfng, oil har deainirsa, anb ntd - -11 rarp&y 
w i t h  elm d s i . i o n  o f  mmm% a. COP851. Buaevar, mch -toe 
ahal.1 not be liablr to pny w o n  LOT tho 8&ion of Leamatt& A. 
C W t M  a5 t0 SU& &(Ic~$.FuI~. 
Notvithatuding ehia $&ion 12. a, thr tmmt shnll be 
bowd to third parti- by Cbo actfons of any mutea of a trust 
held pursuant tp thi. Il-uat -*mat. PWr a&im WE- by 1L 
rmatea ahall be bfnding upon tha tWIt ertrte and nay br n l i e d  
upon by thMBaafcs tteaXbg wit& +a0 trruf. without 1LmitLng tha 
g @ - n e i t Y  of ths foreqo*, the 'Trustau  arm r p r o i t i d y  
aaaorlzed to dapoeit and r r f thdrow ~ u t r ~ l s r  *rrp ba&, M V ~ E  and 
L o a n  ud othar  acoomta PLFa+sLrad by the truot, md to or11 ar 
gurcluur arreta of tho ?mz& estate, upon tbs anthoritatfon 02 eny 
one Pzwtee bxeof. 
B . 3  On anp aivfslion m i  the txuat vatz~b  trz partial or 
I fiaal di&r&ution o f  irhr trust a&at;P, th4 ?xeust1ea seg' O L l ~ c ~ t r c  
tao M utab in &vided h r - b  or fn kfhd,' as ]partly in 
money and part ly  fn kind it valua.CC- nrasoaibly datezninod by ths 
Traatrss. X n  d * r g  8wAs allws8ti0pr, *a rTU*bwi -1 Rot be 
~ o q u l r e d  fo mka a ~ r a t . t . a  bifttibu++ion of.,rtrs trust estate but say 
nrake r non-prorata dlocation pmvfdoQ tha k m t s  ie.boatrd to m u a h  , 
boner iciary hawe qpiPICZIVlf: OE. propo+ioaa~  d u e .  
12 - 4 A l l  mat- detarnclnstione of, allocatf ens 
to and charqua hpainnt princfpal Plld W g  the 1ftet.ime of . 
tba 'Emator shall. h. ~ + m o r n e d  by UUr PrinaiprU, end ar- M: of 
9- or cdf io rn la  ia o r r d  a t  th. tlnu 02 aa& ;ha 
d ~ ~ ~ o n  insoiar: sll such A& is appl ica~la .  A l l  -+tare 
ragardinB datez&zuti& mf, allaca*ione b & -as q a h m t  
principal and folloving t2.m 7mstar45 doat& rVurll ao 
goveraod by the PriamipdL aad zhcime M o f  ttm Plat0 of &izor~ia 
in eLfeioct: at  the data of hsr death, iruPiax as much %ct h 
aggliurbir . 
12.5 Eny TlraETreaa by f i l ing wittap aotico Fn tZlc rpcords 
of the trust End giving nc#ica to a l l  currant beneficicrfss of ths 
trust MY eurrPnder, dirrdaim or ralclsir any right;* pavers or 
dZseretion gzax~bod t o  s ~ i d  hustaes of thtg -. Such ecticm 
ahall be i ~ o c a b l a  ~ to ouch -teen. 
12 - 6  !k%r R u a t b ~ ,  4m aurborixad to a l loca t .  any portion 
o f  tha l%ustozfs wnatatfon-6kipping l%ixsrrz 'bur (mm) xxvmption, 
at; prsJanr @uUiorlc%d bp 6&an 2631 o f  trha Iaatemal RavenUe CcQ, 
vhlch remaim unolloaat& a t  tbo t k r  or th* lkwtorls aaath. 
12.7 The % ! ~ R Q S S  y o  autborizad to dtvidr any kust 
ccratr~d heseundet i n to  se~prptr twte o f  property exempt frbm the 
w n  anel p q w  -js;ct to . ~ b a  ~ h a ~ i  h a ~ a  
a c r e t i o n  bo gay or apply inawn or pr$nclgal of any txust . ' 
dfvldpa to any beneficiary horwitb to savs GSlT or 0th- taxlo. 
i 
PA* OP TnxEs 
13.1 aL1 inhuikraoa, aatafe or 0 t h ~  death taxes, and 
m 
any gmarution-Pximiag traarfu tuac, t b t  may, Dy ra-n of the 
of Trustor, be attributable t o  t;bs Trn&or's prubake eeata ,  
or sny porttoa of it, o r  to any proplc;Sr . t ia l~  purruant ZO or 
or as a aosnequsnee of t h  Tzajeorpo &.a+&, shaU, be paid by the 
DeRHl?l?ONB' lLRD XULW O? C~NS'.~T~€~CL!ION 
PO= pUEPQE04 Oi -8 i.l~l&ruWtnt, d l l i M t 5 ~ 0  Of ' E Q * ~ X ~  
terms and rules aP ceneCrsctzfon are providrd. 
14.1 Raf!wences to mirrman moqn' leuht2 daaoendantk in the 
firs*, S Q O Q ~ ~  OX pny achu degree or  the --tor d a s i g ~ t e d .  
14.2 A logally adopted child v h ~  pha at tb- date a3 
edoption wade th* ago gf oightorrn (18) yerrr and such cd~pttbed 
cllild'e t a m  dasamdanta by bbLood o r  adoption khnll ?a# o a n s i d a d  
as Lavful descmidants 02 tha adopt* pammtt~ and of  mywe vho la 
by blood or adoption an urmutor of adoptinq pat'antr. 
14.)RsSUW2Oa# tc "6h€fPan O f  "~0Z"otl" f I I )  
b e a ~ ~ f i c i a r p . ~ ~ ~  r o w i o n d l  ~o dbkamiwd by'* tsnaa aad 
CQnditiom or a0 ills-. 
1 4 . 4  f ( lZaX4DU tO -OIOCU~OX* OX " ~ w ; o c u ~ o ~ '  'ZUldU CLU 
executor, axacuttix, ad~&~iSitrator, . a & h ~ ~ i w .  perroad 
representatf.ve or other parson or perauna chaxgad with the 
remponufbi3.ity roc the aUnAal.strathn 02 the T ~ W ~ O X ' S  grohate 
.t. 
uprar.a. 
14- s Rsi~rcncae ko_ *oduoationa lhall mean srcloadatxy, 
cellega, e t a  and poek-qsaauata study at public or private 
ina~ . t s t ioar .  
14 .6  miteno thr a t e +  clam%y mquixa anathrv 
c a a s t ~ d a n ,  tho meocrrllne, iaa5alna aM nautXu geadprr -1 *a& 
include Um othmrc, and tho rlbgulat aad plural sciprbcrs shall 
include the o'ctter. 
14 .7  X i  any prrntisiclj or provisiora of t h i e  inrtrrmrnr LP 
fnWt.Lid o r  MPniorceablat tae reaa- prsviaions s W l  c.~lthu-  
to 'ba fully oger(ltive.' 
I certify that I hmra read the 33392 R~~atirtwm?it. OF the  
Lconarda A. Cowu, T r w t  oi: 1982 and Uxit it corredly";t~~k.s the 
held, edainiltarad aad blrrtributaj. by the W t r o * .  I approve of 
tho tzvst and r-et Uuk tho hut.- it. 
4 
r California thia 3 +- -
dry ar 
WIE, xsoaaana A. cotmu apd h c n  -, +he m m i a  
o f  thrr Tfrurt A q l c r c ~ a r t t  02 Leo- A. 'cam?, h a v w  reviawad thr 
re-, oz the taurt, M contn~~ud ~n tho rimst and 
. .  
~ b t e u m n t  $ssroil, aocr* ud agrw +rr in b o a  by tiw 
. -
#eat.&& 
On thslri &day as -, wsz, bserP mr, tha 
ma-tgned, a ZTOWUY m i +  ~n arrd tor srott, prrrsoaally 
appeared tXmEHcE aiiwm, ly knuva to ru (ox p m d  te O. 
on ths bagis of apnesww--) to b~ tbh PIIPQn a . 8  - 
is 6Ub;CWfbUI to t h m  within im&xmmat, Prrd ac3wavLldg.d to m e  thct 
.she sY.acut& Uu o;armo. 

LEOWAlU?A A COWAN and LAWRENCE'c&%W, TN,- af tha TNa Apemuat 
dexribGd*hatby-*uuiwdu-r**un. 
SfATEaFW);LIPOXMA . 1 
) 0, 
COUNTY QP SAN FRANCISCO) 
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LAST WILL & TESTAMENT 
ZACaARY A. COWAN 
I, ZACHARY A. COWAN, of Declo, Cassia County, Idaho, publish and declare 
this to be my Last Will and Testament revoking all othcr and former wills and codicils that )nay 
have been msdc by me. 
i2LwS.J - 
I am single. I have no childwL 
AU of my property is my separate property. It is my intention by this Will to 
dispose of all property which I am entitled to dispose of by will, community and separate, real 
personal and mixed, which I may own or hzve any intatst in whatever at the time of my death. 
!2u?s%u 
APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REp-Am 
I nominate and ~4 
.. ,.,2: . , 4 1 
estate. In the event Stephen D. ~ & d  should I 
Personal Representative, then, in such event, I appoint Mary Killings, Heybum, Idaho, as the 
Personal Representative of my estate. I direct that the Personal Representative and alternate 




- 1 - 
EXHIBIT 2 
CLAUSE 3 
POWERS OF TJZ PERSONAL WRESEWATNE 
My Personal Representative is autbonzed and empowered to exercise all powers 
in the management of my estate that any reasonable and prudent individual would exercise m the 
management of e l a r  property owned in my Personal Representative's own right, upon such 
t e rn  and concYirions as may seem b a t  to my Personal Representative, and to execute and deliver 
any and aU rastruments and to do any and all acts which my Pmonal Representative may deem 
necessary or proper to cany out the purposes of this Will. 
CLAUSE 4 
DIRECTIONS TO PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
I direct that m y  body be cremated with no services. I direct that my friend, Bob 
Soninger, shall be responsible for the ashes. My ashes shaU be spread over Carson City, Nevada 
brothels. 
CLAUSE 5 
DISPOSITION OF CERTAIN PERSONAL PROPERTY BY SEPARATE WRITING 
I order and direet that tmta& &&@ p&tpef@ @ha% be distributed 
according to a written list of  items and intended recipients thereof prepared either in my 
handwriting or signed by me, if such a list is in existence at the time of my death. 
a A U S E  6 
tiiA%mB 
All of the rest, residue and remainder of my property which I own or have any 
interest in whatevn at the time of my death, other than bmoficial interests in trust.;, I give, 
bequeath, and devise to the American Can= Society. All beneficial interests that I have in any 
trusts I give, bequeath, and devise to Uary Killings. I exercise any power of appointment that I 
might hold and appoint Mary Killings. If for any reason Mary Killings predeceases me, her 
interest and the power of appointment s8all pass to Stephen D. WmtMl. 
IN WITNESS w'klERBQF, I have hercum set my hanil and seal thisw f-/l 
day of ma$ 2005. 
The foregoing instrument, consisting of four (4) pages, including the page signed 
by the undersigned witnesses, was, on the date thanof signed, published and declared by the 
above-named Zachary A. Cowan, to be his LIIS?-W~ and Testamat, in the presence of us, who, 
at his request and his presence and in the presence of tach other, and on the same date, have 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) 08 
County of Cassia ) 
We, ZACHARY A. COWAN, the Testator, and Bona b e  Davis 
and Kalli Hitt the witnesses, respectively, whose 
names are signed to the attached or foregoing instrument, being &st duly swom, do hereby 
declare to the undersigned authority that the Testator signed and executed the instnunent as his 
Last Will and Testament and that he bad signed willingly, and that he executed it as his f?ee and 
voluntary act for the purposes themin expressad, and that each of the witnesses, in the presence 
and hearing of the Testator, signed the Will as witnesses and that to the best of his knowledge the 
Tcstator was at the time ab adult, of sound mind and undm no constraint or undue influence. 
S u b m i  sworn to and acknowledged before me by Zachary k Cowaq the 
Testator, and . . Bona Rae Davis and Kalli Hitr 
Rcsiding at Burley, Idaho 
MY Commission expires /@ -/d -/O 
.- i iCl:"jALJ J, WIPER 
ALLEX B ELLIS 
ELLIS, SROtW & SHEILS. CHARTERED 
Attomeys-at-Law 
707 North 8th Street 
P 0 .  Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 8370 1-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TI-IE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Mary Killins Soignier, 
PlaintifT, 
v. 






TO: W. Kent Fletcher 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED That in order to defend this lawsuit an appropriate written 
response must be filed with the above-designated court within 20 daysafter service of this Summons 
on you. If you fail to so respond, the court may enter judgment against you as demanded by the 
plaintiff in the complaint, 
A copy of the complaint is served with this Summons. I f  you wish to seek the advice or 
SUMMONS - I 
representation by an attorney in this matter, 1,ou should do so promptly so that your written response, 
il'any, may he filed in time and other legal rights protected 
An appropriate written response requires compliance uith Rule I O(a)(l), and other Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall also include: 
I. The title and number of this case. 
2. If your response is an 'answer to the complaint, it must contain admissions or denials 
of the separate allegations of the complaint and other defenses you may claim. 
3. Your signature, mailing address, and telephone number, or the signature, mailing 
address, and telephone number of your attorney. 
4. Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to plaintiffs attorney, as 
designated above. 
T o  determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the clerk of 
the above-named court. 
WITNESS My hand and the seal of the clerk of this court this day of March, 2009. 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
"bo @A*&L. WACQHU 
Deputy Clerk 
SUMMONS - 2 
itI,t,EN 8. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & Sf-IEIL.S, CI-IAR'I'ERED 
Attorneys-at-1,aw 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 8370 1-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Mary Killins Soignier, 
Plaintiff, 
W. Kent Eletcher, 
Defendant 
) Case No.CV OC 0905785 




That I am the attorney for the above named defendant in the above-entitled action. That on 
2009,I received copies ofboth Summons and Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial in the above-entitled action and that I hereby acknowledge said service 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT O F  SERVICE- I 
000053 
- .  -. C Y V U  A &  . " v .  JO t ~ m  , C r y s t a l  Seve r son  
. .P 
Hawlsy T r o x e l l  Page 3 .& 
I ., 
i 
PcLLkPl B E1,LIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SIIEILS, CHARTEED 
ARotneys-at-Law 
707 Xoith 8th Street 
P O Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISBN0 1626 
APR O 7 2009 
Atto~neys fox Plaintiff 
IN 1 IIE DIS IRICT COURT OF TIIE FOURTI* WDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEE 
STATE OF IDAHO, FN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Mary Killins Soignier, 
Plaintiff, 
W Kent Fletcher, 
Defendant 
1 
) Case No CV OC 0905785 
1 






That I am the attorney for the above named defendant in the above-entitied action That on 
Apri1,2009, Ireceived copiesof both Summons and Complaint and Demand for Ju~y 
Trial in the above-entitled action and that I he~eby acknowledge said service 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE - I 
000054 
Craig I.. %leadows, ISB No. 108 1 
Michellc R. Points. ISB No. 6224 
1fAWL.EY IROXI?LI, I3NNIS & IIAWIiEY I,I,P 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1 61 7 . . 




itttornevs for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher 
IN THE IIISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS'I'RIC'I 
OF TbIE S'fATE OF IDAIIO, IN AND FOR TI 1E COLJNTY 01' ADA 
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER, 
Case No. CV OC 0905785 
Plaintiff, 
) ANSWER TO COMI'I,AINT, AND 
VS. ) DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
) Fee Category: I. 1 .a. 
) Filing Fee: $58.00 
) 
COMES NOW Defendant W. Kent Fletcher, by and through his counsel of record, 
Ilawley 'froxell Ennis & t-fawley LLI'. and by way of answer to the Complaint and Demand for 
Jury 'I'rial ("Complaint') filed by Plaintiff Mary Killins Soignier, admits, denies and alleges as 
follows: 
I. Defendant denies all allegations not specifically admitted herein. 
2. Defendant admits the allegations set forth in paragraphs I and 11 of the Complaint. 
ANSWIJIt ' I 0  COMPLAIN f ,  AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAI, - I 
3. Defendant denies the allegations set fbrth in paragraph Ill of the Complaint on the 
basis that the reterenced document speaks for itself; and further. that the allegations set forth 
conclusions of la%, to which no response is required. 
4. With respect to the allegations set forth in paragraph IV ofthe Complaint, 
Ilefendant admits that he drafted Eixhibit 2 ofthe Complaint rtt the request of Zachary I\. Cowan, 
but denies the remaining allcgations on the basis that the referenced document speaks for itself: 
5. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraphs V and VI ofthe 
Complaint. 
6. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph VII of thc Complaint on 
the basis that the rei'erenced and purported "ruling" from the probate court speaks for itself and 
specifically denies that said court found that Defendant was negligent. 
7. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraphs VIII and IX of the 
Complaint. 
8. In response to Plaintiff's demand for relief and judgment, Defendant denies 
Plaintiff is entitled to any of the relief requested. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
The following defenses are not stated separately as to each claim for relief or allegation 
of Plaintiff. Nevertheless, the following defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any and 
all of Plaintiit's claims for relief. In addition, Defendant, in asserting the following defenses, 
does not admit that the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses is 
upon Defendant but. to the contrary, asserts that by reason of denials and/or by reason of relevant 
statutory and judicial authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses 
and/or the burden of proving the inverse of the allcgations contained in many ofthe defenses is 
000056 
ANSWICR 1'0 COMPI,AINT, AND DEMAND FOR J L R Y  SRIAL - 2 
upon I'laintiff. Moreover. Defendant does not admit. in asserting any defense. any responsibility 
or  liability of Defendant hut, to the contrary, specifically denies any and all allcgations of' 
responsibility and liability in the Complaint. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
I'laintiffis barred tiom maintaining this action against Defendant based upon the 
applicable statute of limitation. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant by reason of 
compromise and settlement of the claims upon which the action is based. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because Plaintiffs 
injuries, if any. were proximately caused, in whole or in part, by the conduct of parties other than 
Defendant, u h o  are not parties to this action. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintift'is barred fiom maintaining this action against Defendant based upon the statute 
o f  frauds. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because evidence of 
any oral agreement upon which this action is based is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintift' is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because Defendant's 
acts were justified. 
000057 
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SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
I'laintiff is barred fiom muintaining this action against l>efendant in Ada County. as the 
only appropriate venue for any dispute is Cassia County. 
RCLE 11 STATEMENT 
Defendant has considered and believes that he may have additional defenses. but does not 
have enough information at this time to assert such additional deknses under Rule I I ofthe 
ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure. I>efendants does not intend to %ai.ie any such defenses and 
specifically asserts his intention to amend this Answer if, pending research and after discovery, 
facts come to light giving rise to such additional defenses. 
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendant has been required to retain the services of llawlcy Troxell Ennis & Ilawley 
LI,P to defend him in this litigation and should be awarded his reasonable attorney fees and costs 
incurred in defending this action pursuant to ldaho Code $ 12-120 and $12-121, ldaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54, and other applicable law. 
DEMAYD FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendant hereby demands a trial by jury as to all issues so triable and will not stipulate 
to a jury of less than twelve (12) jurors. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
W1IEREI:ORE. llefendant W. Kent Iletcher prays for entry ofjudgment as follows: 
1. That Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed and Plaintiff take nothing thereby; 
2. l ha t  Defendant bc awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs necessarily 
incurred in defending this action; and 
3 .  For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
000058 
ANSWlR '1.0 COMPI,AIN'f, ,4ND DEMAND FOR JURY 'fRIAL - 4 
~ t t o w r  Defendant W. Kent Fletcher 
000059 
ANSWI:R I O  COMI'LAIN r, AND DEMAND 1-OR JlJRY I'RIAI - 5 
I I IliREBY CIKf IFY that on this April, 2009, 1 caused to he served a trite 
copy of the foregoing ANSWER '1'0 COILlf'LAlN'I', AND DEMAND FOR JURY f I i l  .\I, by the 
method indicated below, and addressed to each ofthe folluu,ing: 
Allen B. Ellis 
131..1,15, BROWN & S1-IEII-S, CI 1AR'fERE;I) 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, ID 83701 -0388 
[Attorneys for f'laintiffj 
LL.S Mail, Portage Prepaid 
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Cmig L. Meadows, ISB No. 1081 
blichelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
I1AWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & l iAWLEY LLP 
877 &fain Street, Suite I000 
P.O. Box 16 17 





Attorneys for Defendant 
IN TEIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC'I 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COLiNTY OF ADA 
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
W. KENT FLETCHER, 
1 
1 Case No. CV OC 0905785 
j STIPULATION FOR CHANGE OF 






COMES NOW PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT, by and through their respective 
counsel of record, and pursuant to this Stipulation seek this Court's Order changing venue of this 
action to Cassia County, Idaho. Ada County is not the proper venue for this case as the subjects 
of this litigation took place in Cassia County, and the Defendant resides in Cassia County 
000061 
S rIPIJLArION FOR CIIANGE OF VENUE; ORDER rHEREON - I 
.., 'uur i n u  11:59 PAX 3 0 5 9 5 6 4  
e*#-> 
6 i Z 0 0 9  2 : 17: 56 PM ~ @ ~ ) C I Y S L I I  Severson 
DATED THIS day of April, 2009 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
Blo02/ocrz  
Page 4 
TROXELL ENMS & 
ORDER TO CHANGE VENUE 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon stipulalion of.the parties, and good 
cause showing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED thnt this mtion should be transferrd pursuant to IR.CP. 
40(e)(2) to the District Comt of the Fifth Judicial District of  the State of ldaho, in and fox the 
Coullty of Cassia. 
A'.--. 
DATED THIS &day of Ajnil, 2 W I  
.-..-~ 
STIPULATION FOR CHANGE 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April, 2009, I caused to be semed a true 
copy of the foregoing STIPULATION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE; ORDER THEREON by the 
method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Allen 0. Ellis 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
707 North 8th Street 
P 0 .  Box 388 
Boise, ID 83701 -0388 
[Anorneys for Plaintiffj 
Craig L. Meadows 
Michelle R. Points 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNlS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite I000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701 -161 7 
[Anomeys for Defendant] 
- U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
- Hand Delivered 
- Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
Telecopy: 208.345.9564 
- U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
 Wand Delivered 
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New Case Filed - Other Cla~ms Ronald J. Wilper 
Complaint Filed Ronald J. Wilper CCRANDJD 
CCRANDJD 
CCTOWNRD 
Summons Filed Ronald J. Wilper 
Acknowledgment Of Service (4-6-09) Ronald J .  Wilper 
CCDWONCP Acknowledgment Of Service (04106109) Ronald J. Wilper 
Application For Entry of Default Judgment Ronald J. Wilper CCDWONCP 
CCDWONCP Affidavit Of Stephen C Brown in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Application for Entry of Default 
Application For Entry of Default Ronald J. Wilper APDF 
AFDF 
CCDWONCP 
CCDWONCP Affidavit Of Stephen C Brown ~n Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Application for Entry of Default Judgment and of 
Non-Military Service 
ANSW CCGARDAL Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial Ronald J. Wilpel 
(Points for W Kent) 
STlP Stipulation for Change of Venue: Order Thereon Ronald J. Wilper 
(Stipulation Only) 
Change Of Venue to Cassia County Ronald J. Wilper VENU 
REOU 
CCNELSRF 
CCNELSRF Reqbesl Sent ti) tne Sbprerne Court V12 Ronald J Wt~per 
~nlerdepartrnenta~ Mali 04,13,09 
CCNELSRF Civil Disposition entered for: Fletcher. W Kent. Ronald J. Wilper 
Defendant; Soignier, Mary Killins. Plaintiff. Filing 
date: 4/13/2009 
STAT CCNELSRF STATUS CHANGED: Closed Ronald J. Wilper 
7 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
M THE MATTER OF CHANGE OF ) O R D E R  
VENUE. ) 
An Order was entered in the District Court wherein venue was transferred From AdaCounty, 
Fourth Judicial District to Cassia County, FiRh Judicial District in the case listed below: 
Mary Milins Soignier v. W. Kent Fletcher 
Ada County Case No. CV OC 0905785 
Therefore, after due consideration and good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that venue for all further proceedings in this case be, and they 
hereby are, transferred from Ada County, Fourth Judicial District to Cassia County, Fifth Judicial 
District. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that Administrative DisCrict Judge R. Bany Wood shall be 
assigned this case for further reassignment within the Fifth Judicial District for the purpose of the 
determination and disposition of all matters, includingtriai. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk for Ada County shall file and 
serve this order upon the parties or their counsel and take any action necessary to transfer venue of 
this case to Cassia CoQnty. 
DATED this _LL_ day of May 2009. 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
ATTEST: 
- 
Stephen W. ~ e n ~ o n , @ l e r k  
cc: Administrative District Judge Dada S .  Williamson 
Administrative District Judge R. Bany Wood 
Trial Court Administrator Larry D. Reiner 
Trial Court Administrator Linda Wright 
District Court Clerk J. David Navarro. Ada County 
District Court Clerk Lany Mickelsen, Cassia county 
Craig L. hfeadows. ISW No. I OX I 
Michelle It. Points. iSi3 No. 6224 
I-IAWLEY SROXE1.L ENNlS & I-IAWI.E:Y LI-P 
877 hlain Street, Suite I000 
P.O. 13ox 16 17 





Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher 
IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIF'TII JUDICIAI. DISTRICT 
OF TIIE STATE OF IDAI-10, IN AND FOR 'THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
MARY KIIdIdINS SOIGNIER, cf +'O@~J/ 7 
1 Case No. CV OC 0905785 
Plaintiff, 
) AMENDED ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, 
VS. ) AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
W. KEN?' FLETCHER, 
) 
COMES NOW Defendant W. Kent Fletcher, by and through his counsel of record. 
IIawley Troxell Ennis & Ilawley LLP, and by way of answer to the Complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial ("Complaint') filed by PlaintiffMary Killins Soignier, admits, denies and alleges as 
follows: 
I .  Defendant denies all allegations not specifically admitted herein 
2. Defendant admits the allegations set forth in paragraphs I and I1 of the Complaint. 
AMENDED AMENDED .4NSWI1R '1.0 COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR 
.IL!KY TRIAI- - I 
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3. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph III ofihe Complaint on the 
basis that the referenced document speaks for ilself, and firrther, that the allegations set forth 
conclusions of law to which no response is required. 
4. With respect to the allegations set forth in paragraph IV of the Complaint. 
Defendant admits that he drafted Exhibit 2 of the Complaint at the request of Pdchary '4. Colvan. 
but denies the remaining allegations on the basis that the referenced document speaks for itself: 
5 .  Ilekndant denies the allegations set fbrth in paragraphs V and VI of the 
Complaint. 
6. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph VII of the Complaint on 
the basis that the referenced and purported "ruling" from the probate court speaks for itself and 
spec~fically denies that said court found that Defendant was negligent. 
7. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraphs VIII and IX of the 
Compiaint. 
8. In response to Plaintiffs demand for relief and judgment, Defendant denies 
Plaintiff is entitled to any of the relief requested. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
'The following defenses are not stated separately as to each claim for relief or allegation 
of Plaintiff. Nevertheless, the following defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any and 
all of Plaint~ff's cla~ms for relief. In addition, Defendant. in asserting the following defenses, 
does not admit that the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses is 
upon Defendant but, to the contrary, asserts that by reason of denials andior by reason of relevant 
statutory and judicial authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses 
and/or the burden of proving the inverse of the allegations contained in man) of the defenses is 
AMENDED AMENDED ANSWER r0  COMPI~AIN r ,  AND Dl?M,\ND I'OR 
JURY TRIAI, - 2 
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upon l'laintif: bloreovcr. Ilefendant does not admit, in asserting any defense. any responsibility 
or liability of1)eSendant hut, to the contrary, specifically denies any and all allegations of 
responsibility and liability in the Complaint. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant based upon the 
applicable statute of limitation, I.C. 4 5-2 19(4). 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant by reason of 
compromise and settlement of the claims upon which the action is based. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because Plaintifrs 
injuries, if any, were proximately caused, in whole or in p a t ,  by the conduct of parties other than 
Defendant, who are not parties to this action. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant based upon the statute 
of frauds. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because evidence of 
any oral agreement upon which this action is based is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
131aintiffis barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because Defendant's 
acts were justified. 
AMENDED I\ME,NDI:D ANSWER TO COMPI.AINT, AND DEMAND !:OR 
JURY TRIAL - 3 
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SEVEN'rH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Uefbndant in ;\cia County, rrs the 
only appropriate venue fur any dispute is Cassia Countv. 
RULE 11 STATEMENT 
1)cfendant has considered and believes that he may have additional defenses, but does not 
have enough information at this time to asserf such additional defenses under Rule I I of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants does not intend to waive any such defenses and 
specifically asserts his intention to amend this Answer if, pending research and after discovery. 
facts come to light giving rise to such additional defenses. 
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Def'endant has been required to retain the services of 1-Iawley Troxell Ennis & ilawley 
LLP to defend him in this litigation and should be awarded his reasonable attonley fees and costs 
incurred in defending this action pursuant to Idaho Code 9 12- 120 and 9 12- 12 1 ,  Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54, and other applicable law. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendant hereby demands a trial by jury as to all issues so triable and will not stipulate 
to a jury of less than twelve (12) jurors. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WIIEREFORE, Defendant W. Kent Fletcher prays for entry ofjudgmcnt as follows: 
I. 'fhat Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed and Plaintiff take nothing thereby; 
2. That Defendant be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs necessarily 
incurred in defending this action; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
AMENDED AMENDED ANSWER TO COMPLAIN'f, AND IIEMANI) FOR 
JURY TRIAI. - 4 
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AMENDED A M l f N I ~ I ~ D  ANSWER '1.0 COM1'LAIN.r. AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY 'I'RIAL. - 5 
I I lI:UlI3Y f l~RTII:Y that on this , I caused to be ser\.ed a true 
copy of the Soregoing IZMIINIIE OILIPL,\INI'. ,\NU I>I!MANIj 
1:OK JURY 'l'KIr\L by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
4 
Allen £3. Il l is A!.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
fIlal,IS, BROWK & SIIEILS. CIIAR"l'2.:KEI) I land Delivered 
707 North 8th Street - Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 388 -E-mail 
Iloise, ID 83701 -0388 'relecopy: 208.345.9564 
I ~Zttomeys for Plainti Sf1 
AMIINDED AMFNlIElI ANSWrR TO COMPLAIN?', AND DI.IVAND FOR 
JLRY l'RIAI - 6 
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Craig L. Meadows, IS W No. 108 I 
Michelle R. Points, IS13 No. 6224 
IIAWLEY 'I'ROXELI. llNNlS & tIAWI"E<Y LLP 
877 Main Street. Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 161 7 





Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher 
IN THE DISTRICT COIJKT OF 'fIIE FIFTII JUDICIAL 1)ISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF lDAI1O. IN AND FOR THE CObWTY OF CASSIA 
MARY KIIaI~INS OIGNIER. 
Plaintiff, 
) Case No. CV 2009-5 I 7 
) 
MOTION FOR SlJMMARY JUDGMENT 
VS. i 
W. KENT FL,E'TCF1ER, 
Defendant 
COMES NOW W. Kent Fletcher, by and through his counsel of record, Hawley Troxell 
Ennis & Ilawley 1LI.P. and respectfully submits this Motion fbr  summa^ Judgment seeking an 
order from this Court dismissing PlaintiTt-s Complaint with prqjudice. 
This Motion is brought under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). 
'The basis of this Motion is that Plaintiffs claim is barred by the applicable statute of 
limitation and under the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel, and because Defendant did not breach any 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMFNT - I 000072 
duty to Plaintiff. thus I'IaintitTcannot sustain a claim of professional negligence against hrlr 
l.'letcher.. 
This Motion is supported hy the klemorandum in Suppon of Motion for Summary 
Judgment and the Afti . Kent Fletcher, both tiled concurrently herewith. 
DATED ' E l  IS June. 2009. 
HAWl-EY 'I'ROXELL ENNIS & IIAWLEY 1.1-P 
- ---I A 
Atto eys for: Defendant W. Kent Fletcher L
MOTION FOR SlJblMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
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1 I113RliHY CfiR'1'11:Y that on thi- djge ay of June, 2009, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing bfOI'1ON FOR SUMMARY JIDC?MLINT by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to each of'the following: 
Allen B, Ellis 
J 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
EI.,I.lS, BROWN & SI-iISl1-S, CtiAK'I'ERED liand Delivered 
707 North 8th Street O v e r n i g h t  Mail 
I'.O. Box 388 E-mail 
Boise, ID 83701 -0388 'l'elecopy: 208.345.9564 
[Attorneys for Plaintiffl 
MO"l ION FOR SUMMARY JIJDCiMENT - 3 
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Craig 1". hleadows, IS13 No. 1081 
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
1 IAW1.131' 'T'ROXELI. ENNIS & HAWI"I<Y l.I.P 
877 blain Street, Suite 1000 
P.0.  Box 16 17 





Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent 1:letcher 
IN TflE DISTRICT COIJRr  OF r11E FIFTlI JUDICI/II 1)IS'I RIC7 
OF r l lE  STAI'F OF IDAItO, IN AND FOR I IIE COUNTY O F  CASSIA 
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER, 
Case No. CV 2009-5 17 
Plaintiff, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT O F  
VS. 
W. KENT FLETCI-IER. 
) DEFENDANT3 MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant W. Kent Fletcher ("Fletcher"), by and through his counsel o f  record, I-Iawley 
Troxell Ennis & IIawley l.LP, respectfully submits this Memorandum in support of his Motion 
for Summary Judgment. l'hrough this motion, 1:letcher sccks an order dismissing Plaintiffs 
Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice 
MI<MORANDIJM IN SIII~PORT OF DL.:FENDA&QR~;;~& 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENI' - I 
1. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Zachary A. Corvan was a client o f  Fletcher's fiom approximately 2000 through 2006. 
Affidavit of W. Kent Fletcher ("Fletcher Al'f."), 7 2. Fletcher did some estate planning for Mr. 
Cowan. ~vhich included the drafting of  his Last Will and festament ("Wilf'). td, Exh. A. 
Mr. Corvan executed his Will on May 23, 2005. 
[luring his lifetime, Mr. Cowan was the benef~ciary of a trust created by his mother. 
1,evnarda A. Cowan. of Riverside, California, known as 'The Leonarda A. Cowan 'Trust. Id., 1 3. 
Clause 6 of the Wilf directed the residue and remainder of the Mr. Cowan's estate, other 
than beneficial interests in trusts, be given to the American Cancer Society, and that all 
beneficial interests that he had in any trusts be given to "fvlary Killings", the Plaintiff in this case 
Id., 7 4. 
Prior to finalizing the Will, Fletcher asked Mr. Cowan about his interests in any trusts, 
including his mother's trust and Mr. Cowan informed Fletcher that he had received the 
disbursements from his mother's trust. I .  5 Fletcher then asked Mr. Cowan if he wanted to 
keep the language in Clause 6 regarding the Plaintiff in the Will in light of the fact that he had 
received disbursements fiom his mother's trust. Mr. Cowan told Fletcher that he was uncertain 
as to whether or not all of that property had been disbursed, and that he wanted to leave the 
language in the Will. Id. 
'The Will was duly witnessed and attested to by the required number of witnesses. 
Fletcher ASS, 7 6 .  The Will is a \zalidly executed testamentary instrument, and Mr. Cowan was 
competent at the time he executed his Will. Id. No party has presented a challenge to the 
validity o f  the Will. Id. 
MFMORANDUM IN SOPPORT OF DFI:FNDAN7 'S MO I ION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
000076 
Mr. Cowan died on the October 20. 2006. /cl., 4 7. 
Mr. C'owan's Will was admitted to informal probate on November 3, 2006 in the llistrict 
Court (Magistrate IXvision) for the Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County. Case No. CV 2006 
1234 CProbate Action"). Id., 7 8. 
Pursuant to the terms of the Will, Stephen D. Westfall was nominated and duly appointed 
to be the Personal Representative of the Estate of Mr. Cowan. Id., '1 9. 
'The Perso~~al  Representative filed an Inventory of the estate on January 23, 2007. Id.. t/ 
10. 
In his Will. Mr. Cowan directed that all of his personal property be distributed according 
to a written list of items and intended recipients, if such a list was in existence at the time of this 
death. Id., 7 I I .  A written list ofi tems and intended beneficiaries could not be found and it was 
concluded that a written list did not exist. Id. 
At the time of his death, Mr. Cowan did not hold or possess any interest in any trusts. I d ,  
1 12. ]'he testator's Personal Representative determined that the residue of the testator's estate 
should be given to the American Cancer Society. Id. 
Plaintift'contested the Personal Representative's interpretation of the  Will in the Probate 
Action, claiming that she was entitled to certain monies deri~red Srom the Leonarda A. Cowan 
'l'rust, and that Clause 6 of Mr. Cowan's Will was ambiguous, thus, Plaintiff claims that the 
Magistrate Court should allow and/or consider parole evidence to aid it in determining the intent 
of the testator Mr. Cowan. Id., 1/ 13. Plaintiff submitted a number o f  affidavits in the Probate 
Action which said, in effect, diat Mr. Cowan had made representations that Plaintiff would 
receive a substantial portion of his estate upon his death. Id. 
MIIMORANDIJM IN SIJPPORT OF DtiFErNDANT'S MO'I'ION 
]'OR SUMMARY JLIDGMENT - 3 
The Magistrate Court in the Probate Action Sound that there was no latent or patent 
ambiguity concerning the Mr. Cowan's Will, that Mr. Cowan's intent \\.as clear and 
unambiguous on the Pace of the Will document, and that Plaintilf s challenge to the Will was 
without merit. Id., 7 14. 
Based on the Magistrate Court's decision, the residue of Mr. Cowan's estate was to be 
paid Rmcric.m Cancer Society. I . ,  [ I .  Plaintiff filed an appeal of'the Magistrate Court 
decision in the Probate Action. Id. 
On or about September 9. 2008, the parties of the Probate Action entered into a 
"Stipulation for Settlement of Claim of Mary Killins Soignier. ilpproval of Petition for 
Construction of the Will and Plan of Distribution and Dismissal ofAppeal" (hereinafter 
"Stipulation for Settlement"). Fletcher Aff., Exh. R.  That Stipulation was signed by Fletcher 
and Plaintiff, among others. Id., 7 16. 
In consideration for Plaintiff signing the Stipulation for Settlement, she dismissed her 
appeal and received payment from the American Cancer Society in the amount of $1 00,000. Id, 
7 17. 
11. 
LAW APPLICABLE TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Summary judgment is only proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on lile, together with the aflidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). l'he moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celolex CTorp. v Carrerr, 477 U.S. 317,  323, 
I06 S. Ct. 2548,91 I,.l'd.2d 265 (1986). 
MF~v~ORANDIJM IN SUPPOR'f OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 
The ~tioving party has the burden of establishing the lack of a genuine issue of matcrial 
Ihct. Orrhmrrrr v.  Iilrrho Porvrr ( ' t r . .  130 fciaho 597. 600. 944 P.3d 1360, 1363 (I "17). '1'0 meet 
this burden. the moving party must challenge in its motion and establish through evidence that no 
issue of material facts exists for m element of the nonmoving party's case. ,Smirh t- .Lferidiun 
.loin1 Sch. Uisl, .%. 2, 128 Idaho 71 4, 71 9,918 P.2d 583, 588 (1996). I h e  nonmoving party 
"may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's 
response, by affidavits or as othenvise provided in this rule, must set forth specific Fdcts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e). 
If the moving party initially establishes that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the 
burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that is sufficient to establish a 
genuine issue of material fact. Smith, 128 Idaho at 71 9.91 8 P.2d at 588. When presenting 
affidavits, they "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein." I.R.C.P. 56(e). The nonmoving party must submit more than just 
conclusory assertions that an issue ofmaterial fact exists to establish a genuine issue. Ct>gh/lm v. 
Beta Thera Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388,401, 987 P.2d 300.3 13 (1 999). "[A] mere scintilla of 
evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts" is not sufficient to create 3 genuine issue of material 
fact for purposes of summary judgment." Samuel v. flepworrh. Mmgester & Lrzutniz, Inc., 
I34 Jdaho 84, 87,996 P.2d 303. 306 (2000). 
111. 
LAW APPLICABLE TO LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM 
l'he elements of a legal malpractice action arising from a civil action are: (I ) the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer: 
MEMORANIIIJM IN SUPPOR?' OF DEFENDANT'S MOI'ION 
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(3) the Sailure to perform that duty: and (4) the failure to perform the duty must be a proxiinate 
cause ofthe injuries suffered hy the client. 1,rtrnh v.  .Ifnmveiler. 129 ldaho 269. 272, 923 P.2d 
976. 979 (1996); rtl~vius v. .2lrrruno, 120 ldaho I I .  I .;, 813 P.2d 350,352 ( 1991 j. In such :m 
action, the plaintiff has the hurden of proving negligence on the part of the attorney as well as 
proving that the negligence was the proximate causc of thc loss of a right to recoixry in the 
underlying case. Strmr~el v. flepworih ;Vtingester & Lrzrrmiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84. 88-89, 996 P.2d 
303, 307-08 (2000); .I/fzrrrcz.y v. IGrmer.7 Ins. Co.. I 18 ldaho 224, 227, 796 P.2d 101, 101 ( I  990). 
1%'. 
ARGUMENT 
A. PlaintifPs Claims Are Barred By The Apptieabte Statute of Limitations. 
Plaintiff's claims are barred by ldaho Code (i 5-219(4) (2009) because Plaintiff was 
damaged at the time of drafting the Will in 2005. or, at the latest, upon the death of Cowen in 
2006, niaking the complaint filed in March of 2009 untimely, The statute of limitations on a 
professional malpractice claim is set forth in ldaho Code 5 5.219(4). That section provides that 
with rcgard to a malpractice claim, '.the statute of limitations . . . expire[s) two years following 
occurrence, act or omission complained of. harring fraudulent or knowing concealment of the 
injury, and will not be extended due to any continuing consequences, resulting damages, or 
continuing professional relationship." Rice v. Lilsler, 132 Idaho 897, 899, 980 P.2d 561, 563 
(1999) (emphasis added), see ul.ro Lrrpham v. Slewtrrl. I37 ldaho 582: 585. 51 P.3d 396, 399 
(2002) ("An action to recover damages for professional malpractice must be commcnced within 
two years after the cause of action has accrued."). 
Although the statutes purport to create strict "occurrence" rule for accrual of such an 
action, the Idaho courts have interpreted the statute to allow tbr a cause of action to accrue once 
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the Plaintill: has suffered "some damage.'' Sireih 1'. Veigel? 109 ldaho 174, 178. 706 P.?d 63, 67 
( 198x5). 
This rule, known as the "some damage" rule, was further clarified in C'hicuine v. BignuN, 
122 Idaho 487,835 P.2d 1299 (1 992). In that case, the ldaho Supreme Court found that a cause 
ofaction accrues when there is objective proof that \vould support the existence of some actual 
danmage. Ilowever, there is no requirement that Plaintiff has knowledge of the damage but that 
the existence of records showing alleged damage suffered by Plaintiff was sufficient to constitute 
accrual of the action. Lumphun v. Sle+v<rrt, suprtr. 
I'he Idaho Supreme Court has uniformly held that "some damagew is not a potential or 
theoretical injury, but rather, has to somehow equate to an objective or actual harm to a plaintiff. 
Although Idaho courts have held that until some damage occurs, a cause of action for 
professional malpractice does not accrue, this does not mean that the damage must be objectively 
ascertainable to the injured party, as this would simply reinstate a discovery rule, which the 
legislature has rejected. tuphum, 137 ldaho al 585, 51 P.3d at 399 (citing Hawley v. Green, 
I 17 ldaho 498, 788 P.?d 132 1 (1 990)). 
Most recently, in the case of City of"Z1cCirN v ,  b'u.ulon, el ul, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 
(2009), the Idaho Supreme Court reiturated that the statute of limitations ibr professional 
malpractice bcgins to run when the plaintiff has a cause of action against the professional. In 
Btr.uron, the City of blcCal1 sued their attorneys in part, for allegedly negligently advising the 
City of McCall to release its lien against J-U-0 Engineering. The ldaho Supreme Court held that 
the date on which the City of McCall released its lien was the date on which the damage 
occurred, beca~~se  that was the date on which the City of McCall lost its opportunity to recover 
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npinst J-0-13 Engineering. Iti at 663, 51 I3.3d at 636. The date on which the party loses its righf 
to reco\ery is the date on which the statute of lirnitatians begins to accrue. Id. 
In this case. even in the unlikely event the Court were to find that Fletcher negligently 
advised Mr. Cowan in the preparation of his Will, Plaintiff would have incurred .'some damage" 
at the time ofthr  preparation of the Will in May of 2005 because there was objectively 
ascertainable evidence that the Mr. Cowan did not have any interests in any trusts at that time; 
thus, Plaintiff's action for legal malpractice brought in 2009 would be barred by the two year 
statute of limitations set forth in ldaho Code 1$ 5-2 19(4). 
Alternatively. if there is some question as to whether Plaintiff suffered "some damage" 
when the Will was drafted in May of 2005> there is no question that some damage occurred at the 
time ol' Mr. Cowan's death in October of 2006, as any other opportunities to amend the Will 
would be impossible. 
1 h e  Complaint in this case was not filed until March 25, 2009, nearly a year and a half 
after the applicable statute of limitations passed. The Court should ~ l e  as a matter of law that 
Plaintiff's complaint is barred by the statute of limitations and dismiss this litigation 
B, Fletcher Did Not Breach Any Duty Owed To Plaintiff, Therefore, Plaintiff Has No 
Cause Of Action Against Fletcher, 
For a plaintiffto have standing lo sue based on attorney malpractice, the claim must 
include (I)  the existence of an attorney client relationship, (2 )  a duty owed by the attorney to the 
plaintiff, (3) a breach ofthat duty and (4) a demonstration that the negligence of the attorney is 
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages. Ililrri&ld L- iluncock: 140 ldaho 134, 136, 90 
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Plaintiff bvas not a client of1:letcher. (ienerally, m attorney \vill be held liable for 
negligence only to his or her client and not to someone with whom the attorney does not have an 
attorney client relationship. Wick v. F;i.sniirnn, 122 ldaho 698, 838 P.2d 301 (1992). 
The ldaho Supreme Court has carved out liom the general rule requiring the existence of 
a direct attorney-client relationship, a narrow exception where "{a]n attorney preparing 
testamentary instruments owes a duty to the hentSficiririrs numedor iiicn~ified therein to prepare 
such instruments ... so as to effectuate the testator's intent as expressed in the testamentary 
instruments." Id at 139, 90 P.3d at 889 (emphasis added). 
Where such a duty exists, the attorney may be liable to the beneficiary if"the testator's 
intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments is frustrated in whole or in part an3 the 
beneficiary's interest in the estate is either lost. diminished, or unrealized . . .." Id If there is no 
error made by the attorney that frustrates the testator's intent in the document itself, there is no 
breach of duty. 
Attorneys are not subject to lawsuits by person who simply did not received what the 
believe they should have, or did not receive what the understood the testator indicated they 
would receive. Id. 
Even where a duty is owed to a third party beneficiary, i t  is limited because "[tlhe 
attorney's duty to his or her client must remain paramount." Id. at 138-139, 90 P.3d at 888-889. 
I'hus. an attorney has no duty to inform, notify-, or consult beneficiaries when a testator changes 
or amends the distribution of his estate. Id at 139, 90  P.3d at 889. Moreover, an attorney may 
not attempt to "dissuade the testator from eliminating or reducing their share of his or her estate." 
Id 
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For example, in E.rlul@ of'tlcckcr v. (irllrrhun. the Idaho Supreme Court refused to extend 
an attomey's duty in preparing a will to suntiving spouses except to extent an existing duty is 
owed to a client to draft the documents according to the testator's intent. I40 Idaho 522,06 P.3d 
623 (2004). In E.ctnle cfj'Beckcr, an attorney drafted a will for Ms. t3ecker who was dying of 
cancer. Id at 524.96 P.3d at 625. 'The initial draft was appmved by hls. Becker's sister and 
Ms. Becker's husband, and at the first meeting with the client the attorney asked about the 
disposition of the farm to which Ms. Becker responded with her daughter's name. Id Thus, 
Mr. Becker received something akin to a life estate and brought suit against the attorney alleging 
a direct duty was owed to him as the surviving spouse of the testator. Id at 525, 96 P.3d at 626, 
I h e  Idaho Supreme Court disagreed stating the attorney -'fultilled any duty to the beneficiaries in 
giving effect to Ms. Becker's intent as expressed in the will. f ie owed no further duty to 
Mr. Becker." Id at 526,96 P.3d at 627. Even where an individual is named in a testamentary 
document. so long as the attorney drafts the document according to the testator's intent and does 
not negligently make and error or otherwise frustrate that intent, the attorney has fultilled any 
duty owed to named beneficiaries. I f f .  
Like Ffurri&ld, a duty may be owed to a named beneficiary of a Will, such as the 
Plaintiff, to draft a testamentary document according to the testator's intent. Clause 6 of Mr. 
Cowan's Last Will and Testament fi~lfills any duty owed to Plaintiff because i t  devises to 
I'laintiff"[a]ll beneficial interests that I have in any trusts beneficial interest" to Plaintiff. Ilad 
Cowan died with any beneficial trust interests, Plaintiff would have received exactly what 
Cowan had intended. 'She fact that Mr. Cowan had no interest in any trust at the time ofthe Will 
is not relevant to the adequacy of Fletcher's drafting according to Mr. Cowan's intent. 
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Because Fletcher satisfied any duty owed to I'laintiffas a named beneliciary by 
accurately dratling Mr. Cowan's Will according to his intent. Plaintiffs clai~u hi ls  to 
demonstrate a breach of duty. The Court can make this finding as a matter of law. 
C.  Plaintiffs Claims i t r e  Barred By The Doctrine Of Judicial Estoppel. 
Plaintiffsettled all claims she had related to Mr. Cowan's U'ill by executing the 
Stipulation fbr Settlement in the Probate Action and is therefore judicially estopped from 
pursuing this malpractice action against Fletcher. 
Specifically. the Stipulation for Settlement pro\fidcs that the parties, inclusive of W. Kent 
Fletcher, and Mary Killins Soignier and her attorneys. stipulated and agreed to the ibllowing: 
"[ajll claims of Mary Killins Soignier under the Last Will and testament of Zachary A. Cowan, 
as heir: devisee, or holder of power of appointment ... are settled for the sum of One Eiundred 
Thousand i)ollars ~$100,000)." Fletcher Aff.. Exh. C, 
The Stipulation for Settlement further provides that, with "the exception of the payment 
made to Mary Killins Soignier pursuant to the Settlement described above, the personal 
representative's petition for construction of the Will of Zachary Cowan and for the approval of 
the personal rcpresentative's plan of distribution of the estate shall be granted by the Court." 
Fletcher Aff., Exh. C. 
'I'hrouyh the Stipulation for Settlement, Plaintiff agreed to settle all claims related to her 
claim as heir or devisee to Mr. Cowan's estate. as well as to approve of the personal 
representative's plan ibr distribution of M r .  Cowan's estate. 
In Z_lcKa)i v. (hvmr, 130 Idaho 148. 937 P.2d 1222 ( 1997), the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that a party who is taking an inconsistent position to a position taken in an underlying action. is 
estopped from bringing a legal malpractice claim against an attorney who represented them in an 
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undcrlyittg action, *'when the party maintaining an inconsistent position either did have, or \$as 
chargeable with, l i ~ l l  knowledge of the attendant lhcts prior to adopting the initial position." ld. 
at 155, 917 1'.7d at 1229, Although 1;letcher did not represent Plaintiff in the underlying action, 
that application of the doctrine is analogous, 
In .Lf~.h'ciy, the plaintil'f, hls. blcKay, hrought a legal malpractice action against her 
attorney and the guardian ud liietn appointed to represent her child in an underlying medical 
malpractice action. Ms. MiKay argued that the settlement was made without her consent and 
that the settlement amount was insufficient. Notwithstanding Ms. EvlcKay's representation in the 
attorney malpractice case, in the medical malpractice action, the claim was settled, and all parties 
agreed to the terms of settlement, and the Court approved the settlement. Id. at 139, 937 P.2d at 
1223. Ms. McKay later stated in the attorney malpractice action that she was never satisfied with 
the settlement and that she never really agreed to the settlement. Id at i50, 937 P.2d 1224. 
'The original attorneys filed motions for summary judgment on the basis of judicial estoppel. The 
District Court granted the respective motions for summary judgment and also ordered 
Ms. McKay's counsel to pay attorney fees and computer research costs as a sanction under Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure I I .  The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Ilistrict Court's decision to 
grant the motions for summary judgment based on the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The 
Supreme Court, in surveying decisions from appellate courts liom other states: held that judicial 
estoppel is applicable in the context of legal malpractice claims. Id. at 153, 937 P.2d at 1277. 
In McKuy, the Supreme Court, consistent with the District Court, found that because 
Ms. McKay, as the litigant, stated in court that she agreed to the settlement, she was judicially 
estopped from taking an inconsistent position in the attorney malpractice litigation. 
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Similar to the facts of this case. I'laintiKagreed to the settlement ofall her claims related 
to any claim she had to hlr. Cowan's estate in the Prohate Action, atid obtained an advantage as a 
result of the settlement. Plaintiff cannot "'repudiate" her earlier agreement, and by way of her 
inconsistent position, obtain recovery from another party. arising out of the same transactions." 
See e.g., zLf~~Kc~y, 130 ldaho at 155, 937 P.2d 1279. 
Plaintiffs claim against Fletcher is barred under the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel and the 
Court can make such a finding as a matter of law. 
D. Plaintiffs Claims Are Barred Under The Doctrines Of Waiver And Quasi-Estoppel. 
In the event the Court finds the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel is not applicable in this case, 
Plaintiff's claims are nevertheless barred under the doctrines of waiver and yuasi-estoppel. 
Waiver is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage. 
Record,S/eel& (bnstrtrcfion, lnc. v. Murtel Conslruclion, Inc. 129 ldaho 288, 923 P.2d 995 
(1 996) (citations omitted). Similarly, quasi-estoppel applies when a person asserts a right 
inconsistent with a position previously taken, with knowledge of the facts and his or her rights, to 
the detriment of the person applying the doctrine. Id. Put another way, the doctrine is designed 
to prevent one party from gaining an unconscionable advantage by changing positions. I d ,  
(citing iMifchel1 v. Zilog Inc., 125 ldaho 709, 715,874 P.2d 520, 526 (1994) (other citations 
omitted). 
PIaintiR'is asserting a "right" through this litigation for attorney malpractice inconsistent 
with the position she took in executing the Stipulation Ibr Settlement, to the detriment of 
Fletcher. 
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Plaintiff should bc prevented l i o~n  gaining an unconscionable advantage in this case, 
when she already settled 31 claims related to Mr. Cowan estate (or a11 claims shc hati as an heir 
o r  devisee ofthe estate), which by definition must include her claim of attorney malpractice. 
She Court can lind as a matter of law that Plaintiffs claims are barred under the doctrines 
of waiver and quasi-estoppel. 
v. 
COkICLUSION 
There is no issue of material fact and this Court can find as a matter of law. that 
Plaintiffs complaint against Fletcher is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, or 
alternatively under the doctrines of judicial estoppel, waiver or quasi-estoppel. Moreover, 
Plaintiffhas no standing to bring a malpractice action against Fletcher on the basis that Fletcher 
drafted Mr. Cowan's Will based on his intent, and made no error in drafting the Will. 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed in its entirety 
RESPEC rFljLLY SGBMITTEI> TIilS une, 2009 
EY 'TROXEI<L FNNIS & 11AWL.EY LLP 
1 - 
k t  meys b r  Defendant W. Kcnt Fletcher 
MEMORANDl!M IN SUI'POKS 01: 1)EFENI)AN'I"S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JU1)GMENT - 14 
I 1 ll:Rli13\r' CER~f'II:Y that on thi 2009, 1 caused to be scr\,ed a true 
copy of the Ibregoiny IClliMORAN[3UM IN Sl.iPPOIIr OF l)Ilf;EN1)1iN'f'S ,lilO.l.lON I:OR 
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Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher 
IN THE IIISI'RICI' COURT OF THE FIFTH JUIIICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER. ) 
) Case No. CV 2009-5 17 
Plaintiff, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF W. KENT FLETCHER 
VS . ) 
Defendant 
W. KENT FL,ETCHER, being fust duly sworn upon oath, deposa and states as follows: 
I .  I arn the Defendant in the above-entitled action. I have personal 
knowledge ofthe facts set forth herein, and can testify as to the truth of the matters contained 
herein if called upon as a witness at the trial of this action. 
2. Zachary A. Cowan was my client @om approximately 1998 through 2006. 
During that time, I did some estate planning for Mr. Cowan, which included the drafting ofhis 
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Last Will and Testament ("Will"). blr, Cowan executed his last Will on May 24. 2005. A true 
and correct copy of thc  Will is attached as Exhibit A. 
3. During his lifetime. Mr. Cowan was the beneficiary o f  a trust created by 
his inother, 1.eonarda A. Cowan, o f  Riverside, California, known as The Leonarda A. Cowan 
Trust. 
4. Clause 6 of the Will directed the residue and remainder of the  testator's 
estate, other than beneficial interats in trusts, be given to the American Cancer Society, a d  that 
all beneficial interests that he had in any trusts be given to "Mary Killings", the Plaintiff. 
5. Prior to finalizing the Will 1 asked Mr. Cowan about his interests in any 
trusts, including his mother's trust, and he informed me that he kdd received disbursements from 
his mother's trust. 1 asked him if he wanted to keep the language in Clause 6 regarding the 
Plaintiff in the Will in light o f  the fact that he  had received disbursements &om his mother's 
trust. Mr. Cowan told me that he was uncertain as to whether all o f  the trust property had been 
disbursed, he wanted to leave the language in the Will. 
6. The Will was duly witnessed and attested to by the required number o f  
witnesses. The Will is a validly executed testamentary instrument, and Mr. Cowan was 
competent at the time he executed his Will. No one presented a challenge to the validity o f the  
Will. 
7. Mr. Cowan died on the October 20,2006. 
8. Mr. Cowan's Will was admitted to informal probate on November 3, 2006 
in the District Court (Magistrate Division) for !he Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County, Case 
No. CV 2006-1234 ("Probate Action"). 
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9. Pursuant to the terms of the Will, Stephen D. Westfall was nominated and 
duly appointed Personal Represcntative o f the  Fstate o f  Mr.Cowan. 
10. The Personal Representative filed an Inventory o f  the estate on 
January 23, 2007. 
11. In his Will, Cowan directed that all his p e r s o ~ ~ a l  property be distributed 
according to a written list of  items and intended recipients, if such a list was in existence at the 
time ofhis death. A written lis? of items and intended beneficiaries could not be found and it 
was concluded that a written list does not exist. 
12. 1 have been unable to locate any beneficial interest or powers o f  
appointment in any trust held or possessed by Mr. Cowen at the time o f  his death. The Personal 
Representative determined that the residue o f  the testator's estate should be given to the 
American Cancer Society. 
13. Plaintiffcontested the Personal Representative's intwpretation o f  the Will 
in the Probate Action, claiming that she was entitled to certain monies derived h m  the Leonarda 
A. Cowan Trust, and that Clause 6 o f  Mr. Cowan's Will was ambiguous, thus, Plaintiffclaimed 
that the Magistrate Court should allow parole evidence to aid it in determining the intent o f the  
testator, Mr. Cowan. Plaintiffsublnitted a number of affidavits in the Probate Action which said, 
in effect, that Mr. Cowan had made representations that Plaintiff would receive a substantial 
pottion o fh i s  estate upon his death. 
14. The Mag~strate Court in the Pmbate Action found that there was no latent 
or patent a~nbiguily concerning Mr. Cowan's W111, that Mr. Cawan's Intent was clear and 
unambiguous on the faceofthe Will document and that PlaintiWs challenge to the Will was 
without merit. 
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15. Based on the Magistrate Court's decision, the residue of Mr. Cowan's 
estate should bedistributed to the American Cancer Socicty. Plain(ifTfi1ed an appeal of the 
Magistrate Court decision in the Pmhate Action. 
16. On or  about September 9, 2008, the parties of the Probate Action entered 
into a "Stipulation for Settlement of Claim of Mary Killins Soiynicr, Approval of Pctition for 
Constru~Tion of the Will and Plan of  Distribution and Dismissal of Appeal" (hereinafter 
"Stipulation h r  Settlement"). A true and correct copy ofthe Stipulation for Settlement is 
attached as Exhibit B. 'That Stipulation was signed by myself and Plaintiff: among others. 
17. In consideration of Plaintiffsigning the Stipulation for Settlement, she 
dismissed her appeal and received payment from the American Cancer Society in the amount of 




) . - 
4 
SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN before me this _dI_ day of  June, 2009 
. 
Notary Public fo . . 
Resldlng at -__ 
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1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on thi 1 caused to be served a true 
copy ofthe foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF W.=NT FLETCHER by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to each of the following: 
/ 
Allen B. Ellis 
,J 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
ELLIS, BROWN & SIIEILS, CHARTERED I-fand Delivered 
707 North 8th Street - Ovtmight Mail 
P.0. Box 388 E-mail 
Boise, ID 83701 -0388 Telecapy: 208.345.9564 
[Attorneys Sor Plaintiffl 
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LAST \VILL & TESTAMENT 
I, ZAGN/ii?Ir A COW-All, of Declo, Cassia County, Idallo. publish aud declare 
tl?is to be mjr Last arid Testament revolting aLL other and fomer wills and codicils illat may 
have been made by me. 
CLAUSE 1 
DEaARAnONS 
1 am sin& I have no children. 
AU of my property is my separate propem. i t  is my intention by this UTill to 
dispose of all property u%ich I am entitled to dispose of by aiU, commuoity and separate, real, 
personal and mixed, wkcb I may own or have iderest in whatever at the time of my death 
CLAUSE 2 
.hPPOINME%T OF PERSON.% RZPRESEhPTATnG 
I nominate and appokt Stephen D. Testfall as the Personal Representative of my 
estate. In &e event Stephen D. -Westfall should predecease rue, o~ fail for any reason to act as my 
Penonal Representative, then, in such evenllf I appoint Mary Killings, H e y b m ,  Idaho, as the 
Persoral Representative of my =tat-. I direct that tbe Personal Representative and altzrnate 
Personal Representative rrp~oiit2d in this paragraph shall senle ~vithout bond. 
GL.4USE 3 
POIVEXS OF TfSE PERS0N.a. WPXSEN?14TnrE 
--A 
My Persona! 'epreselltati~~e is aothorized md empowered tn exercise all powers 
in 21: management of my e a t e  Ylat awl reasonable aad pl~~dent  individual would exercise iu the 
mazagement ofsivilar property oa911ed in my Peisonal Representative's own riglli, upon such 
terms and conditions as may seem best to my Personal Represent;iti\~e, and to exacute and deliver 
any and aB k t r m e n t s  and to do my and all acts which iny Personal Repres~lctative may deem 
necessary OT~iOper to c q r  o-a the puposes of this Wl. 
CLAUSE 4 
DIRECTIONS TG PERSONL WPRESEhrl.47nrE 
I direct that my body be cremated urith no services, I chect that my friend, Bob 
Soaioger, sbaE be responsible for the ashes. My ashes shall be spread over Carson City, Nevada 
bothels. 
CLAUSE 5 
DISPOSITION OF CERTAIN PEXS0NA.L PROPERTY BY SE?.WTE M'XrrLNG 
I order and direct that certain items of my personal propem shaU be distiibuted 
according to awritten list of items md intended recipi~ats &ereofprepxed either in nly 
handwritkg or sign-d by me, if siich a list is in existecce at the time of my death. 
CLAUSE 6 - 
RESIDUE 
AU of therest, residue and remainder of my property ~ ~ h i c l l  I o w  or have a y  
interesr in ~vl~atcrver at the time of my death, othel- than bensficial i::terests in ir~lsts, 1 zi\;e, 
i~eqcearii, and dz~nise Po the Ameui:;ul Cancer Society .MI bmeficial internis that I ilaile iu m y  
frusts I ~ic.,e, bequeath, a d  devise tn Maiy Elliriys. I exercise any poa~erofappointrxent 'Jlai I 
might 11old and appoint Mary Kiihgs. Zifor any reason Mary ICilhgs prtdeceases xne, her 
hterest mil tlie power of appointment shaz p a s  to Stephen D. Wesifd. 
IN WIVTTNC,SS WEERETIF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this % f 4 - 
day ofBa / R  ,2005. 
I 
~ a c &  A. dowan 
Tbe foregoing &tnment, consisting of four (4) pages, includmg %e page s i p e d  
by the undersigned witnesses, was, on the date tbereof s iged,  published and declared by tLe 
aEove-named Zachary A. Cowan, to be his Last Rii;ill and Tesianrmf in the presence of us, who, 
2t his request and his presence m d  in the presence of each other, md on the same date, have 
---- 
STATE OF W.b&IO 1 
1 ss 
Couaty of Cassia 1 
the. ZACHARY A CONIAN, the Testator, ard Bona Rae Daiiis - 
and E a l l i  Kit t 
, ole witnesses, ~~spectively, ~ ~ : l , o s ~  
MTHEWTIERoPM 1 C*aNo, t2wOO6-IW 
E8l'AEOP: I 
f LrJ'XJ'VUmOW iWm dS112EmN'r 
ZACHARY A. COWAN i 08 GLMM OF MARY SCK.Ll%? 1110fGNI3!% APPROVAL OF MTRlON 
beocr&d, 1 P O R ~ U ~ ~ M W U A N D  
1 -OF-AMI 
) DIBMXdKfnt OFAPPEIJ, 
Come now ShpW D. WoeXlhU, the p~WOrt mpmsd&% bFdv %Uta ot'aachnry A. 
Gowts, by W thmuph bts rprclal mnael, bandd J, Chieholm, and the ettomy fix tks orrtidp, 
W U ~ l M  K6ni fWdwrli Mary Rflliar balgicr, by and thmqgh ba ddwnsr WUlllhl Whll$iasd 
lit. .ad SIIlslsy O. Cokutd thd Amarbm C~MW Sod*, by d !b& itr Wmq,  %'illhim 
A4 Psooas, tu etiptitstt md agmcl rs LblbwR: 
I .  All el&M d M r r y  KU-& tha LA@ Will ud Taau#l*R.d* A, 
Cwrq~hdr,dw/*rDoatBsWofapovrrofyroalatmant(ruMsottoths 
pmhrlaar o?bugi& 7 h - . u ( - m k r t  &a rw a?Onahldnd 
nKnrarngt mnur.(Sl~,~). The h d D  r#lld will ad lnottldc MY inwme oftha 
ost~loWMdrmutdb,-b~vy~liUrnLWw. 8rldbumrhsl#kprldh 
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Craig 1.. Meadows, ISB No. 1081 
Michelle R. Points. ISB No. 6224 
IfrtW1,I:Y SROXELI. ENNIS & 1 I/\WI.EY L1.P 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 161 7 





Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher 
IN I'IIE DIS'TRICTCOURT OF T I E  FIFl'tf JUDICIAI. DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAIIO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER, 1 
1 Case No. CV 2009-5 17 
Plaintiff, 
VS. ) NOTICE OF E1EARING 
W. KENT FI.ETCIJER, 
TO ALL PARTIES AND TIIEIR COL'NSEI, OF KECORD. 
PLEASE TAKENOTICE that the Defendant W. Kent Fletcher will call his Motion for 
Summary Judgment for hearing before the above-entitled Court. Burlcy, Idaho, on the 1 0 % ~  day of 
August. 2009, at 10.00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel can he heard. before the fionorable 
Michael R. Crabtree. 





r Defendant W. Kent Fletcher 
I I1I:KENY CIIR'I'IFY that on this une, 2009, 1 caused to he semed a true 
copy nt the f~iregoing NOI'lCli OF  tfliARING by the method indicated below, m d  addressed to 
each of the following: 
Allen B. Ellis 
ELLIS, BROWN & SffEII,S, CIiAKI'EREZ) 
J ~ . ~  Mail, Postage Prepaid - 
I-fand Delivered 
707 North 8th Street Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 388 - E-mail 
Boise. ID 8370 1-0388 lelecopy: 208.345.9564 
[Attorneys for Plaintiffj 
ALLEN 8. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTXRED 
Attorneys-at-Law 
707 North 8th Street 
P .0  Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsim~le) 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, R4 AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
Mary Killins Soignier, 
Plaintiff 
1 Case No.CV 2009-51 7 
) 
) MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION 
) WITHOUT CAUSE Rule 40(d)(l) 
I 





Comes now the  lai in tiff, through her attorney of record, and moves the Court for 
disquuiification without cause of the Honorable Michael R. C rabke  pursuant to Rule 40(d)(l) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this 291b day of June, 2009. 
Allen B. ~ll i ' f  
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION WITHOUT CAUSE - 1 
BRWICrlTE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 29' day  of June, 2009, I caused to be sewed a inre and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Michelle R. Points - 13,s. Mail 
Craig L. Meadows - Hand Delivered 
Hawle~, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, I,LP Overnight ivfail 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Telecopy (FAX) 
Boise, Idaho 83701 - 16 17 954-5238 
Allen B. Ellis 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION WITHOUT CAUSE - 2 
000103 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER, 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV-2009-0000517 D 
Plaintiff, ) 
) NOTICE OF HEARING 
Vs . ) Motion for Disoualification without 






NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above entitled matter is set for 
hearing on Mondav, Julv 20, 2009, at 10:OO AM, in the District Courtroom of the 
above-entitled court. 
DATED this 1st day of July, 2009. 
A 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certifL that on this 1st day of July, 2009, 1 caused to be sewed a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
1. Allen B Ellis 
Ellis, Brown & Sheils 
P.O. Box 388 
707 North 8th Street 
Boise. ID 83701 
2. Michelle R. Points 
Craig L. Meadows 
Hawley, Troxell, ENnis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
Boise, ID 83701 -1617 
, J  
U.S Mail 
2 U.S. Mail 
Tara Guhderson 
ALLEN B ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEtLS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys-at-Law 
707 North 8th Sbeet 
P .0  Box 388 
Bo~se, Idaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 'I'HE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
Mary Killins Soignier, ) 
1 Case No.CV 2009-51 7 
Plaintiff, ) 
) NOnCE OF WITHDRAWAL OF 
) MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATIOE 
) WITHOUT CAUSE 
W. Kent Fletcher, 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Comes now the plaintiff, through her attorney of record, and withdraws her Motion for 
disqualification without cause of the Honorable Michael R. Crabtree 
DATED this 1" day of July, 2009. 
Allen B. ~!l;s 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION WITHOUT CAIJSE - I 
CERltFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTlFY That on Uus I "  day of July, 2009, 1 caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Michelle R. Points 
Craig L.  meadows 
Ilawley, Troxell, Emis 62. Uawley, LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 161 7 
Boise, Idaho 8370 1 - 16 1 7 
- U.S. Mail 




NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION FOR DISQUALlFICATfON WITHOUT CAUSE - 2 
ALLEN B ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN L& SHEILS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys-at-Law 
707 North 8th Street 
P 0 Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 8370 1-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Tclephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
fSU No, 1626 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COLR'I' OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 'THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, PJ AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
Mary K1111ns Soign~er, ) 
1 Case NoCV 2009-5 17 
Plaintiff, ) 
) MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
) TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT 




Nature of case: In this legal malpractice case, plaintiff Mary Killins Soignier alleges that, as 
a proximate result ofthe negligence of the defendant attorney, she has been denied her testamentary 
entitlement asanamed beneficiary in the decedent's Will. The Will, which was drafted by defendant 
attorney Fletcher for the testator Zachary Cowan, provided, inter alia: "A11 beneficial interests that 
I have in any trusts I give, bequeath, and devise to Mary Killings (sic). I exercise any power of 
appointment that I might hold and appoint Mary Killings (sic)." See Exl~ibit A to Fletcheraffidavit. 
MEMORANDUM [N OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUM,%ZRY IUDGMEXT - 1 
The rmst referenced in the >@ill is the Leonarda A. Cowan Trust, a copy of which is attached 
to the affidavit of Allen B. Ellis as Exhibit I .  There are two ,notable provisions in tlie trust. First, 
the trust does not extend a powcr of'appointment ta the decedent Zachary Cowan; rather, in the event 
he does not suwive the trustor Leonarda Cowan and leaves no issue, the trust assets go to Ms. 
Cowan's niece, Sandra Eileen Keller. See Trust, paragraph 4.2 (d)(i). The second notable feature 
of the Trust is that when Zachary Colvan reaches the age of fifty years, the Trust will teminatz and 
the assets are to be distributed to Mr. Cowan "outright and free of trust". See Trust, paragraph 
4.2(d)(ii). It is undisputed that at the t h e  attoruey Fletcher d-rtfted the 2005 Will Mr. Cowan was 
past his fiftieth birthday and the trust had terminated, i.e., '41. Cowan turned fifty in November, 
2003. 
Defendant's alleged neelicence: A: the time the Will w w  drdted, defendant attorney 
negligently failed to review the Trust document Jr, if reviewed, did so in a cursorp, negligent 
fashion. This failure to review is undisputed because the Will references a power of appointment 
in the Trust, which, in fact, did nct exist.. Had Mr. Fletcher reviewed the Trust, he would have 
ascertained that the Trust would terminate or had terminated upon Mr. Cowan's fiftieth birthday by 
the express language of the Trust document. Given the inevitable termination of the Trust, attorney 
Fletcher was on inquiry notice respecting the following issue: whether Mr. Cowan had reached fifty 
years, and, if so, his intention as to those assets which had previously been held in the'rrust. 
The Will provision, as drafted by attorney Fletcher in 2005, purported to dispose of Mr. 
Cowan's "beneficial interests" in trusts. This will provision 3 without force and effsct Ixcause the 
testator's beneficial interest terminated on his birthday in 20113 and, from that time forward, he 
owned the trust property "outright". See Trust instrument (Exhibit 1, pp. 5, 8,9). 
MEM0RRPdL)UM n*; OPPOSlTION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMkXT - 2 
As is noted below five years earlier, attorney Fletcher had drafted a \viH w:th an   den tical 
format For the decedent Cowan (with a different beneficiary), which sought to beqwth  the same 
assets held in the Trust. At that time the Trust was in existence, and the bequest of'"bencficia1 
interests that 1 have in any trusts" vias avalid be'quest. See Exlibit 2 io Ellis affidavit. In using this 
superseded will a a cookie cutter for the Wiil namiiig plaintiff Soignier-Killins a beneficiary, 
defendant attorney inadvertently referenced the testator's beneficial interests in a trust which did not 
exist. 
Proximate causation: Following Mr. Cowan's death, the Will was placed into probate and 
plaintiff here claimed an interest in those assets which ha2 been held in trust. The residuary 
beneficiary, American Cancer Society, argued that, because no trusts existed in which tfe decedent 
had a beneficial interest, plaintiff, although a named beneficiary, si~ould receive nothing. The 
magistrate judge accepted this argument by summary judgment filed September 17,20117. That is, 
because decedent had no beneficial interest in a t ~ u s ,  there is no ambiguity, reasoned the magistrate, 
and "the testator's intent is clear and unambiguous 3n the face ofthe Will ciocument", i.e., plaintiff 
Soignier, although a named beneficiary, should take nothing. (Exhibit 3 to Ellis affidavit, p, 12). 
As reflected in Exhibit B to the Fletcher aEdavit, plaintiffKillins Soignier settled her claim 
against the estate for $100,000, substantially less than the value of the tmt propert)' gjven to the 
decedent Cowan outright at the time he turned fifty years of age. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS KOT BARRED BY THE -OF LEVEI'ATIONS 0.C. 5-219f4& 
Summq of-: Where the existence, or not, of any alleged negligence ~ iepnds  on 
the outcome of litigation, there is no objective proof of actual damage until the litigation is 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
concluded. City o/'.t;lc(irll v, Ru.r~cjn, 146 Idaho,_-, 201 P, 3d $29,636 (2009). In the case at bench, 
tmtil themagistrate rded on Septernber 17,200: (E,xhibit 3) that plaintiff should r&e nothicg under 
the Will, any claim against attorney Fletcher foi malpractice ~vould bc spcu;ative. The cornplaint 
herein, filedon March 1 9,2009, within two yews of the magistrate's decision, is timely under ldaho 
Code $5-219(4). Even negtigence which increases the risk :hat a client will be harmed does not 
trigger the mrming of the statute of limitations until harm actually occurs. Parswns Packing v. 
itfmsingill, 140 Idaho 480, 482, 95 P.3d 631 (2004). To hold otherwise "would foment future 
litigation initiated on sheer surrnisj: of potential damages ir. order to avoid the likely consequence 
of seeing actions barred by the statute of limitations". City 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ c C a 1 l  v. Bmfon, 146 131aho a: 201 
P.3d at 636, citing Muck F~nancial Cnrp. v. Smilh,I l l Idaho 3, 12,720 P.2d 191, 195 (19861, 
Thus, attorney Fletcher's ~ o o r l y  drawn Will did not create the inevitabilipj that plaintiff 
would be damaged; and the fact that the Will increased the likelihood a f  financial loss ioes not, ill 
and of itself, trigger the limitations period. 
The Idaho Suwreme Court 11% consistent& held that in order for a claim for crofessional 
mdaractice to accrue, there must be "objective vroofthat would s u a ~ o r t  the existence of::ome actual 
*". Chicoine v. Egngnalt 122 Idaho at 487. Defendant wgues that :he statute of limitations 
was triggered either (I) in 2005, at the time the Wjll was drafted, or (2) upon death of testator in 
2006 (Defendant's Brief, p. 8). Had suit been brought on either of Close occasion%, it would be 
subject to dismissal given the absence of any objecive damage. 
As observed by the Supreme Court, i t  wcruld be "nonsensical to hold that a cause of action 
is barred by the statute of limitation:: before that c:au:x of actior: [for professio~~al n alpractice] even 
accmes". Ctty of AfcCaN v. Baton, 201 P.3d at 634 (bracketed material explanatory). In most 
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insianccs, such accrual cannot occur until the underlying litigation has k e n  reso!vcd. 
In Fairway Development (Yo. v. Peterson, Mo.T.v, I24 Idaho 866, 865 P.2d 957 (19931, the 
client retained an attorney to challenge the asse5sn.cnt of its property. The district court denied the 
client's motion for pmial sumayjudgment ,  and the client sought an iriterlocutofy appeal which 
the Supreme Court initially grant<:& but the appeal was sutjsequently dismissed as [laving heen 
improvidently granted 
The case was remanded to the district court. The district court dism~ssed the client's 
challenge to the assessments, and the client appealed again The Supreme Court reversed the 
dismissal and remanded the case to the district court. On remand, the district couit dismissed the 
client's claims on November 3, 1988, based upon the failure to exhaust its administrative remedies 
years earlier. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the dism~ssal. 
On December 12,199 1 ,  the client sued itsattorney for professional negligence. The case was 
dismissed based upon the statute of limitations. i.e., Idaho C ~ d e  section 5-2 19(4). The Supreme 
Court afirmed the dismissal, holding that the malpractice claim accr~led on the date of dismissal of 
theunderlyngclaim,November 3, .988: "Accordingly we hold there is objective proofthat Fairway 
Development [the client] suffered some actual tlanlage when the district court dismissed Fiurway 
Development's claim on November 3, 1988". Id 124 Idaho &L 869,865 P 2d. at 960. 
Likewise here. Plaictiff 5 claim for professional negligence accrued when the magistrate 
dismissed her claim that she was beneficiary under the Will. Until that point, any claim against 
attorney Fletcherwould have been premature, i.e., there was nc "objective proofthat would s u p r t  
the existence of some actud damage". Chicoine v. Bignull, 122 Idaho 482,487, 835 P.2d 1293, 
1298 (1993). 
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In Chicoini., anattorneyre~trcscntedrhe client in asuit lhr damages. resultingin ajury verdict 
of damages against the client in 1983 The client's attorney lilcd a timely motion for a judgment 
nowithstanding the verdict (j.n.0.v.) and later filed a motion fc~rnewtrial. The district crlurt granted 
the motion forj.n.0.v. which was wversed by the S$~preme Um~rt. O'Veil I .  Schuckard!, 1 12 Idaho 
472, 733 P.2d 693 (1 986). On remand, the district court granted the motion for new trid which, on 
a sccond appeal, the Supretce Court on July 11. 1?89, reverred on the grounds that the nsu  trial 
motion was not timely filed. O'Neil v Schuckharcir, 116 Idaho 0 7 , 7 7 7  P.7d 729 (I 989) (O:Veil 
10- 
tn December 1989, the client brought amdpraeticr ac~ion against the attorney based upon the 
dilatory motion for new trial. The district court dismissed the s!iit as not timely. The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that "there was no objective proof of some zctual dunage to Chicoine until this 
Court reversed the order granting a new trial in O>VeilII on July I I ,  1989 122 Idahc at 487, 835 
P.2d at 1298. 
That is, in Chicoine, the mere allegationv by the client's adversary that a motion for new trial 
was dilatory did not trigger the statutory period. In tile case at bench, the allegations by the American 
Cancer Society that plaintiff was not an entitled beneficiaty under the Will did not trigger the statute 
of limitations. Until those allegations were adjudicated against the plaintiff, the limitations period 
did not commence to run. That adjudication occurred on September 17, 2007; plaintiffs complaint 
was filed March 25, 2009, clearly within the two year limitation period of Idaho Code section 5-  
21 9(4). 
In Mack Fitzuncial v Smith, 11 1 Idaho 8, 720 P.2d 19 1 (1 986), the clients allege? that an 
accounting firm was negligent with respect to audits performed on a prospective borro-m: in 1978 
MEMORAUDUM lN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JCUOMENT - 6 
through 1980 in reliance upon the ~udi ts ,  the clicnt extended credit. Subscquent!y, the borrouser 
went into bankruptcy, and on Apnl 23, 1984, the client filed a malpractice action against the 
accountants. The district court mlcd that the claim for malpractice was time barred. The Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that i t  was not until 1983, as a result of a bankmptcy ruling, that the claim 
for malpractice accrued. It was not until the bmknptcv ru!ing that "it :hen became apparent that 
Mack Financial [the client] would not be able :o fully recompense From the bankruptcy estate the 
amount which it had loaned to Sho.:maker [the debior]". Id. I I I Idaho at I I fexplanatoiy material in 
brackets). 
Again, only upon a clarifyingadjudication in the underljing bankmptcy action d i t  there emerge 
"objective proof that would suppoi t the existence caf some acvsal damage". Chicoine v. Bignoil, 122 
Idaho at 487. 
'The most recent andysis of Idaho Code 5 5-21 9(4) in the professiond malpractice context is 
City of .UcColl V. Bmfon, 146 Idaho -9 201 P.3d 629 (2009). The City of McCali had entered into 
a contract with St. Clair Contractor's Inc. ("St. Clair"] for the construction ofa storage lagoon to hold 
treated effluent. The City was represented by the defendant attorneys throughout the construction 
project. St. Clair encountered various delays, arid rhe City, upon the alleged advice of its attorneys, 
terminated the contract in February, 2001. The bonding company for St. Clair hired a replacement 
contract to complete the project. ' f ie  City concluded that tt.e replacement connacto;'~ work usas 
deficient On the alleged advice of defendant at:omeys, the C ~ t y  withheld payments tcl the bondhg 
company for its replacement contractor 
In December 2001, the bondingcompany filed su t  agaiiist the City .^ortvrongfully demanding 
payment on its performance bond and withholding payments. 'rlie defendant attorneys represented the 
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Cily and in January 2002, the City began incurring defense c:ists in the lirigation. On  May 4,2004, 
thejuy awarded $4,955'096 in breach of contract damages aga~nst the City. On May 3,2006, rheCi!y 
filed a malpract~cc actlon agdln;: the a!torneys, alleglng regligcnce in rzcomrnenii~ng the City 
terminate St. Clair and withhold palmeats from .:he bondin;: company. 'Kt attorneys ixoved for 
summary judgment on the grow~ds, inter alia, that the complaint was barred by !he StaNte of 
limitations. ?he district court grznted the motion for summary judgment. (In appeal the Supreme 
Court reversed. In explaining its dicta in Chicoine that "the e:iistence of the damage did nut depend 
on the outcome of lawsuits", the Court opined: 
Although we stated in C'hicoine that "[tlhe exislence ofthe damage did 
not depend on the outcome of the lawsuits, since only 'some damage' 
is necessary for the action to accrue under I.C. 5 5-219(4)," in that case 
the existence ofsomedamage actually did depe~~d  upon the outcome of 
the lawsuit. We held, "Chicoine asserts that the action against Bignall 
did not accrue pursuant to I.C. F, 5-219(4) until July 1989, when this 
Court reversed the uial court's granting of a nevi trial. We agree." 122 
Idaho at 487,835 P.2d at 1298. The negligence of Chicoine's attorney 
had occurred years earlier, but there was not objective proof of the 
damage until this Court later reversed the grant of a new trial, 
terminating the lawsuit. 
Likewise in thc case at bench. Whether attorney Fletcher's will drafiing impacted the plaintiff, 
a named beneficiary in the Will, could not be ascerrained until the magistrate judge had ruled on her 
entitlement as a beneficiary. That is, as in Chicoina, the effec.: of any alleged negligence "depended 
on the outcome of the litigation", as it  did in Giq c~fMcCall: 
Under the circumstences of this caw, the exi::tence or effect of a ~ y  
alleged negligeace #on ihe part of the City's Attorneys regarding their 
legal advice and strategy depended upoc the outcome of the litigation 
against the City by IVausauandSt. Clair. There'xouldnot beobjective 
proof of actual damage until that occ~med, (Citations omitted) 'To hold 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDCJMENT - 8 
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othenvise in this cme "would forlent fume litigation irlitiated on sheer 
surmise of potential damages in order to avoid the likely callsequence 
of seeing actions &red by lin~itations (Ci ta~on o~nittedj. Clients 
involved in lengthy litigation wodd have to file protective lawsuit3 
against their attorneys when following their advice aiid strategy. 
without yet having any objective proof of acm-il damage or being able 
to prove a cause of action for professional malpractice. 
I'o summarize the above holdings as well as a decis~on 11ot referenced above, Tr~nsrm~ C'ullev 
Bunk v Krtlen & Pirrenger, 1 12 Itllbo 357, 723 P.Zd 326 (19117). 
Case - Underlv~n@ L,lt~~atlon - SOL ,2ccruaI Fo~n: 
Mack Financial v. Smith Bankruptcy Bankruptcy ruling re 
I I I Idaho at 8 payout to creditors 
Killen v. Pittenger Bankruptcy Judicial confirn~ation of Ch. I3 
112 Idaho at 357 plan without a ~ w c l  of post- 
confirmation interest 
Chicoine v BignnN Appeal re grant of motion Reversal of grant of new 
122 Idaho at 482 for new trial trial bv Supreme Court 
Fuinvay Development AppeaI to district court Dismissal of suit 
124 Idaho at 866 re administrative ~ I i n g  by district court 
Ciry of McCull v. Burton Suit vs. City Ibr Verdict on contract breach 
201 P.3d at 629 breach of contra& 
In each of the above cases, a judicial dec:slon triggered the statute of !imitation:<. Until each 
such decision, whether the plaintiff had been "damaged" was :;peculation. Llkewise here. Until the 
probate court ruled in Septemher sf 2007, finding that plaintifF was not an entltlzd beneficlq, 
plaintiffs legal injuries remained speculative. The herein suit, which filed in March of this year, is 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUhlMAkY JUDGMENT- 9 
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Preliminam note: Defendant appears to argue that (1 )he owed no duty to ~lairltiff because she 
was nat a client, and (2) even if plaintiffwas an "identified beneficiary" wl~o was owed a duty under 
fjurrigfeld v ifoncock, 140 Idaho 134'90 P.3d 884 (2004). atblrney Fletcher has "fkifilled" that duty. 
(Defendant's brief, pp. 9, 10). However, defendat has not proffered any evidence to support the 
co~~clusion that his conduct conforned to the applicable itanl'ard of care for Idaho anorne:;~. Out of 
anabundanceofcaution, plaintiff has fl;ledtheaffid.svit of attorney John FF. Magnuson who opines that 
certainconduct of attorney Fletcher did fall belcw rheapplical~le standard. Thus, there is no bvis  to 
impose summaryjudgment on the grounds that attorney Fletcherhas "filfilled any tlutyoweC:onamed 
beneficiaries" (Defendant's brief, p. 10). 
Inherent defect in Will: Defendant Fletcher authored a will which contained a provision, 
purportedly for the benefit of an identified &neficiary (plaintiff Killins Scignm), erroneously 
describing the property devised to plaintiff Killins Soignier as held within a trust and erroneously 
attributing to testator Cowan a power of appointment as to that property. It would be cynical (and 
speculative) to conclude that testator Cowan intended to includea provisionin his Will that purported 
to given beneficiary Killins Soignier a bequest but which bequest, in actuality, gave her n o h n g .  
On the face of it, a reasonable conclusion is that attomey Fletcher failed to read the trust or, 
i fhe read i t ,  failed to remember the provisions at the time he drafted the &ill. This ~:onc:ujion is 
confirmed by reference in the Will t o  apowerofappointment which the 'rust instrument does not have 
(Exhibit I). As a result of his failure to inform iin:self zs tc 1 key testamentary document prior to 
drafting the Will, defendant attorney did not reccsgnize that the testator's trust interests i.emiinated at 
MEMORANDUM LU OPPOSITION TO ,MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 10 
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age fifty years w d  the testator owned the trust <wets outright at the time the Will wWas drafted, 
The only other conclusion is that the testator Cowan, intended to name plaintiffa~a beneliciary 
but, for whatever hvisted reason, intended that she take nothi:~g under the Will. 
Aoolicability of Harrie(eld: The reference in the Will to a non-existence power of 
appointment in the trust is evidence that attorney Fletcher failed to read the trust. That failure resulted 
in his i yorance as to the relevance of testator Cowan'sage as ir related to his devisable assets and how 
thoseassetsshould bedescribed. This breakdown on.&. Fletcler's panresultedia benelci~ry Killins 
Soignier taking nothing under the Will. This is precisely the scenario contemplated by Harrideldv 
Nuncock wherein a duty is owed by the aeomey to the named beneficiary: 
Considering those factors, we hold that im attorney preparing 
testamentary instruments owes ;I duty to the beneficiaries named or 
identified therein to prepare such instnunents, and if requested by the 
testator to have them properly executed, so as to effectuate the testator's 
intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments. If, as a proxinlate 
result of the attorney's professional negligence, the testator's intent as 
expressed in the testamentary inr:tntments is frustrated in whole or in 
part and the beneficiary's interest in theestate is aiiherlost, diminished, 
or unrealized, the atxomey would be liable to the beneficiary harmed. 
Id. 140 Idaho at 158. 
in trusts which no longer existed {'because he then owned the properpi outrlgbt). the magistrate was 
guided by the plain language of the '#ill and concluded that pla~ntiffshould take nothing. That is, the 
"beneficial interests" devised to her did not exist. This ci-cumstance is precisely the sccnario 
addressed by EIarrigfeld wherein a duty resides in the attorney to a named beneficiary. 
/ 
/ 
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W E ' S  CL.4IILfS (4RF; NO I BARRED BY 
m Q C W E  O F ~ U ~ E S T O P P F L  
Defendant argues that the plaintias c1airr.s are judicially estopped by virtue of her havir.g 
executed a st~pulation for settlement \bithrespect to the probztc action. Det'cndant's analysis imolves 
a profound m~sunderstanding and/ora m~sapplication of the doctrine of judicial estoppel '[%e (!octri~e 
is intended to prevent a party from playing "fast a d  loose" w ~ t h  courts. PlaintiFs settlement in the 
underlying probate matter is not hconsistent with hcr inalpra,;:ice claim here. 
The policies underlying preclusion of inconsivtcnt positions are general 
considerations of the orderly administrations of justice and regard for 
the dignity ofjudicial proceedings . . . Judicial estoppel is intended to 
protect against a litigant playing fast and loose with the courts . , 
MiKay v. Owens, 130 ldaho 138, 152, 937 P.2d 1222 (I!???) quoting Rissetro v. PIurnber and 
Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597: 601 (9" Cir. 1996). 
The most recent pronouncement of the doctrine ofjuacial estoppel is contained in fkinze v. 
Bauer, 145 ldaho 232, 178 P.3d 597 (2008). 'I'hat ease involved an action against an attorney by his 
client arising froma divorce. The divorceactionwasprimarilyconcerned with the division ofproperty 
and the custody arrangement pertaining to the couple's child. Following the commencement of the 
divorce trial, the magistrate brought. the counsel for the parties in their chambers for an off the record 
meetingconcemingthe parties clainls. The parties began discus:iions concerninpa possible settlement. 
Following thosediscussions, the settlement waspre:.ented to th~rcourt withsome, but not all, %r terms 
of the settlement discussed by the magistrate. T l ~ e  magistrate then placed the parties under oath and 
Heinze acknowledged that he agreed with the tenns of the settls:ment ard  would abide S:+ them. Two 
days after the settlement, Heinze sent Bauer, his attorney, an email expressing misgivings about the 
settlement. Bauer thereafier filed i~ motion to set aside the settlement and the magistrate denied the 
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motion I le ln~e~hen brotight suit zdleying damages for allege,l negligent representation of him in the 
divorce proceedings. The court kegan its discussion by noting chat judicial estoppel appiics when a 
party makes statements in open court: 
Stated another way, the concept ,3f judicid esti ppel takes tnto account 
not only what a m y  states under oathin oogn ::our!, hut also what that 
parry knew, or should have known, at thz time the origtnal position uas 
adopted 
I45 ldaho at 235-236, clang iMckhv v Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 937 P.2d ;22? (1997) iemphasls 
added). 
?he court noted that Heinze made his st%e*nents in cq:en court while he was ulrder 03th: 
In the settlement, Heinze received a final divorce, secured joint custody 
of his child, and a div;sion of the community estate, by which he was 
able to retan the marital home to preserve a scl~se of continuity for his 
child. This advantage was obbaried through sv,om statements Under 
oath, Heinze was asked if he was in agreement with the settleinent, to 
which he replied: "1 am." 
fd 145 ldaho at 241 
In reaching its decision, the court discussed the eleme~ts ofjudicial estoppel 
Judicial estoppel is applied when a litigant, obtains a judgment, 
advantage, or consideration from one party, through means of sworn 
statements, and s~ibsequently adopts inconsistent and contrary 
allegations or testimony to obtain atecovery or a right zgainst another 
party, arising out ofthe same transaction or sul?jijct matter. 
Id. 145 Idaho at 240. 
'The court also discussed th* considerations to be alleged in determining the applicahon of 
judicial estoppel: 
First, a party's later position must be 'c1ear:y inconsistent' with its 
earlier position. Second, courts regulariy inquir- whether the party has 
succeeded in persuading a court to acce?t that oartv's earlier aosition, 
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so tkat judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later 
proceeding would create 'the perception that either the first or the 
second court was misled.' ... A third consideration is whether the party 
seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair 
advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not 
estopped. 
Id 145 Idaltoat 241, quoting New ifampshire v /Maine, 532 1! S. 742,750,121 S Ct 1808,1815,149 
L Ed 968,978 (2001) (emphasis 3dded). 
ft is clear from an exami~lation of the dxision ill fieinze that judicial estoppel has no 
application to the facts of this tax. There has be,% no represen7ation in open court; nor has there been 
any "sworn statement" by plaintiff: nor has there "xenany inconsistent positions taken. The senlement 
agreement signed by her only provides that she i:j resol\'ing al: z!aims as against the estate ofZachary 
A. Cowan. Defendant does not appear as a party to that action but simply as an attorney for the estate. 
Amdavit of W. Kent Fletcher, Exhibit D, p. 2. Far from mak~ng any statement in open court, plaintiff 
sunply resolved her clams against the estate. PIaintiff has not obtained any advantage vis-a-\'IS Mr 
Fletcher, nor has Mr. Fletcher been disadvantaged. Rather, defendant is attempting to obtain 
cons~deratio~l which was not bargained for and concerning a transaction to .which he was not a party, 
I e , a dism~ssal of any clams aganst him personally for his legal malpract~ce. 
Plaintiff also cites .LfcElay 1:. Owens, szipra. Like lieiz:e, this case involved stat'zments made 
in open court concerning settlement. Plaintiff was a mother of a child who had been b o n  with severe 
birth defects, She hired Houst and 13wens as her attoneys wit11 Howard h'ian~veiler being appointed 
guardian ad litem for the child. Pl:&ntlff hfcKay arbwed that sl:e 'was forced to accept the scttiement 
on her own behalfas well as minor's compromise on behalf of her son due to the alleged malpractice 
of attorneys Owens and Manweiler Prior to the minor's comprc~mise hearing, McKay filed objections 
to the proposed compromise, Manweiler's appointment as gumdian and other matters. 1-iowever, she 
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agreed in upen court to the settlement at the min>3r1s cornprom:se hearing based upon the advice from 
herattomey. Following the acceptmee ofthe settlement, McKay brought an action against Owens and 
Manweiler alleging negligence in settling the case without her consent and on the basis that the 
settlement amount was iluufficient. In rejecting MeKay'a argument, the court noted hat  the 
statements made in open court were to be afforded substantial credibility: 
The sanctity of court proceedings is something that cannot be trlfied 
urth, nor will we pennit a party to play fast and loose with the courts. 
To allow McKay's argument that Owens' ard Manw'eiler's alleged 
malpractice -forced" her to lie in court, desecrates the sanctity of court 
proceedings, and impedes the administration of justice. h order to 
properly cany out irs duties in approving aminor's compromise, a court 
must be fully infornled of the nature and status of the agreements. To . 
mislead the court hy stating that one agrees to a settlement when one 
does not, adversely affects the court'sabilityto ilischarge its duties, and 
impedes the administration ofjustice. 
Id Idaho 130at 154 
The court held that McKay wasjudicially estopped fror I dleging mdpractice in the set?lement 
because ol'these statements: 
In contrast, McKay's legal malpractice claim goes to the heart of the 
settlement itself: that Owen and hfanweiler settled the case without her 
consent, and that th- settlement amount is insuficient. The case would 
not be -'settled," as a matter of :aw, without .:he compromise of the 
minor's claim being approved by th: court. A;i: discussed previously, 
McKay assented to the settlement without resersation or objection, and 
now is complaining about the very conduct she clearly approved at the 
minor's compromise hearing. 
Id I30 Idaho at 155 
In the instant case, we have no representations in open court, nor do we have any 
representations that are at all inconsistent. Defendant is not a party to the settlement; he appears only 
as attorney for the estate. Plaintiff is not judicially estopped from bringing an action against him for 
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his own personal mdpmctice in drafting the last will and testar!rent and the estate plarxiblg fi3r Cowan. 
See Middleekaufv. Lake ofCascade, 110 ldaho 909,719 P.2d 1169 (1991) (party to he estopped must 
have obtained a judgment, atfvantrtye or consideration %om another party in order for estoppel to 
apply). 
Finally and of equal importance to the above points, the plaintiffs in ,WcKay and Heime, were 
challenging a prior in-court sett1t:ment which they themselves had approved. Plaintiff here is 
challenging the adequacy of the sellement with -he Cowan Estnte. Had plaintiff refused to settle with 
the Estate, defendant would likely argue that plaintiff had failed to mitigate her damages. 
It is clear from review of lclaho case law that judicial estoppel is not implicated in this case. 
Plaintiff has not received any advantage from Mr. Fletcher ir, his individual capacity. Plaintiff has 
made no representation or sworn statement concerning Fletcher. The doctrine ofjudicial estoppel is 
inapposite and has no application to the facts in this case. 
Y!XI.MR THE DOC'TRINE OF WAIVER NOR T& DOCTUVE OF 
U A S I  ESTQPPlL BARS 1 HIS ACTION 
Defendant states that if the court finds the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel is not applicable, 
that plaintiffs claims are barred on the doctrines ofwaiver and quasi estoppel. Defendant cites 
Record Steel and Consiruction inc v Martel Construcrion, 129 ldaho288,923 P.Zd 995 (1996). 
Quasi estoppel is a doctrine designed to prevent one party kom gaining an unconscionable 
advantage over another by changing positions. IJnder the facts in the instant case, there is no 
evidence of a change in --position" with respect to Fletcher. He was not a party to the rettlement 
and there are no representations in the settlement which have :my bearing upon his conduct. 
With respect to waiver, the court in Record Steel stated that waiver will not be inferred. 
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Instead, the intent to waive ntust ,:lcarly appear. id 129 Idaho at 292. l'lte court also stated that 
the party asserting waiver must sl~ow that he acted reasonably in reliance upon it acd that he has 
altered his position to his detriment. There is no evidence in this case of any fact that would 
clearly indicate to plaintiff :hat, by releasing her claims against the estate, she was also releasing 
her claims against Fletcher. Moroover, Fletcher hw otTered eny evidence showing that he zelied to 
his detriment on any alleged representation by plaintiff. Tbe monies paid to plaintiff i~cident o tke 
settlement from the assets of the atate, not Fletcher himself. Fletcher Affidavit, Exhibit B, p. I 
'The doctrine of quasi estoppel and waiver tave no apc!icatiou to the kcts oF:hc instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
None of the grounds asserted by defendult merit entry of summary judgment in defendant's 
favor: 
1. Statute of limitations: Vntil the probate wurt ruled upon plaintiffs claimed entitlement as 
an heir to the Cowan Estate, plainiiffs malpractice claim was speculative. The requisite "damage" 
was not incuned and the statute of limitations was not higgerzd until the September 2007 ruling by 
the magistrate judge. The herein suit, filed in March 2009, is 'xithin the hvo )'earlirnitation of Idaho 
Code section 5-2 19(4). 
2. Defendant's duty: As a named beneficiary in the te:;tator's wiU, defendant owed a duty to 
plaintiff to effectuate the testator's intsgt expressed in the Will, i.e., t h t  p1aintifE'beneflcia receive 
that property which had been held in trust. 
3. Judicial estoooel: The doctrine ofjudicial estoppel lws no application to these proceedings: 
(1)plaintifFs position in the probate proceedings is not inconsitltent with her claims agaiust defendant 
here, i.c., she 1s not playing '-fast and loose with the courts"; and (2) plaintiffmade no sworn statement 
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in open court or by affidavi: that is inconsistent with her position in this !itigation. 
4, Quasi estoooel/waive~: Plaintiffs settlement in ihe underlying probate ntattcr and the 
alleged malpractice of defendant dttomey are tr:utsactions separate and apart from one another. That 
is, there is no detrimental reliance by the defendant nor are f ~ e r e  statements or conduct by plaintiff 
which can be construed as a waiver. 
Dated this 27' day of July, 2009. 
Attorney for Plaintiff - 
CERTIFICA'TE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 27" day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by t ie  method indicated below. and addressed to the 
following: 
Michelle R. Points 
Craig L. Meadows 
Hawley, Troxell, Emiis & FIal.vley, LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 




X Telecopy (FAX? 
954-5238 
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ALLEN B ELLIS 
ELLlS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTEED 
Anomeys-at-Law 
707 North 8th Street 
P 0. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
TN THE DISTRICT COlJRT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIiE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
Mary Killins Soignier, ) 
1 Case No CV 2009-5 17 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. MAG:.IUSON 
VS. ) 
1 
W. Kent Fletcher, ) 
) 
Defendant. 1 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)SS. 
County of Kootenaj ) 
I, John F. Magnuson, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1.  1 make this affidavit upon my own personal knowledge and am competent to iestify 
to the matters contained herein. 
2. 1 am an attorney at law with oEces for private practice located in Coeur d'Alene, 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN t' MACNUSON - 1 
Idaho. i was admitted to the Washington State Bar in 1987 and worked in Seattle, Washington for 
the tim of Lesourd and Pattcn urr:il June of 1991. In 1991 1 rerumec to idaho and took t3e Idaho 
State Bar and uas adm~ncd to the practice of law ,n Idaho in 199 I 
3. S~nce  1991 1 have been a sole pmpnetor in the pract~ce of law 
4. I have a general civil practice with  he exceptian that 1 do not practice i l  the area of 
domestic relations, bankruptcy, or criminal law. A pr t ion  .tf my p-acu'ce has involved probate 
matters, both litigation and non-litigation.. 
5. 1 have been retained by the attorneys for the plaintiff to act as an expert witness on 
plaintiffs behalf. In that connection 1 have reviewed the fo!lowing documents: 
Document 
Petition for Informal Probate of Will & Informal Appi:. Of PR 
Claim of Mary Killins Soignier 
Inventory 
Petition for Construction uf %?I1 and Appr3val for P1:a 
Order Setting Hearing and Establishing Method of Service 
Opposition to Petition for Construction of Will 
& Approval for Plan of Distribution of Estate 
Memorandum in Support of Mtn. For Summary Judgn~ent 
Affidavit (Steven Dalton) 
Supplemental Affidavit of Stephen D. Westfall 
Proposed Findings of Facts & Conclusions of Law 
Opposition to 'Motion for Summary .Judgment 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. MAGNUSON - 2 
Oplnlon Regarding S m , q  Judgmen: (1~>/18/1)7 
Order Dismissing Appeal without Prejudice 01/22/08 
Motion to Withdraw Judgment on 
Petition for Construction of Will 
Letter to Sam Cowan from 7,ac Cowan 02/05/04 
Letter to Zac Cuwan & Frederick Mack from Idaho Trust 03/05/05 
Message to Zac Cowans k n t  Fiercher 051 10105 
Letter to 7ac Cowan &om Kent Fletcher 05/20/05 
Letter to Zac Cowan from Kent Fletcher 05/24/05 
Letter to Kent Fletcher/hlichael Saenu' 
Stephen Westfall from William Whitehead 
Letter to William Whitehead from Kent Fletcher 03/08/07 
Letter to Kent Fletcher frorn William Whitehead 03/08/07 
Letter to Trevor Roberts &om Stanley Fontander (Idaho Trust:) 03!09/07 
Lener to F. MacWStephen Westfall from Fornander (Idaho 'Tmst) 03/29/07 
6. In my opinion, which 1 hold with a leasonable degree of legal certainty, the conduct 
of attorney W. Kent Fletcher in the preparation octhe 2005 will for testjto: Zachary Co',van fell 
below the applicable standard of care for attorneys practicing in the state of Idaho in 2005. 1 hold 
this opln~on for the following reasons: 
a The will draited by Mr. Fletcherrefers t n  a power ofattorney hell! by testator 
Cowan which power of attorney 1s not granted by the trust rhls dlscrepaney tells me that Mr 
Fletcher either did not read the W t ,  or did so in aiasty fashion, missing the fact that no power of 
attorney was created in Mr. Cowan's favor 
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b. Had Mr. FI&~rrevi& rta: tlustor had he &IW, w in acarefui fashior. he 
would have l e d  that upon abinhg the age of 50 y m  the tntst property would mwt to Mr. 
C o w  and he would become the outright owner of the. p p r t y .  
c. At the time of the on of the 2C05 Will, Mr. Fletcher bad a duty to 
inquite of Mr. Cowan wherher he had ahbed the age of fifty yrars and to modify the language of 
the Will and r e f m c c  the subject propity es property owned outright by the testator which had 
previously been held in hvst 
d The fact that the Will references "all beneficial interesai that 1 b.vc in any 
austs" indicates that Mr. Fletcher failed to inquin of Mr. Cowan how he wanted the property, 
pmkusly held in trust, devlrzd. 
e. Thc: portion of the Will which m h  to "ul1 beneficial inszests that I haw in 
any trusts" is of no force and effec? given the absence of such trust or MS. 
7. Under these c i r c t m ~ s ,  &*a will, a portjon of which has no force andeffect 
and which fails to effbmate the intention of the restetor, constitutes a deviation from the sfandad 
of care and falls below the standant of carc of attorneys practicing in ldaho in 2005. 
SUBSCRIBED ED SWORN To before me this B a y  o f ~ d y ,  2009, 
- 
fif-q& c1y_$- 
Notmy WIic for ldaho u 
bsiding ~ P W  d R b  
CommissionEkpires: \ \ ( 1 3 / ) 7  
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000129 
V I I I I I L U V I  HUN 1 3 : U j  PAX jU>Y3(1 *  
OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY Thst on thls 9 day of Ju13, 3009,l caused to be sened a true 
and correct copy of the i'oregoing document by the method ~ndicated below and a&idressed to the 
following: 
Michelle R. Points - 1j.S. Mail 
Craig L. Meadows Hand Delivered 
Nawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP - Overnight Mail 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 X Telecopy (F.4X) 
P 0. BOX 1617 954-5238 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1517 
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Allen B. Fll~s, tSB No 1626 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS 
707 North 81h Street 
P.0  Box 388 
Bo~se, ldaho 83701.0388 
Telephone. (208) 345-7832 
Facsirmle. (208) 345-9564 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AiiD FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
MARY KILLB'S SOIGNIER, 
Plaintiff, 
W. KENT FLETCHER, 
Defendant 
1 Cars No. CV 2009-5 17 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MARY KILLlNS SOIGNIER 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)SS 
County of Cassia ) 
Mary Killins Soignier, being first sworn, states: 
She is the plaintiff to this action and makes the following statements from personal 
knowledge. 
When she entered into the settlement of her claims against the estare, she had nc notice that 
anyone was asserting that, by relewing her claim, against the cstate, she would also be releasing her 
claims against defendant Kent Fletcher in this action. No document that she signed purported to 
release Fletcher in any capacity. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARY KILLMS SOICi:.IIER - 1 
Affiant made no statanent in eoun, squarn or otbei~&, fo fhc c%ct that she 'ntecded to 
release Fletcher by dismissing h a  cI&s against tbe rslate. 
A%& has received no considenition fium Kent F l e t rk  for any raleasc of claims against 
him She aewr told Fletcher &st, by r e l w  her claims against me estate, she intended to release 
her claims against Fletdtcr himself. 
DATn, this -Y of. July, 2009. 
fZJBXXIl3ED AND SWORN to rno on this =day of ~uty.  2009. 
. . 
I HEREBY CFXTFY that on the X d w y  of July, 20W, 1 caused a me md correct mnf of 
the foregoing document to be served uponthe follwyringindividd(s) by tbtrn&od i a d i d  below 
aod a d b e d  a0 follows: 
MiohelIe R Points [ ] U.S. Ma3, po~tag.3 pxpdd 
Craig L. Meadows [] HaadDeIivmxl 
Hawley, Troxeil. Fin& & Hawley, LLP [ 1 Ovenight Mait 
877 M i h  S t ,  Sra, 1 000 fp-By Facsimile 
P.O. Box 1617 
Bok, Idaho 83701-1617 
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AI,L1?N B. ELLIS 
ELI.IS, DROLPN 6i StlEILS. CIIAR-TEIICD 
Attorneys-at-L;a\v 
707 North 8th Street 
1'.0. Box 38% 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
1208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
1SR No. I626 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
Evlary Killins Soignier, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
W. Kent Fletcher. 
1 
j Case No.CV 2009-5 17 
j 




STATE OF IDAflO ) 
jss. 
County of Ada j 
I, Allen B. Ellis, being first duly sworn, depose and state as fbllows: 
I .  1 am the attorney for the plaintiff in the herein matter and make this affidavit upon 
my own persunal knowledge and am competent to testify to the matters contained herein 
2. That attached hereto as exhibits are true and correct copies of the following 
AFFIDAVIT OF ALLEN B. EL,I.IS - I 
Zachcry Couan Will dated 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 
Opinion Regarding S u r n m q  Judgment dated Septerllber 18, 2007, 
Cassia County Probate Case No. CV 2006-1234 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3 
L(-'y/~'\c- 
Allen 8- I-*' 
Attorney for Plai~ttiff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this 271h day ofJuly. 2009 
Notary Public for Idaho 1 
Residing at Boise i 
Commission Expires: 1/5/12 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY T h ~ t  on this 27'\iny ofJuly, 2009.1 caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Michelle R, Points 
Craig L. hlcadows 
Hwvley, 'rroxell. Ennis & Flawley, L1.P 
(177 Main Strcct, Suite 1000 
1 ' . 0 .  Box 161 7 
Boise, Idaho 8370 I - 16 1 7 
___ U.S. Mail 
__ I-land Delivered 
- Overnight Mail 
Telccopy (FAX) 
954-5238 
/\I:f.'IDAVI'r' OF ALLEN B. El-L.lS - 2 
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T I P e t r s X ' e  ptopaf hralrh, rupgart, w e  and mint-, * 
X n w t = +  s h a l l  pay td or apply ror tha banafit af t h e  huator so 
Ouch of the trnrit & a h  as t3hr zrust~ea nacassary .to so 
pmvF* rpr #a Trustor. " 
msUIM OP llgB PmsT sDsw.!m 
4 . 1  ~ p o ? . t h a  d u t h ' o i I 2 m ' ~ n u t e r ;  t h e 2 r u a t u s n 4 m Y  
~ b *  p~.q 'w .W +Lpdt,' 0r.w th*r. )rrpotor, a t  a ht r r  osz or . . 
rU a 'canaequsac~ of h w  dsath, (aChar than . IjrcnnlnCo~ Kl;teS, 
paysuer% 0% +ich are senred by Mtrtgagre, bad i ,  oi tnurC, or 
agra-to oi W e  -g r e  propattyl, including 4 r p a n - P  
o+ 1- ~ W B ,  fupucaf. -re, pnd tp, uurta ot t d d . d s h U o n  
of Tzbtor'r probate arsiate and o i  this trust. PaywU,k Of tha 
;rbora-apgitiad dabta vhich ara obligations oz #* r r u r t o X t s  
prQBat8 eatrta shall br Mdr in tbr rrolr.dioo~ltidn of #a Tn;r&acu 
i n  the event that the urmts oZ 'hastorrs pmbctr artaka an 
adssusta to pey asch ~blirjat:Fcr~, arrd sbsll. beoaao ab * l igat ion of 
the trust: estate qnly in tbe wont d to 'che &ant that tha 
-tilts 02 l!nIStar,s probate asCcs.ta axe inmtiicient Cp d t s c h a q a  
w&l obligations. 
4.2 Upon trhe .daath oil the -or, ths &ustrtu, ahall 
culaurta W o r  dbtribate the rartats &ining aft- 
satistaction of th* p ~ ~ i s i a r u  02 sr&:on 4.1 of a 6  Trust 
Agmsnront a0 EalXoulr: 
fa) sa tlLa want mat th. mn&~r'= *on, Z&XXRT 
M3Wlg, shall havo ourvivod tho -tar, tha Rpntppa ahall 
distri&&e tcr tha Trnstar~s  raid agn vbrtrvu mmt is hild 
i n  tha tru& e5-t-e at oz by rsa*on o f  thu Tmatw~s death ia 
that e p f n  maax p m ~ o r t y  aixanmzy rwMt as 3 -ens.&, 
1Fprbg~ C o M W  C l u b ,  &U%&O -6, C;b, 0ub5.Smt artd - 
02 trust a d  frhree o;i a ~ .  tranai~r; iahbtitanop, eebza or 
ethos dnatb w. In tbr rvout that %he %'ruStOX86 s a l d  con 
=hall not ha9. mmivrd ~ n u t m r ,  Vit%wut rsgard to his 
As-, khe gist pukuzant to this oubPPct,lon 4.it(a) ghku be 
bletxibtatu! +o a*Lm6U xg%safc ie a&s Dbdll nat have 
~llkvivod tha ?l?swtpr t lm g i f t  yorowxnt to this 
subsaction 6.2 (a) Pboll fafl. 
(b) m the wonC that r,amuwc~ EBi\ZELI shall have 
a W i v s d  Che Tnaa to r ,  Was Txtiwteer; Bhdll dintrbte to 
ClWZR vhafxv8r izctoreeit in bid in the trust estate 
, . 
st or by reaman of *a Tnrotrsr's deatn in that c&ah 
raeidential real property locatad on Sen Antodo Xor,O between 
SeVutth and Z f q h t h  Streets, Carmal, c3r. o u t c i g X  and f rP9  orl 
tmt and froo of a31 transfer, inheritance, eztata or okke?: 
d - e  In *Vent that LAPiB3Ba CSa7zE  e W L  wt hava 
n& -ived the , thq g i n  to a. 
~~~i~ 4-2fb)  ahaU isil. 
(a) ma hnsta(up shall asrtkblltsh a txwt ahaza, 
~ g a a . t : a d  mum r, to fuddrd V A ~  o m  mms~ VBXJSAND *HD 
Oo/~oo w w  ($l~o,ooo.oo) rcrr each henaFfcLary ut fa* ia 
q - g r a P a  4 - 2 l o ) ( i ) ,  (it), anb (UI who ~ t v i v l l e  txucCor 
faor a amxhum of lgRPE 8rmmp xsovaam d m  Oofloo naam$ 
<QJOO,OOO-OO). lt8. s&KLI h026, odaJntBtPr and 
#StribuCa the assot. o i  ZQUsT X M a separat. tzust aa 
h ~ x e b a f t a r  wmided:. 
(i) *h. %%uS&u &all pay to or am% far tao 
m 
beqelit of 3B%ARZT Tim so W 91 the not fixrolyr of 
T ~ P B %  z as' kh- 'hwtrur, 'ta taeir b t s ~ i t m ,  doPrm 
news- at dosirabtr iox: tha plbgar health, swpor% - lLainianancr of rpCh boMciD;Lr+y, pmmidod .acb 
paymmftm of  incolru &an aoc'oxwrl rn T 8 0 0 ~  DO- 
c65, aoo .aoi in any g i ~ r p  OZ~ZLN~W 
iii) TNI~WW rhdlr pay to or apply tor tho 
benaiit of UJIg sa auch o+ the he% In- of 
!ERQSX Z ae the m e t r e s ,  ' b  air di.crstion, daas 
nacanuuy  or daeirabLe ior tbn proper  health, 8nepOr%, 
cnrs aad aofnhimnc% of such. benailcipry, providfbd BU& 
gaymeats of inoaae shall not axce.ad PrPa THOUaaM, W?X.X?S 
(~5,000~00) in any g i v ~  aaLurdrr part  
(W). The Trust-= shall pap t o  o r  apply 
for the ban.ift a2 K&m m a  so ach  of trhr net incoma 
o f  TRUST Z u tba huoteor ,  in t h e  dknaretion, daem 
1 ==--ry 0-z d-i*abSe l?oz the ;rxopm harlth, suppark, 
care md ~ f n t a n a n c r  of aucb bartrstiaiw, provided ~uch 
P a m -  0s imoate hhall nct: araasd FfP8 THOVsaRD DO- 
f $s,aoo. 00) fn aoy givm calundar year; 
. (iv) Xnp b a l ~  oZ Zb. net in(aac of %X?ST X 
not gat4 or a $ p ~ e d  a+r &*a pm9- rach y-, 
ahall br luzmmLllCoa w adr90a t o  &kiwAp,i. Dpoa Chr 
adad o f  urrch oi Cho ~ i i d i z v l a s  DklDed 1;1" thf. . . 
oPbsrction 4 .l(o), tho !l%u&csu *lL tmumfrr tnrm - 
'3?RUST X to 'IWJST X I  [hs puvidad b ~nbs@ct& 4 .Z(d)  ) 
on- (U3) n* t h m  . i r p l u ~  0s  ma zxtUt6- (LAM- in 
T X (an tbon comtifuerd). . 'Dbc Znmtaee, in taafr 
dlncsation, &al l  &loo81 mcb M . t m  ta tSPP.tw. ffpOR 
tda dsotb of '  aU 'of tbr b d i c i P r i * a  ianed in thi. 
sub&ion 4.2CE); , *a' asdata os ,TRUST X, aa ttran 
"\nnt%=tmd, ahall be -farred ta C a T  X I .  
{d) Pso l%mt&aa -1 ac;trab&iah a second 
&war@, duignrtid lcaOST IT, to cotl~& qC tbr balanoa oi tbp 
-t ttat;ilte t&g ~SXXC ~ t f i d i n e t i ~  o f  t;ho provisions 
. , 
section 4.1 of this wt: H-t ura nubcfffions (a) 
ttlrough ( 0 )  at W a  beakion 4.2 .  p a  lkustnas &all hold, 
zxmtnistar a2ld distribute the assets o f  IImST I1 se a eeparcka 
tru6.t; an baroinaf+ar provided. 
(i) m tao avaht thrrt the Tnastarra tam, 
WCEAXl OXaB, ahrll bnvs m v d  tha -tor, and prior 
to th4 k b a  Vhan ha s h U  ham atCkFnod tha agr of f i e  
yttare, ttla T m & w s  anal1 pap to or apply rot the benozit 
01: tho Said S M  *IIPQI)~ p~Ica* ( 7 O * l  o* the 
m t  car TRDBT n, ---lly or at m p n  
fru5aam intcmiie. 3h addition, tho !maatma ihaU pay 
tP or apply for the hsnefit of fhr Zmstorla d d  son d r ~  
PCI& O l  the grhLpal of m T  ZX' (but a& in ircesa of 
a Wmu%t f70%] o f  t h  priaoipal as than 
c ~ o ~ t l k a i l )  aa the TrPsteu, in thrfr diocrsr t ion~ clew 
MCP~.ZLIY ,fa tLU) prop= health, puppazt, sax* . 
main-co O X  tbn .%?putnz*s ass tdsoa.  ha -tees 
-1 h or appll fax the b M i t  or - a * e  at-, 
.6ymA-aLt&a1 O S h u : . ~ ' i f  nhr Ohrllnotthan 
Lh l i v i ~ g ,  & pmzmat (30))  ai net in- ot 
WST II q u a r t . ~ a n a t m ~ ~ y  pr it mwro m-t b a a .  
fi additf on, t h e .  !hm+ra -1 pay tr, or apply for the 
ZWllliit o i  the %%ustorts said niece 60 suoh of tho 
pr-lga2 a t  rmm ax (he in -s- of +kLfy 
patcPnt [30.S] of. thLI prbeipdl m than oonrtftutod) as 
the Truafaos, in aeir dlscriation, does necessary foz the 
propar boil&, aupgort, cot* end iuciritmanc* of the 
+rta sixid aisca. 
(ii) mLth t&e 'Prustorla eon, Z&CEAR?r (XIVAN, 
-1 iirtah the we of tiftN yeera, TRUST I1 -1 
lx tmhate,  and soyenty puscent (702) of the trurrt P P ~ ~ = P  
of l!XiYST TX than on hand eball ha ~ ~ u t a d  t o  tho 
Txuatcz' ti maid son autriqht snd h s a  of tqust ,  and thirty 
parcant (30a) oi! a* W S ~  oi TAT XI men oa 
baa'? W l  be dtstzriburc~ to ?Pmu&Curti 'nisce, SazDRA 
B- Xm'Lm, outrig?lt and F n m  of trust. Tha Tnzstksrl 
ahall haw bi~m*t:ion to cboare the wlatrr to be 
d.istr~uted ta Mall. 
1-1 xn thr gvrntr tfLa t i  son, 
UMU?, shall btP prior tC) a t i (L in~n~  a* of firtfl 
ye-, 1.0virAg than. 1ivFnrJ lss"e, trhs 9m.Ct.os +-etmL1 
distrfbafa ths eta-4 ot W S P  IT thrll on - 
hand .aveniq porcrnt 1701) tro then Living irauo of 
ZACElU%X COWJLX, by right of r e p r ~ e n t s ~ o n ~  frsL o f  i"rclot;, 
and t h q  xmnzent (lo*)* tha %nk&a~'s  nima, SAKDR* 
mX?z~ mclxamj prwFd.a, w, i n  ttu, avurt #a% the 
~ ~ r r o r * ~  eqlCd niece nvt b~ uving ak uu aate or 
any di*tz%bution . pursuant t o  t h i s  
SUbWnIWaph 4.2 (d) (Lfi) , her spare ot #a trust estata 
or ZfWST XI: mhPll b4 birtribstmd t;o h c r  thur liPFng fasue 
by right o f  xopreswtatian claa of m. 
fiv) fn tha avmt tha*, ZWEWZY coXAW ahalT  die 
uriox to a E t a b 3 i i g  tba age of Zlfty y e a s ,  Ulthinzt livihg 
issm, the Trustees s h a l l  dfsrxFbufs the entlrc b u s t  
estate of mTlS?? XI to S m  Cree of tnzst 
a d  if she she1 not, be Li*rlng st the dots of 
d i ~ ~ i b u t i o n ,  the krm& u+ata sball ba di)rtriSUtBd t~ 
a9 ;bdn l iving i z s w  02 aunm EXfXzta RRW by right of 
raprasantzztion, fmm at *t. 
4.3 XF, at tho tiPa of tha %!ma&art8 be'&, or at any 
later t h e  M%oT"IL n3fl diLf;llibUtiun OX tlla'trust estate, GAcEARY 
CQVtAX, FXKXEK -'and all al  Uuir i r e *  err dscraecd, 
and 40 okhex disp~aiftfon 0% t h o  ttnst antab is M r d  harob, 
th% .crust antate, or the poitfm of St: a n  -iaLNg, 
thareupm b i s t r ~ b u t ~  o rmcr or mzo &ik ips  chosrn ia tllo 
bhareUon of tho TrwCaea, maBjrct to *)u l b i t n t i o ~  on ruch 
tha* aU& C 1 I S U l i t i ~  be pllll~fid ChaZif ia  ?M 
sactian 170 or the x a w  ~ v - m  & 1&&- 
C 
4.4 aay prwisiaao.  of t9F. haeC weanen* to the 
'otlptxaxy notwluwumd&g, hi the ov& that: my m8ab of a t*unC 
held ~~~ t o  taa groviaiow ot tbip 2xnst Am%-mt b m *  
diatrlhrttobla to a h&iciary w&w Chr c r g i  02 t u b n % p c ~ ~  (21) 
y-, ?=.% TS-U~~XWS -1 r+urln ta wsrCp in a furtbu trust tor 
&a. benefit o f .  maah banafk.;tary. Thr Trustees ahsll Pay to o r  
apply t o r  the banefit or UUC~I h m f i c i ~ y  no mch of MIC 
inaeromr,  u*1 thr pxhcippl o+ tbc trurt .Etatr sa Wan 'Enwbu, In 
their d h e r s t i o n ,  Uaem aecassaxy. Zor the pxopor h d t h .  nuwork, 
oaxe maintaannca Pnd oducatioa OF a\& bue f lo la ry ,  aft*+ talcing . < 
*c-t, t o  thr extant tao %ruatL~s  dorm prop=, u?f incow or 
other rsrsaurcss of such baaaiiciary outsida this trust, know to 
~ ~ a ~ -  men maci~ banericiary attains the pya of twwty-ODE 
(25) X-*, 1210 l'rwma shell dfatributs +xi such buch91.cicry 
entire tuLt a3-ko thm hala for hit or her bd?eiit, fraa of 
t-t. Ef much bamZicialy -1 die bet- mcaivhq cwlots 
dfs*Fation of the tlrtllq* eatutn so+ aside for h i a  tx bar mefit 
h e - w a ,  m W  6 W L l  d.iht3-ibUlt8 eh% bOlafUlC OC thb trUBt 
estate to oach pamano or  mitig~, and bll cnich ~ g d  
cah&itlons, alther cmtriw or fn tMzst, am t2m hanoticiary shdll 
d o a i p t -  ln h i s  at- her l a s t  Will add- to pcobab by a atme of 
=wweT=n1: jPtisbfctioa, -aaX.krq n w f i c  r@fagrfutcr to uri* paot- 02 
appointsent. 1 ~ n  the -at fhat ~ ~ ~ h . b ~ h a r i ~ j . a y  LIWL fail to 
sxlroiaa =us& parcE 05 appaintpmnt, i9.m zrw&aw ehall A b k i b o t s  
C 
tae balmlc.8 or tha trust uitah to e h  thrn xiv* ia- of - 
bsnafidary, by right bL &prumnfr.-, or, in k b  aeZtnlt 
1 
thhSS4f, to the then Z iv ing  inrue of tlu parrDtrs. fE0n whom each 
'banefiaiazy ucrs drautodrd, by rfqht 0% mxpr~uxtation. 
-armwiL m x o s r a  
5.1 Tf tflb abhzI or separate tinst h a t l  frn. any inocons 
. beiabricinry of a &st held -t h u m -  has, at any tiara, i n  
the winiod 0% tha '~~urtaa8, a fa& mt value SO. LOW, in 
relation to mste of a ~ u t x a t b n  p&eof ,  that Continuama 
af the tmst puma& to i t a  w i l l  &fiat ox 8ubstantiaLZy 
i m p a i r  the ; r d o ~ l ~ t  oz tne p-osen of Cha b t ,  tke  . . 
Trucfooe my, ha t b o k  d i s s r r t i ~ n ~ '  but rrr not rrquFr*d ta, 
t f u d a a t e  such t , ~  uld, ragardlesa of the wo oi sufh 
benafie;luy, aiatrituta uza pr-cipul and any eacrusd or 
W e t s f b u t a d  i a ~ 0 ~ 2 e  ?hawoZ to mclb b d ~ l e i & ~ ,  OT his -aim, 
owsexvator, o r  athex fibaclazy. 
5.2 mtlraa sooner termhake4 i n  ecaordance v i a  other 
pmvisfone nereaz, cach trust haM heramdrtr Paall C a s t h a t s  
tvur'cp-ona (211 lraara aZtek tha daakh oi tba lant srmvlvor of tbe 
~ ~ Q X I  thr T Z U S ~ W ~ E  6ANIS.b E m  m1 ltnd O f  
Zr- el: acmm  con^^ or S ~ W ~ U  smm. xmai  who am iLv.PiPs 
at .trha death o f  t b o  muflar. AQ ptLneirSp1 and uadilrtributad 
fmcoxw of  any t m e t  do tardnatBd &ALL be disCributod to the then 
firanaa burraii+xlar of that taxat  in Lne phspattionn in  vbLJl trhey 
* 
are, a t  tha t h e  of -&an', ta roam$- the iaasae. ' 
5.3 ~ h c  l t rastu~ m y  authorize e t a ;  we o i  ~ o r 8 ~  .. 
rasidancm locatri on Sam AnWmi~ Rosd, C a r n e l ,  Californta, aad Chc 
'furn.itxm and ihhtl.bkrga W(?ZML, rt aPoh t b ,  for suoh perfads. 
I and ~n such tornrp; aad ~ t t o r r o  en a %?xudc+s mur;p drtrrPina, by 
any OF tha rouw*: &cmm cmm pnd h l o  tnailp, tiuumm H ~ E N  
XmLER and bur r e ,  aad.u,mmcs ~ A Z X N  and h h  r d l y . .  X t   an^ 
tfsa that Iawmfza CJmxSu I.,uGking as a T1VIena OL W l h T R U r t  
ngrepmrnt, ]r9 'ie &ereby speaij?icnU.y &+*rd tcs mtaln said 
residenee and ita turai-a an6 M a h i n q s  aa assata a2 th8 trust 
orta+o, xegardZus of any lossu the trwk or its b-ficiariee loay 
6UXsr by v i m  oE said ratantion, to o ~ ~ l p y  said rorcidance and 
u t i l i z e  3- furniture end hurni-s .for his pusonrrl we an4 thar 
of other nrambars oE his ilmUy, and is ya l iavd  of the effact of 
eny m a  ell ProvZIIlollri or lcw i!ozt,iddillcj s Txuatss from deal* 
with the raraix of a tust estata Lor h i s  pareow account end 
ratlitbig uty g a b  or protlt; +rcm aach dealbgs,  a6 crrlch plro~irti~fis 
of lav telata to acid ruiUaaca. 
LWI'J%Tlaff 08 BZ!iXFXC- 
1 
6.1 Prr 5Stara.t 0% ruch boIlpfiCiary Fa t$o j..aea" ud 
P ~ b g f p a l  02' any tTnet h a d  pursuant herata sball be Srao Frvm the 
~vutror or i n t u ~ ~ r t a c o  or ~ n y  -tor o f  banreiciary sad 
frmu i.he c3ahs 02 &hrn  inoludinff any of huh benefioiary. 
W if)tt~'%8+2 o f  lach beneiiefary Chsll not be subjoct: to 
a*ecbmmt, ~ e o a ,  g%uu~, c l a i m  s i s i q  axma p-B 
#. 
i~ bbd*NBicy PC. zmy dher ro- QZ xsqal ar 6-1- a r ~ y  or zi-. 
The 5.n- at rach bmriicia*ly not bo ~ t r o ~ ~ p t l b l r  to - .. 
anttcipatiwn ot a;lima+im aad any att;osaJ;rt to ant idpate  or 
'kZUWfPf tSItht b- 8 m  bQ  aid 1Pd b~f*Clk%v~.  
&fhwlat CP w w m  
7.1 Tt(Ut unil princlpai distrlbucah~m t o  a 
b w i i c h x y  be mid &ra&3,y to a bahaiicriary or ?nay be applied 
ta a" benaiiolaryla use a& 'bPacilt: ae the d m  
apprapriats. Any benrf lciary vho is incupaa;LtaW thzmgB -fil.n*u, 
age o i  0tha.r caase way h ~ P e  the and prineipa to a& he i= 
on*%-& appliad t o  his beneiit. Inoollrs or pinelpal distributkble 
to a bumficiary vhiob may be subjrct  . to  rrocution o r  latry Whaa 
received by the baaficisry mey ba appliod %o to& benmtioiazy+s 
bmeiit. &ray m u s h  eppLicle.tLon 02 incoma or prfnaipal nhall be ma& 
oa suoh oce~siun8 urd b mth m a ~ e r  es CIle r z ~ s t a c a  dean adviseble 
- - -=.<,: -'- - &*. .*&$ ,,3 %@? -4; 
..', . -. -- . *.- - . Y . . W . U I I Q '  C . . 1  
end nay IwZLudrt p a m t  to a bimefioicry parsmally o r  to other 
parsons d a d  appmgrfate by Uw z k - ~ ~ ~ t o c u .  r*aolpt of t l lc  
hei ic iaxy  or other lI;oT8?3~U to vhm dlStXibutfm is aada shall br 
a c ~ ~ a C a  -a or l m m t m u *  nsponsibilStie*. 
or ASltm'm 
6 .  Z Ea* OZ the b t  8 h a . s ~  -1 be a eapatatr tnut 
f*r t r u s t ,  accomrting, tur and dl1 p*az pri-poa~a. Pro l'ruatees, 
havww, w liagl- ths prop~r ty  of the. rapnrate -t, asseta knd . 
I 
int-t. 14,- m¶5gled progcrrtp. Bpid lmd%pibad .Lrtora* ahaU ' 
alwayP b@ oedaL to that tnut'rr -rtiorutr costrib;ltLoa-<o a,* 
lninglsd asseta. - 
render to 'l'ruator a vrittur rocaunt of, the  trust rdafnhMtioa. 
Sueti r ; h U  be made vhes mtpsted by the %ustor, aZtrr 
the daath of *ire Trustor, .tfhs Ohblr ronlP1 cn ~ U a L  
accounting to =dl bensiioiary to ee tfaa or trha 
~?ccounthq b t  f.nc%%m m y  be dirtxibutpd. If heneficfariar 
*titl*a to A ae-s-ting ham,  e e - w  ~ M Z  be 
d & i v d  to t h e  psroatir or guardian. Xi b%neifci&rioa antitled 
to an accounting rrra iparpoc~tated, thak. aaao~a li, g shall ba 
delivozad to thrrir --tor, guardian or the +on caring for 
ESW& benafioiary. W s s a  ths acocwcting i n  abjactnd to in writing 
o w - i i v r  (65)  dnp &u: 8 w A l . i ~  to thr prtdosas to r h a m  the 
accounting is to bhr re&-& ( m p t  cccpunthg~ rU5du.d to the 
I : o r )  thr aceam* shaI.1 hr doaug E h a l  and wnclpaiv~ in 
rrp~wct to all +amm?aFtriaas dtrelurld in tbr h-urrS. ?2ha 
a ~ ~ t L n ~  .haZ1 be b i a a ~  ap aL1 -om 4e.ropfad ia the.&, 
 lad^ bonoficiariso vhm axe not h.Mm cr who are not prt barn. ,. 
aro bansri~Fary u--Uap $+I- ~0rnj-m w i t h  ulo T ~ U P ~ ~ U  w x  hv-  
'n.1 LEIO@A.'CUWAW ~a w a r e  &signatad 
as thi T r u a t a q ~  o i  the trlUt: hsrcpnder. 
I. - - 
A. CWW, IMFtERCE CZmSXti &all ssm as tZia solo h u r t e a  
herscurdex. 61 the deathl resignatfon or incapacity of WRXEl?cII 
CWGZN, ROEXU' 1MOOglfl shell 6- M a m t ~  heaMdm. c?n the . ,  , 
dwstb, resignation OX incapacity of :eieher GEcXAmA .A. C O W  or 
Ram, ~ ~ 1 C W .  at r: tine vhon ?~&wBJ%c& C Z ~ Z ~  ld hot swing as & 
hustee, or L S ~  the sole T-rushu har~under. 
l.1-3 Pol: gurpeoo-1 of tAe inta-7rrctatfon 0% W s  t rust,  
the tnCapaci(y of thr T ~ s t o r ,  or ot a ??mstao to a- as aueh 
Tsu~taS,  .hall be aandusivelp established by the vrittcra .' 
c*rtieic;t;tion oi. two (2) pqsio- a t t A g  sum n u s t o r  or 
Tnzskae tbat such Trustox or is anable t o  manage h i s  own 
a . f tah i  or tho- of the trust. 
11.4 A Trustma m y  zuign  &y, glvbaq mrittan nottco of 
reaiption to u l l  o f  thr mmrit in- b&aaficiaties or their 
guan~tans b r  by fix* tha appm+ri&e pstit~a w i t h  the hurt i 
jucbdActinn aver tlu emst. Ih' the meat of  ruigaation, 
a a  mi*. rms:- e t m u  cowsy the tmm w+ts t> a*' 
dcniqmtsd ~ac?ur.rbr TrUstusr. - 
1i.s no oobc mrbelx .bo r r q u ~ ~ d  of any 'Runoa w 
he te in .  
11.6 Xo euctccluor hastae Phall bia' obligated to axamlne 
or m r f r w  thr -,- xroordr sn: uctr of ~ L ~ Y ~ O T ~ O  -cia. 
. . A '&U&OE -1 bo rospa~aib$o only ios hts orn a& or mn;tsaioha 
*oh arc qrosaTy nnogligont or a in bad raltl~. 
U - 7  xu one durlk*r w i t h  thL hUrrtPaf nu& illquim 
~OnCsrning the valldiIzy 0% any action8 of aLujb 'huo+asa. 
11.8 6 o  hnrstsoa m y  recaive raarranablc oonrpenaakion ltnd . .; 
~ O i n b U X s ~ t  $OX - J E W .  SU& c o l s p a r ~ ~ 0 X l  &l.& P3imbUXSaat 
r o t  wcganacsi a l l  be paid f r c r ~ a  und -1 bo a propar.8mxpnsa of 
the trust. 

Id1 YO enforce any m a r t g a p  or dead of ixuat or 
pl-6 held hemandex and to pusllhase a t  eny MI* t&p~*.lmdar 
my progsrty suhjrct ~ ~ 0 .  
(of p a r c h a s m  a4nrriUee or other prqmrtzy %ran ,  
and to X o a s  a& a w l  vecured o f  f i ~ ~ a a u r w l ,  CO, 
tae e w m r  ox bther r o m t i v a  of thc W r r e  *ts. 
(f) .Eo -gt, -491, nalJ. at publlc pr p r i v a f s  1 
Pale for ewb or on credit:, if- atl? or w f t b p u t  notiam, to 
-meltt eezhaqm, partit%on, diyida,  subdivide, mxtgage, 
pladml. F m p r ~ v r .  sad rappix, to'-* c ~ ~ i  tcr lanss foz . , 
t&m.dthfa or.-hyond the & ~ i w  . .  . of any'&wst, 
9- asp yb*polrr, h&d& & ~ m r ~ i o n  fac .and, of  dl& 
m 
gas or a i l ,  sad to uibr in% rqy cov-CI ar agroaasrrtzr 
relatbg to proparty oo llaaai or  eny i f f8rrrprrrs.at.  vhi& ngy 
*an or thvraftar br rtnstd tbezaan. ' 
(9) 15, ooqppa2.r, rutgit td s.eitrr~~on, trloana 
w i t h  or *tho& wns5d*iicn, m: oi2mmfsr adjust c l a w  in 
favor ox aoy t n r s t r  4% i n s t i t u t m ,  cunprcaninr, axxi 
d a f d  a c t t c M  aad -. 
(a) TO. cony sudl. lnsmraoce aa tha .p- mpy 
aaam adPFsabLe as an m a  of tha - t i .  to gay p r s n t m ~  an4 
othot  aee&Lsamaats an any liie inmsmnce' oantxkct w M c h  nay L+t 
. . 
any a br hpld hat.ullder. . . 
i Po impst and reinv~r6t: any proparty hPrh 
heraundar, h o l u d i n ~  accsunr(l+akad i n c m ,  in an& srsounta and 
(j) To hozzw SOIldy itom aay peraon, fa, or 
I carpomtion, inoXlxdL.rg Cha T r a m t l u  b.XltlllfiQT, for m y  r;rest 
PurpDea, ngon oOeh karms and corylfticae as t b i  mt*ra XE=Y 
de%ar, progar, and t o  obligate t&a traat for rapapankp t o  
WmmbPr ww of tbr .trort pruputy by ~ o r t p q e ,  d u d  a i  tsast, 
pl*, or otbrryise. 
(k) %'a hold any property in their n a p 9  as 
--, - ia 3!nMt8ms' am¶ UaIWI, o r  ill a8 nAat!a Of 
the or P N e g m  in auoh c&i+ioa) thpt 
t i t l e  abaZl pans by dBUv-. - 
(1) Ta rapl~y c o ~ d l  ah4 C O ~ t o  Or 0 t h a ~  agate 
atld pay thenau re&#-* comp~nsatianr to actt an a a d u  01 
counau and i s m a r  M lh3aility && any octloa takan or 
~ortaincd iron k t  to'meiz a m o r :  
(a) . T ; u b ; f o e t s t o  +ha c h r i a n  that ~ C I  coojlolidatioa 
.&all no= d n ~ r t r 4 y  me m t e  i-city oc tha trrrtsb, to 
c o ~ o l i d a t . ,  Eoz xwxwseii of a&asirifntratian and invastmaat, 
Property a+ tba omani~ t ~ ~ ~ t r  m t r d  h w  and to 
aIocqta msdivlded in ta~bab  in .UQ ~?n;luXldatPd fund to tim 
srvrral truata. 
In) To buy, s?U uuf. trade in s a a r k ~ i ~ s  of any 
nu*-, including optioas, ehort sa3es, on w i n ,  rttd Cot 
such purpoars to msintab tnd opera- saxgin accolultr w i t h  
brokrtr% and t o  pl-%ga any securities held at w&eaad Lry 
*am w i &  SQch bmhra  rn sacur i ty  Fur la- end adv-as. 
( 0 )  TQ do cL1 nu& acto, take a l L  such p r o c r e d h ~ ~  
end em+x@i* aU. such rfmYr aM priyiZeg.as, although naftbr 
apecificalZy herdsbfor* mantiom nor ~ o n f m r a  vpoll taozn by 
law vFth relatfoa tc such praputy as if the abeoiure o ~ s r a  
tttct-mf .Ud b =OMaC+ian th-tb tO ahtar into any 
or agzt.-t. binclhy~ *a .W eptato. 
r 
u . 2  XI, mer wmm~ta.w:tlq 'with 'aha ,am&&, ths 
huetaea a m  -lo to agree v i a  axwaer v i n p .  arry ~ t t r  
urrwting trhr ,-tion or dirtrzbutica oe ~ h r  tnu* &to, 
a h a  clecisian of Lgo- a. axwr, M i a  rthr is serving as xnurtoe, ' 
,- 
sw ~.crcr*rn. L B O ~  a. c a m ~  a h a ~  *is* tho ZZVPCW -inq 
%em, in vritfng, of har &ci&on, and ouch lltrUPtr0 m u 1 1  p w p t y  
w i t h  ttte decfafon oZ a. ummc. E C I ( P ~ ~ ~ ,  such 'iPrpotse 
i saau rnrt be xiablr t o ' o ~ y  -on rctr ~ 1 .  action of LEONWIEIA a. - as ~ o s  pursunnt t o  sa& drcision. 
Edi th-s  this Be&fe,n lz.a, tha tmau.t: shnl.1 ba 
bound to third parti- by bye actrXan8 of any Tnutsa of a trust 
h a d  P-t to thL. Trust Z q j r ~ ~ ~ o n t .  ~ n y  aabiol, -00 by a 
zrwtaa  -3 be b h t h g  trpoa tha tnut -to and mury be ralisd 
vpon by thM gaxtdes W i n g  w i w  me ttnrrt. Rlthout  lialtfng thc  . . 
gwerrlity of tho fort go^, the . anust rsu  urr epcifictJJy 
adhorizcd tso dapoait and tri-w turaaa rrcll bankt savi.ngs aM 
loan and O t h e r  ucaountr E.lnkrinsd by #a t n m t ,  -4 t o  p r l l  or 
gurchasa asset8 O f  the t;rust: a t a ,  ugon tba authorization sf ury 
one Tnufwl h a r ~ o f .  
12.3 on anp &+ision oi the k ustata or or 
I f b a l  d l f i t r h u t i o n  of tha txust opta-, thtr %mat+sa nag rill-te - .-to i n  cmdfvFaea iatsras* or fn lrfsd,' os pertly in 
lnow arrd partly fn kZnd 6% va1ua.tioll~ ruurcmably d k M r i n e d  by the 
%%mis%ras- Ik d n q  suah alleattioar, tlrt z%ustcw rblill rao+ be 
zogu- t o  a a l ~  a -ta histrib+on o~ . , t t t (~  trust asta-tta i n t  play 
a a ~ ~  s noa-prorata k t l o u r ~ ~ o n  prWid~b ~ ~ o * M M ~ o  cill0gf.d to a , 
bulailiaiary h a  or p x u p a r t i o ~ t o  W u r .  
12.6 All mat- mgaaShg detazatnatdons of, allocations 
t o  and ct=rgea against grLncf- Pnd inoQPe. uuring tha liiertme ot . 
the br goe'ornad'w ~w ~ r i z l u i p e l  aad xu- k;t oi: 
'Ulo state cZ cklizrmsl* in . r i d  .C thi S3.m 02 wda rmca 
dstazdaati.on L a ~ i a r  as much A& 1. applicable. U 1  aattem 
r- ds-tiamh ox, aii-isbn= C, md -DP .QI*IP~~ 
principnj. and hfncom;l foxlaving ttbs mmstnr*s .&oatti smll. be 
gavsraod by atl ~ r h i p a l  aad ~ X C O X ~ O  hut oq thr StaCo 02 &i&nie 
%XI oifect  at the bt;a of her deaCh, baafar as mch A c t  3 s  
asplicabi.. 
12.5 b y  Tmstsas by filing vri- aotioo in tbe rocorris 
of the trudt fa12 giving ne#,ort t o  all currant hurericictiss of tbr 
t x ~ ~ t  may rmnadm, disclaim or ratcsr cny right;, poverfi or 
discretion ~~ t o  said T m s t ~ ~ e  o f  thb trust. swh O c t i c m  
ah&l ba Lrre~ourllle as tn euch %bmtnen. 
12-6 The Tcustaaa era ant2mrlzed tm a l l o c a h  any par t loa  
of the l b m t o x l s  Oeneration-Bk@phg Transfez %ax (GS'PP) ~ c n ,  
n t  w e n t .  ~u+aorf%'& W Seatian 2631 of the In- RnvenUe CodP, 
which taaraFnsl unaLlocatoCl at tha tfu or tho %wmt9rpa death. 
U.7 ThP Rustaes are avtharizad do dLvide any trust 
Wratod bweunrlet: in to  segerclt. tnu;ta of prop* * a p t  ZlWm Cha 
am FP m p m g e r t y  d j r n  to 6aTle. me RU~UIQ~  nhau  have 
dincre^tfon tp pay or apply lnwM o r  p r ~ ~  o i  any tzu* . . 
Ui~ldrra ta any beneficiary horevith to.eavm DS'ET or ctbar taxas. 
PA* OP %axm . & 
13.1 hll hhwitaaas, estate  o ~ :  otaor dent% taxms, aqd 
F 
Wf gcu%?mUcm-pki~piog kzan-f.lr a, that m y ,  By mason ai? Ma 
death of VZ, be attributable to .the Trastar8s pmbt.r estafa, 
01. MY pI-tl,ea CiZ it, or tm any pra&ty .bald p-t wr or 
becoming B Q ~  j*tt: to a* 'CQTPI o i  this w ~gtrararnt at tbe +a= 
or an a aonaeguaacc of thr l ' z u b r ' a  death, shaLl be psi4 by t&e 
!Fm&=ma frPa the arr$aUr of #e iXu%t estata allocated to TZm81 XI. 
D m l X m x O W B '  lUlD RUIgS 02' cxwnmrcL1aN 
POX puzpo6w oi U s  htcraau,t, dlllnft3on.s of h e m n  
termae and rules of constru-on are ~rovidrd- 
. . 
14. L Xeletences t o  *lrrmeb m a p  1 r . W  das~endanta hz the 
f4rsk. nowad or atay (Mu! d-ae of tha ancostor dsaignahd. 
child's Lawful de~cendaniza by b 1 d  or adoption &a53 LW oannlderad 
as l a m 1  descwdanb o t  the adopting pa.mma and of .myme vho is 
by blqod or adaption an kackltor of  a ado- &eatst. 
14.7 Rioruuurrr to ll&amw or #port 1 onn a 
b%nof&&a?yers praporCfoaal. bbrpnt an dot- by'tbr tarns aad 
cbndicfonn or this; b-. 
14.4 mrrrslta~ tg *orec~t~or" or "e%ecutopu aaan 8x1 
executor, e~=catrrix, amLinL:trator, .adainhrtqak.rFu, ~1pnrs-2 
represpataUve or ather person or gessons barged vith the 
reapoadbiliey Lot- the aQlrFr)+.rZT1IUan OX the ~ t o x f s  grobate 
+f 
katatc. 
3.4.5 Roip~yacor ta - *cdaortiona ahdl1 -an swvadary, 
ae1l49pI gradsata end post7)rouwta 6tUd.y at public or prLvate 
-inatitrrtiopr. 
14.6 m e s o  th wnttqt &-iy trw- awthu 
I 
coastnaction, trbo maoco21nel im&aLtxa aad nall%tar gezdw .adll aaah 
includO tha cth.S-s, and ths rringnldt and pb,rs.l, t&b"z Pbkll 
the ot~er: 
14.7 Xi any provi eion or pro9%a*sfocs of t b i e  LaLnrtrcmuat is 
fnvalia or u~lmLoxeeable, the rsmnining p r d a i e n s  ahsll can+Anu- 
t o  'he N 3 y  operative. a 
X cerUiy that I hmta read t h o  -92 RanCltamont o f  t h e  
L e O n K d s  A. COWM TNat oI 1982 anQ thkt tt c~rra&l.y"~tzk*s M e  
held, z W a C w e d  and ttiiitributaa by the ?rrurtrss. I epprwe of 
tb. trvlr u d ' v f t  that the M s . .  u-a it. 
. . 
Xmk-t -2, a=-@ u ~ d  % s ~  br by - 02 Bald txust. . 
~L.,-,,&ROY, , 3% 
3aQmRm A. do- 
I 
, 1992r batom m, the 
rrafa Stall., personally krm tp *u lor v r m r e d  CO m 
) ire- - or w xwixmCD \ 

~ O H - A  A C D W N  and LAWRENCE-, as T R U S  ofthe T m  Agr- 
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LEONARDA A COWAN TRUST OF 1982 
f* - w= Wfi) 
C2mdaa.W-nsin M*tt! US, port of8ee 194,460.M) 
LAST WILL & TESTAMENT 
OF 
ZACBARY A .  COWAN 
I ,  ZACHARY A.  COWAN, of Declo, Cassia County, Idaho, 
pub l i sh  and  d e c l a r e  t h i s  t o  be my Las t  W i l l  and Testament 
revoking a l l  o t h e r  and former w i l l s  and c o d i c i l s  t ha t  may have 
been made by m e .  
CLAUSE 1 
DECIAFUiTI ONS 
1 am s i n g l e .  I have no c h i l d r e n .  
A l l  o f  my property is my s e p a r a t e  property.  It is my 
i n t e n t i o n  by t h i s  W i l l  t o  d ispose  o f  a l l  proper ty  which I am 
e n t i t l e d  to d i s p o s e  of by w i l l ,  community and separa te ,  r e a l ,  
personal  and mixed, which I may own or have any i n t e r e s t  i n  
whatever a t  t h e  t i m e  of my death .  
CLAUSE 2. 
APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
I nominate and appoint Stephen D .  w e s t f a l l  a s  t h e  
Personal Rep re sen t a t i ve  of my e s t a t e .  In  t h e  event Stephen D. 
Westfa l l  shou ld  predecease me, o r  f a i l  f o r  any reason t o  a c t  a s  
my Personal  Representa t ive ,  then,  i n  such event ,  I appo in t  
fn@'g K t l l * ~  k4 e~ h w ~  
Marleann Chris tman,  Meridian, Idaho, a s  t h e  Personal 
Rep re sen t a t i ve  of my e s t a t e .  I d i r e c t  t h a t  t he  Personal  E' ! 
Represen ta t ive  and a l t e r n a t e  Personal  Representa t ive  appo in t ed  i n  
\ 
f i  
i X 
I n i t i a l s  -1- 
EXHIBIT 2 
t h i s  paragraph shall serve without bond. 
CLAUSE 3 
POWERS OF TWE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
My Personal Representative is authorized and empowered 
to exercise all powers in the management of my estate that any 
reasonable and prudent individual would exercise in the manage- 
ment of similar property owned in my Personal Representative's 
own right, upon such terms and conditions as may seem best to my 
Personal Representative, and to execute and deliver any and all 
instruments and to do any and all acts which my Personal 
Representative may deem necessary or proper to carry out the 
purposes of this Will. 
CLAUSE 4 
DIRECTIONS TO PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
I direct that my body be cremated with no services. I 
direct that my friend, Bob Soninger, shall be responsible for the 
ashes. My ashes shall be spread over Carson City, Nevada 
brothels. 
CLAUSE 5 
DISPOSITION OF CERTAIN PERSONAL PROPERTY BY SEPARATE WRITING 
I order and direct that certain items of my personal 
property shall be distributed according to a written list of 
items and intended recipients thereof prepared either in my 
handwriting or signed by me, if such a list is in existence at 





ftll of the rest, residue and remainder of my property 
which I own or have any interest in whatever at the time of my 
&*- C-PT sea-et'y 
death, I give, bequeath, and devise to Marieann Christman. R11 
interests that 1 have in any trusts I give, bequeath, and devise 
to Marie b&&stman. I of appointment that 
I might hold and appoint If for any reason 
Marieann Christman predeceses me, I give, bequeath, and devise 
all of my property to her children by right of representation. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
seal this - day of , 2000. 
'i 
Zachary A. Cowan 
The foregoing instrumentt consisting of four (41 
pages, including the page signed by the undersigned witnesses, 
w a s ,  on the date thereof signed, published and declared by the 
above-named Zachary A. Cowan, to be his b e t  Will and Testament, 
in the presence of us, who, at his request and his presence and 
in the presence of each other, and on the same date, have 
subscribed our names as witnesses thereto. 
Reeiding at 
Residing at 
STATE O F  IDAIIO ) 
) ss 
County o f  Cas s i a  1 
We, ZACHARY A. COWAN, t h e  T e s t a t o r ,  and 
, the  w i tne s se s ,  
r e spec t i ve ly ,  whose names a r e  s igned to  t h e  a t tached o r  foregoing 
instrument ,  be ing  f i r s t  du ly  sworn, do hereby dec la re  t o  t he  
undersigned a u t h o r i t y  t h a t  t h e  T e s t a t o r  s igned  and executed t h e  
instrument a s  h i s  Last W i l l  and Testament and t h a t  he had s igned  
w i l l i n g l y ,  and t h a t  he executed i t  a s  h i s  f r e e  and vo lun t a ry  a c t  
f o r  t h e  purposes  t he r e in  expressed;  and t h a t  each of t h e  
wi tnesses ,  i n  t h e  presence and hea r ing  of t h e  Tes t a to r ,  s igned  
t he  W i l l  as wi tnesses  and t h a t  t o  t h e  b e s t  of h i s  knowledge t h e  
\ ) 
Tes ta to r  was a t  t h e  t i m e  an a d u l t ,  of sound mind and under  no 
c o n s t r a i n t  o r  undue in f luence .  
T e s t a t o r  
Witness 
Witness 
Subscr ibed,  sworn t o  and acknowledged before  m e  by 
Zachary A .  Cowan, t h e  T e s t a t o r ,  and 
, t h e  w i tne s se s ,  t h i s  day of 
, 2 0 0 0 .  
Notary Pub l i c  f o r  Idaho 
Res id ing  a t  Burley,  Idaho 
My Commission e x p i r e s  
Aawley Troxell 
Craig L. %leadous. ISR So. 1081 
Michelle R. Points, ISB No  6221 
~JAVJLEY \'rtxoxi:LL ENNIS ~I.A.IVI.EY 1.1.~ 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P . 0 ,  Box 1617 
Boise. ID 83701.-I617 
Telephone: 208.344.bOOO 
Facsimile: 08.954.5238 
Emaii: cn?eadows;~hawleytrovcll corn 
m p i n t s @ L ~ ~ l e ~ ~ ~ o x c I 1 . ~ o m  
Atto~nrvs for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher 
IN I'EIF: DISTRICT COZJRT OF THE I:lFTI-I JlJDlCtAL J')lS'IRIC'J 
OF THE S'TAI'E OF II)AI.10, IN AKD FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
MARY KlLLMS SOIGKIER. 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
W. KENT FLETCHER. 
Defendant. 
j Case No. CV 2009-5 17 
) 
) REPLY TO PI.AM'I'IFF'S OPPOSITION 
) 1'0 DEFENDANT'S hl0TIOh.' FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
W. Kent Fletcher, by and through his cocnsel of record, Hawley 'Troxell. Ennis 
& kldwley LLP, respectfully slzb~nits this Reply 3 Plaintiffs Opposition to Dc fenh t ' s  Moiion 
for St~mmary Judgment. 
As the Court is aware, anc! 11s set forth with citations in Mr. Fletcher's opening 
memorandum on this motion. this is ail attorney malpractice action filed by Plaintifl'in which 
Plaintiff asserts that she was denied her testamentary "entitlerrent" as ii named henefic. ary in the 
REPLY '1.0 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOS17KC)N TO UEFEfjDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I 
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will of Zachary Cowan. See Sfemorandrun in Clppusition to  Motion for S u n m a q  JuCyrncnt 
("i\iIemorandum"), p. I .  
In the probate case pertainiitg to Mr. Cc.,v;ul'r %'ill and Fstate (,Cassia County Cwe 
No. Ol' -7006 1231), Plaintif~contestctl the Persol~al Kcprrur~~rative's it~terpreraticrii ofthe 1L'ill. 
claiming she was "entitled" to eellain inionies frelm the 1.eonarda A. Cowan Trust (hcreinaf~er the 
"leunwda Trust'';. and that Ciause 6 of Mr. C o l ~ a t i ' ~  W:Il was  an~bigllol-s; thus. Plaintiff 
asserted that the ci~urt in the probate case should allow and/or consider parol evidence to itiif the 
Court in detcrmlning the Intent of rl~e testator hrlr C o ~ a n .  
The court in the probate c:aj:ie found them was no mnhiguity in M r  Couran's %'ill and 
held that the residue of Mr. Cowan's Estate was to be p a ~ d  to the :*imericsn Cancer Society. 
Plaintiff'appealed the court's decision 
On or about September 29.2008. the parties in the probate case entered into a 
"Stipulation for Scttlement of Clailrl of Mary Killins Soignier, Approval of Petition for 
Construction of the Will and Plat1 of Uistributiol~ and Di3mi~sal of Appeal" (hereiwafter 
Stipulation for Settlement"). 
In consideration for Plaintiff'siyning the Stipulation for Settlement, she dismis::ed her 
appeal and received palmen! from the American Cimcer Soclety in thc amount of 5 100.000 
As a preliminary matter. 1'lninti:t'misstat~s rhe nature of the case in her opposition to 
Mr. Fletcher's Motion for Summ.&ry Jutlgment, W i l e  i t  is true that Mr. Cowan had at one time a 
beneficial interest in the Leonarda 'Trust. Plaintiffs claim that the trust referenced in Clause 6 o f  
Mr. Cotvan's Will - - that 1'laintitTreceic.e "all beneficial interests that [Mr. Cowan has] in any 
trusts - - is actually referencing the 1.eonarda Trust. Clause 6 of the Will states in relevant pan 
that, "[ajll beneficial interests that I have in any trusts I give, bequeath. and devise to Mary 
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liillinjsj." 'fhe th'ill docs not relircnce the 1,eorlarita I'nlst. Such an ir~fermci: hy Plainrit'f is not 
supp>ncd by the record. Beca~lse {he %'ill does nor reference the Leonarda I'mst, Plai~:tin's 
allegations related to the powet i t f t i p ~ ~ i ~ t ~ n e r ~ t  or [hat the L.conarda 'Fiust terminated ,when 
Mr. f:otum =ached dre 3ge of 50,  are inelwant mJ cert,cinl:i tio not create an issue of'facr 
related to this .Motion for Summart J\-;dgment. 
The 1.conarda I'ruit codti lu re  been one cf'the trusts in which Mr. Corvan had an interest 
at any given time, bur it crrtainl!, wss r:ot the exclusi\.e trust specified in Clause 6 of 
Mr. Cowan's Will, nor arguably the only trust in which Mr. Cowan may havr had sn interest at 
the time the Will was drafted or at the time of his death. 
Secondarily, P1aintii'fassi.f:; thut Mr. Fletcher was negligent in allegedly not reviewing 
the Leonarda Tm~i docuinent. Again. the Will does nor specifically reference the 1.eo:larda 
Trust. lib, Fletcher's ARidavit on Mr. Cowan's inten1 is clear - - -  upon klr. Fletcher's inq~.tiry. 
Mr. Cowan told Mr. Fletcher that he did not know if all of the propeny had been uatlsferred to 
him fi-om the !Leonard* Trust at the tinx the Will was drafted, and when asked if he wimted to 
leave the language in the Will to bequeath whatever interest he had as a beneficiary in "any inst" 
to Plaintifcupon his death. Mr. Cowan stated that he wanted to lea\.e that language in his WIII, 
Plaintiffs suppsition is s hat sht: should have received something, or that Mr. Fletcher 
had a duty to assure that she received son~ething under the Will, but that is not so. Plaintiff could 
only receive %ha! interest Mr. Cowan may have had in "my trust." It does not necessarily 
follow that Plaintiris to receive something if she is narned in the Will; Plairltiff can only receive 
snmethil?g if  Mr. Cowan had an interest in "any trust" at the time of his death. There i: nothing 
specified in Mr. Cowan's Will that he ictcnded Plaintiffto receive arty interest spcciiic;illy in the 
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I.eonrut1ir Trust. .As sct forth i ~ !o . *~ .  Vr. Fletcl~cr (lid not h3vt a duty to assure that P l ~ n t i ~ l '  
would irl fact reccivc "something' 11nd:r the tenns ot'rhe U'if!. 
Mr. Flctcher unm~biguously dratted Mr. Coivan's Kill as Mr. Co..iul spzci:ic;illy 
requested, and Plaintiff h a  not created any issue of materid fact that would prevent this C o w  
frnni making such a tinding. The Evil1 is unamk~iguous, as the htagistrilte Judge dztcr~r~ined. The 
Will is i~namhigt~c~us as a p e d  to by the Plaintiff, whei~ she settled her Appeal. 'Tl..:re cal.jiot be 
any "malpractice" when from the limr ccimers of the Will, there is no basis for determining that a 
beneficiary did not receive what the teitator intend&. 
Finally, M;. Fletcher cannot be stud to hi~ve causcd P1;lintitTto "recover substantially 
less" than the v d ~ ~ e  ofthe Leonardz 7'r~st property, as asserted by Pla~fitilf, wheu the 
unambiguous provision in the Will regarding Pl~unril'fdici not reference the Leonarda 'Trust snd 
which provision was sprcilicdly kept in the Will at the request of Mr. Cowan to provide for 
Plaintiff' in the event Mr. Cowan had an interest in "any trust" at the time of his death. Of course, 
at the time of his death, Mr. Couarl did not hold or possess any interests in any trusts; thus, 
Plaintitrwas not entitled to any interest under the Will. 
In sum, Plaintiff settled her claim with regard io Mr. Cowan's Estate tttr $ I00,COO - - a 
payment of which Plaintiff was argtlably uot entitled given the unambiguous language contained 
in Mr. Cowan's Will. 
1. 
PL.4IN'fIFF'S CLAIM IS BllHKED BY ' W E  STATUTE OF LIRIITATION 
Plaintiff argues that her claim al:ainst Mr Fletcher is not barred by the statute of 
limiktion because " [ ~ J h e r e  the e.ris::cnce, or not, of any alleged neqlig~ncc depends on the 
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~lutcome ot ittigation. there is no otyecttve proofof actual damage until the l~tigation is 
ct~ncluded." Memoraldum, p. 3. 
Plaintiff assens that until  the Magistrate ruled on September 17. 2007, that Plaintiff 
should tnke nothing under tlie Will, m:! claim against attome;; Fictche: for mrtlpractic: w,.iuld be 
'~spe~ulative '~ and the statute of liniitations coultl nor begin to run until that date. Zleniorandum. 
p. 3. Pl:ainrii?'s argument is :vitho:ir rncrit. 
Plaintiffs claim in the probate case was that Plaintit?' was elititled to inonies yet to be 
distributed to Mr. Cowen from ttie l.eouiuda Tnist. See claim of Vary Killins Soiynier, tiled on 
or about January 2, 2007 in Cassia Ct~unty Case No. i3V 06- i 234. 
Tellingly, by Plaintiff's o u n  assertion, in drafting Mr. Cowan's Will to inuliidr the 
language in the form that Mr. 1-letclier did, Plaintiit's beneficial interests in trusts wns bistrnted 
because the 1,eonariia ' r m  had been t m i n a t e d  prior to Mr. Cowan's execution ofhis Will. .Tee 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Ti-ial. p, 3 , q  V. By Plaintilf~ own account, it was 
Mr. Fletcher's act of allegedly neglisently draftiiig Llr Cowan's !+'ill that caused her to be 
dan~agetl. Confinnation of that "damage" by a court (to commence the running of the statute of 
limitations) rniscviistrues the applic.ablc: law. 
In tfie probate case, Plainiiff was seeking a tinding frt,in the corn  that Mr. Cowan's '~riill 
was ambiguous and that the C c u ~ i  should look tu &davits to determine the intent of the testator 
Mr. Cowan. in team of what he intended to bequeath to f'laiiitiff. Quite differently, in this 
nlalpractice action. Plaintift'is asserting that the inclusion of the provision in 'vlr. C'ow;m's \b'~lI. 
that Plaintiff be awarded any beneficial interest held by Mr. Cowan in "any trust" at the time of 
his death, i i au  frustrated hccause the Leonarda Trust was terminated. These are mutually 
exclusi~e inquiries Plaintiffs claim of damage in h i s  case and me.lsure andior extent of 
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dam:lges is ;ugwhly entirely dii'fercnk than Plailttifri clium of "enti~lement" hefore the court in 
the probate case. 
T%i: h m  !o PlaintifSact.,i311y ilczurred when, according to Plzintiffs '~llegatio-IS. 
hfr Flereher i ~ e p l i ~ e ~ ~ t l y  ilrilfled lbe Will, nut \*hen the cou~? in the probtitc case t;.und th:ir 
Plaintiit'had no i~~terect i l l  .Mr. Cowan'i Estate. Arguably, even if the cotin in the ;?robate c:ise 
found that there was a11 alnbigui..) in ?dr Coivalls lVill a.nd that he in (act intendcd to bequeath 
to PlaintiITeertain propeny of his Estate. the collrt could sot haw held that she had an interest in 
the Levnarda Trust, as that trust was terminated at !he time hlr. Cowm's Xi11 wss dralted by 
Mr. Fletcher: Plaintiff per her o\\n argument, would still have been damaged not\'rithstanding 
any finding by the probate court. I'ut another w:~y, whcn the court in the probate case dismissed 
her claim that she was a beneficittry under the Will. that holding did nct a t k t  her 'laim fix 
damages against hlr. Fletcher. 
Contrary ti, Plaintiffs assetqions, aparty docs not have to have their claim for Ynorney 
malpractice adjudicated by a trier ut'fact to trigger the statute of limitations, and L ~ Q J  <!f .@lr'i.i?fi 
v Bwton. 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.!d 629 (2009), *does not support that unqualified propssition. 
Mr. Fletcher does not dislmte, fix the purpnse of this motion, tl~at in certain ca'es a 
determination of actual damages will depend LIpon that outcome of certain litigation. llowever, 
where the existence of "some damage" does not depend on the oufconie of a lawsuit, the statute 
of limitations begins to assrue. See R z t x f ~ t ~  at 642. 201 P.3d at 635. 
PlaintiEfmisconstrues the Itlaho Supreme C~.,urt's holding in Blixtcin. There were two 
distinct ritiings in 8rrrton. wherein the City of McCall sued its attorneys based on ;illegaticnc of 
negliyenl advice. Two c u u ~ ~ t s  of thc City's com;llaint were based on allegations ol 'negligr~~t 
advice by the City's attorney pertai~:ing to termination of a cnlltraet and the witl~holding of 
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certain prq~nents to contrnctors, i ~ e  idaho Suprcr~le Cou11 held that :mi! ouicon:s ofthe 
lirigation rcisted to this "advice" c i t ~  l i ~ r  breach *)fcontra;.t clitims: theic ~.oulll nor be :I 
determinatil~n of damage: that i s .  the i'ity could have prevailed in the iitigation ,md agurrhiy 
suffered no damage id, 146 ldrh(t at 663. 201 P.ld at 636 The remainmy c la~m \>f+~egligence 
in Rur~on had to do with the City attorney advising the City to xlease a lien against J-L1-U 
E~yineerinp. The Idaho Suprene Colin held that the date 011 which t11e Ci ty  of ktcCall released 
its lien u-as the date on which the ~frvnr~ge occurred because that was the dote on which the City 
of CfcCall lost its opportunity to recover against J-C-R Engmeering. Id. at 663, 2'.)1 P.3d at 636 
B a e d  on Plaintifl's alleyations, there was oo "speculation" that she had in fact been 
dcunaged when Mr. Fletcher allegedly negligently drafied klr. Cowan's Will in 2005; that is 
when Plaintiff surered some asccrtaina'cle dam;~ge, as there was cbje~:tiveiy ascertainable 
evidence that Mr. Cowan did t ~ o t  hasc any interest in the Leonairda Tru.st :which is the stated 
basis of Plaintiffs claim). .4lten1atively, if therc is some question as to whether Plaintiff 
suffered "some damage" when the 'Uil tvas drafted i l l  May of 2005, there is no questiw that 
some damage occurred at the time of Mr. Cowan's death in October of2006. as any ol?portunity 
to amend the Will would be impossihle. 
The outcome of the probate casl: was not disyx~sitive regarding Plaintiffs claims against 
Mr. Fletcher and Plainciffsuffered some damage prior to the commencement of that litigatio~~. 
PlaintifYs claim is barred by the applicable statute of lirni&ttions. 
I f .  
MR. FLETC:HEIR I)lI) NOT HAVE '1. DKTY TO PLAINTIFF 
I'laintiff asscris that Mr. 1:letcher's actions, in draliing the Will of hfr. Cowan. fell !bel~,w 
the applicable standard of care and, rhe~efbre, breached a duty of Plaintiff. Mitemorar~dum. p. 10. 
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A s  a prel~mir,ary. breach of  the .;ta~~d:ud of care and bnach i ~ f  d u p  in %n attorney mdpracticc 
action iprtrticu!arly in a claim by a tl~irj party k n e T i ~ , i q  rrpgardir~g a %'ill clajrn) are mutually 
exclusive inquiries. flwt is, s in~ply  because Plaintifl's purported "expen" is of the opinion !,hat 
Clr. Fle~cher's a c t i o ~ ~ s  alleged!y fell k l o w  the applicable standard of  carel sucl~ 311 op:ninn does 
not create ;ur issue of fact with nlgerd to Sfr. Fletcher's Moticrn fur S u m m a n  Judgn~ent on illis 
15515. 
.%s set fonh in Mr. Fletcher's ~ i x n i n g  memor.~ndum on this motion. the Idaho Supreme 
Court has carved nut a narrow e;:c:pticln where. "[aln atlomey preparing testmentaiy 
instn~ments owes a duty IL) the hncficiaries nan~ed or  identitied therein to prepare such 
instruments . . .  so as to et%chlate the testator's intent as expressed in the tertamcl?tary 
instrument." Hcrrri.@e/d v. Han~~ot-k. 1-10 ldaho 134, 139.90 P.3d 884, 889 (2004). 
A henelicisry will not have a crlse agains t l ~ e  lauyer for not receiving from the 
testamentary instrument (in this case the Will) what they understood the testator had stated or  
indicated they would receive, Id. 
Plaintiffhas no claim against Vr. Fletcher for what hlr. Cowen may have told her she 
would receive. ~h:ther it was from the L e o ~ ~ a r d : ~  'rtst or otherwise. A11 Mr. Cowan chose to 
express in hir Will, in an ~ m b i g u o u s  f o ~ m  (according to the court in the probate cue ) ,  was that 
any hencficial interest M r  C o ~ d n  had in any trust would go to Plaintiff, and ifhe didn't have any 
such interest, nothing would go to Plaintiff. See Opinion entered September 18. 2007, pp. It;- I I 
As set forth in the affidavit of  hlr. Fletcher. prior :o f i r a l i z in~  hlr. Cowan's L\'i!I, 
Mr. 1:letcher inquired i~bout he i~ltcresti he had in any trust, including the 1,eonarda Trust. and 
?ill.. <:owan inld him that he believed hc fiad received disbursements from the Leonnrdr~ 'Frwt hut 
wanted to keep the language in the Will regarding Plaintiff in the event there were other 
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interests I f  the l:lngi~age of a %il l  is clear anif unmhiy~ous .  the i l l te~~t of the testator is derived 
from iht. % i l l  as it rcads an i ts fnce. :illen 1) .Shca. 105 Idaho ': 1.13 (1983). The .anguagv of 
Mr. Coxtian's Will is unnmbiguous on .ts face atld ;%ccurrtcly reflects the !went of 51r, Clor*m. 
:Lrsuably, Soll~?wing the raiiorde of Plaintips argument, fwd Mr. 1:letclrer lealrted that i l l  
fact M r .  Cowan 111td rlo fcrtlier bercfic:ary interest in the Leonarda Trust. there would be xlo 
mention of'PlaintiKin the Will a t  all. i-lowe\.er, Mr. Fletcher belimed Mr. Cowm's 
representation that there may be scllnr benrliciai in~erests 'or~t there" and if there :oerc. he 
wanted Plaintiff to receive the benefit c~f  those il~terests. 
In support of her opposition, Plaintiff submitted the affidavit of attorney .lokx Magnuson 
to opine that btr. Fletcher's conduct, i l l  preparation oTI-.fr. C o ~ a n ' i  2005 Will, fell below the 
applicable st,andard of care because ( I )  Mr. Fletcher refers to a power of sttorney held by the 
testator. which power of attorne) is not granted by the 'Trust (referring to the Lconards Trust) 
which "indicates" to Mr. Magnu?.on that Mr. Fletcher did not review the Trust; (2) had 
Mr. Fletcher reviewed the Trust, he would have learned that after Mr. Co-ivan reached the nge 
of 50, his mother's trust property would revert to Mr. Cotvan: (3) Mr. Fletcher had a diuy to 
inquire of Mr. Cowan whether hi: brui rq:ached the age of50 and to modify the language in 
Mr. Cowan's Will to reflect that he owned property previcusly held i l l  trust; (4) h6 .  Cnwan's 
Will references "all beneficial interests that I h a ~ e  in any t w t s "  indicates io Clr. b13gnuson that 
Mr. Fletcher Sailed to inquire of Mr. Cowan how he wanted the property, pl.eviously held in trust. 
devised: and (5)  the portion of l l r ,  Co%.w's Will that refers to "all beneficial interests that I have 
in any trusts" is of no force and erect  given the absence of such mlst or trusts. 
In sum, Mr. Magnuson opines that "under these circumstances. drafting a will, a p n i o n  
of which has no force and effect imd which Sails ro effectllate the intention of the testator, 
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con:stit~tes a devi:~tion from ?he stmdard of care ar~d falls belclw thr s:itndard of c u e  of atrorneyi 
prac~icing in Idaho in 2005, 
Mr. S'faynuson's affidavit is no? relevant to the pending motion for su;nmar)i judgment, as 
it  creates no issue ol'matcrid fact which wc)uld prrvcnt this Court to grant Mr. Fletcher's motion 
for s u m m q  judgment. 
11s previously set f i r t h ,  the error in Plail~tiffs upposition is that :he rei'eren~e contailled 
in Mr. C0wan.s Will that Pl~nti:Trect+ve "all bi:neficial interests that [Mr. Cowan has] in any 
nusts". actually is referencing the Leot~ardrt Trust. 'The 'Nil1 does not reference the i'eonarda 
Trust. Not\siths+mding that fact, Mr. 1:letcher's Al'iidavit confirms that he discurseJ the status of 
the Leonardarruut with Mr. Co~var~ acd that MI.. Co?van indicated h a t  certvin properties had 
been distributed to l ~ i m  Sram the Leonarda Trust, b111 he wanted to ksep the language in the Will 
pertaining to Plaintiff, in the evellt there were ac!dilional interests. There v;as no iildication to 
Mr. Fletcher at any time that Mr. Cuuqe.n intended to give to Plaintiffanything other han 
interests that he may have in any tnlsts at the time of his death. Tllus, at the time of his death? if 
there were additional interests in any trust, Plaintiff would receive said in:erests, and if there 
were not any interests in any trusts. Plaintiff wolild receive nothing. 
Like Fiurri,zfild, suprd. a duty may be owed to a named beneficiary of a Will, such as 
Plaintiff in this case, to draft a test:wnentary documznc ac;ording to the testator's intent. Clause 6 
of Mr. Co\vanqs Will fulfills any duty owed to Plaintiffbecause it devises to Plaintiff '.[a111 
benelicial interests I have in any trusts" to Plaintiff I lad Mr. Cowan died with any be%eficial 
tnlst interests. Plaintifi!muld hvie :eceii.ed exactly what Cowan intended. '{he fact that 
.Mr. Cowan did not have any interest in any trust at the tirne ctf the Will, or at the time of his 
death, is not relevant to the adequacy of Mr. Fletcher's drafting. according to Mr. (Titwan's 
intent. The ir~trnt ofbtr .  Cowa~;. $om t\e Will. is clear as ti1 the Plair~titl'. Lfr. C:otvan's inrcnt 
as derired from h:s Wili ts clear mil unambigucqus. If Mr. f'ou.m had any beneficial interest in 
any trust st the time of his death, those interests would pass to Plainti% if not, nothing goes to 
Plaintiff, 
Mr Fietcl~er breached ncq d~tt?. :a i'lrtintiff and her claim for anonley malpractice should 
be dismissed. 
111. 
PLAIYTIFF'S CLAIM IS B.4RRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAI, ESTOPPEL 
' h u u g h  this motion, kfr Fietcier assefls that I'1:~intiff settled ;111 claims she h;~d rt:l;lled 
to Mr. Cowan's Will by executing the Stipulation for Settlement in the probate case a ~ ~ d  is, 
therefore, judiciallyestopped 5om pur:;uing this mdpractice action against Mr. Fletiher. 
' f ie  language of the Stipt~lation for Settlement provides that the parties, inclusive of 
W. Kent Fletcher (as attorney for Mr. Cowan's listate), stipulated and agreed to the foilowing: 
"[all1 claims of Mary Killins Soiynier tinder the Last Will and Testament of Z a c h i  A. Cowan, 
as heir, devisee, or holder of powel. of nppointm~:nt . . . are settled for the sum of One Hundred 
'Thousand Dollars ($1 00.000~:' 
It is the position of Mr. 1:ietcher that by sigr~ing a t ~ d  submitting a stipulation to the court 
in the probate case, Plaintiff repr*:sented that uny claim that she may have as heir to Mr. Cowan's 
Esta~e was settled. That is, she crfectively: and 8s a matter of law, agreed to settle all claims as 
heir to Mr. Cowan's Estate, which woi~ld include ht:r ~nalprnctice a c t i c ~ ~  against !dr. Fietchel.. as 
heir to Mr. Cowan's Estate. 
In opposition to Mr. Fle tchc~. '~  ?,lotion fbr Sun~m:~ry .ludgment. PlaintitT has submitted an 
affidavit which states that when "she entered into the settlement of her claims against tile estate, 
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Through the Stipulation fur Se!tlen~ent, Plainriffagrccd ro s a l e  .'tLL Cl.!ti!~lS relared t3 
Mr. t..r>\vct~~~s Will, re sn heir ~1'rl.ict U'i!l. P1ai11tilTagrc:d :o the t e r m  c.it!ic settlzm~:nt. &s did 
Mr. Fletcher (wlw \was iisted as a 3 . m ~  xnd a sigratory!. and Plaintiff.jhat11d bs order& to dbide 
by that agrcemcnt, as she represented to the court in the probi~te case iha! she would, on uhich 
rcpresrnratio~~ the coun relied. 'Ihat the representation a f  Plaintiff was not made in "itpen court" 
as argued by PlaintifTJocs not detcat ?dr. Flet~.i~er's n~otion on this issue. Plaintilfclearly 
represe~lted by signing rhc stipulatian to dismiss land rere i~ing ihe 51 00.000) that she wotrld in 
fact settle all claims related to proceed:; tiom M:. CC)~AW..'S Fs~iftt-1 which must inclt~ds, as a 
matter of k~w. Plaintif'is claim h r  :tdd.tional proceeds due to her kom that Estate based on 
Mr. Fletcher's alleged malpractice. 
In s u n ,  Pl;rintiff is pursuing the same clziirn ayairtst Mr. Fletcher in this malpractice 
action as she was pursuing in the pruhz.tc case (f~dditional proceeds from Mr. Cowtut's Estate) 
- . which she agreed to settle. Plaintiff should nat be allowed to take a position inconsistent with 
that position she took in the prokte  cs;e, wherein she agreed to settle "all claims" related tc her 
claim as hcir to Mr. Cowan's Estate. 
Plaintiffs motion under the doctrine ofjirdicial estoppel should be granted as a matter of 
law. 
I Plaintiff has clted no authority :o rclppi2 the p~~pds i t ion  :hat judicial csttlppel doe:; not :ipply 
iZa party signs a witten stip~alation and perfc~rrns the terms of the stipulation. Nor is there 
any requiremelit that Mr. Fletcber "letrimentally re l ied  on any representation made by 
Plaintiff in the probate case in order ti? pursue a claim of estoppel or judicial estoppel. 
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There is no issue of lneterial fact that PlninrifYs Cornplaint is barred hy the app;icable 
statute of l~m~tation,  that Mr. Elettller d ~ d  not owe or breach any duty to Plalntiffin his draAtng 
of the K'ill of Mr. Cowan, and that Plaintiffs clainls sre bmred under the dcc2ine ctfjudicial 
estoppel. M r .  Fle~cher espectlully requests [ha: the Court make these firdings m a matter of la\+ 
and dismiss Plaintit't-s Complairrt wirh prejudice. 
KESI'ECIH!Li,Y S1181dLITl:D THIS ~ ' ~ o f l t I b .  2009 
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,. U V l l  nawLey Troxell 
LERyrFICKI E C ) F ~ ~ C ~  
X h  
f L-IEREUY CEK.!.lf:Y &a,. on his gclay of July, 2009, I caused ro be sened a true 
copy of the foregoing REPL-Y ' T i )  P~.I\INTIFF'S OPPOSl'nOh' TO DEFENDAKT'!; MO'TION 
FOR SLf%fl.LARY JL~DCMi3'T' ti? the method indicated belo*, and addresed lo each of thc 
fo1:owinp: /"-- 
Allen 8. Fllis -_ J t  i . S  Mail, Postage i'repaid 
ELIJS, RKO'ut% & SHEll-S, Cll . i iR?EMD --- tiand Delivered 
707 North 8th Street Ovcmight .%fail 
P.(3. Box 388 G n ~ a i l  
Boise, ID 83701 -0388 -- klecupp: 205.315.'?56-1 
[;%ttornrys fur Plaintitfl 
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A k n  8. Ellis, ISB No. 1826 
ELLIS, BROWN 8 SHEILS 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Bolse, ldaho 83701-0388 
Telephone: (208) 345-7832 
FacsbnUe: (208) 345-9564 
MARY KlLLlNS SOIGNIER, 
Pkintiff, 
Jeffrey A Strother, ISB No. 2014 
STROTHER LAW OFFICE 
200 N. Fourth St&, Suite 30 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 342-2425 
Facsirnirct: (208) 342-2429 
Attorneys for Piainmf 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICW DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
VB. 
W. KENT FLETCHER, 
I Case No. CV 200E1-617 
I NOTICE OF ASSOClATlON OF COUNSEL 
Defendant. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE thsl Jeffrey A. Strother, of Stmther Law Office, 200 N. 4' 
Street, Suite 30, Boise, Idaho 83702, is assodating 8s sttomey of record wim Allen 8. Ellis, 
of the firm Ellk, Brown 8 Sheik, 707 N. en Sb-eet, P.0 Box 388, Boiss, Idaho 83701-0388, 
for plalnUff Mary Kiltins Soignier in the abovecaptbned matter, and the derk of court k 
hereby requested to make such entries as may be requked to record such assodallon. 
NOTICE OF ASSOCIATION OF CWNSEL . 1  
DATED this day of August, 2009. 
ELUS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHTD. STROTHER LAW OFFICE 
A l h  B. Ellis 
~~ 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ day of August, 2009. 1 caused a true and 
?Y of the fotegoiq documentto be =wed  up^ the lollowing hdivldual(s) by the 
method indicated below and addressed as follows: 
M M l e  R. Points [ j U.S. Mail, poutage prepald 
Craig L Meadows 1 1 Hand Delhered 
H-Y, Tmxell, Enws 8 Hawley, LLP [I m i g ~  Mail 
877 Maln S t ,  Ste. 1000 1 1  By I=acsrmile 
P.O. Box 1617 
- - o ~ v e r s o n  Hawlay T r o x e l l  
i5,'*~.~ Page 3 p$j &a **- PJ 
Craig I,. Meadows, ISB No. 1081 
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
HAWLEY TR(2XEL.L ENNlS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.0.  Box 161 7 





Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF ID.4H0, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER, ) 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
W. KENT FLETCHER, 
Defendant. 
1 Case No. CV 2009-5 17 
i 
) REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION 
j TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
j SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) 
W. Kent Fletcher, by and through his counsel of record, Hawley Troxell, Ennis 
& Hawley LLP, respectfully submits this Reply to PlaintifPs Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
As the Court is aware, and as set forth with citations in Mr. Fletcher's opening 
memorandum on this ntotion, this is an attorney malpractice action filed by Plaintiff in which 
Plaintiff asserts that she was denied her testamentary "entitlement" as a named beneficiary in the 
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%il l  of Zachary Cowan. See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Memorandum"), p. 1.  
In the probate case pertaining to Mr. Cowan's Will and Estate (Cassia County Case 
No. CV 2006 1234), Plaintiff contested the Personal Representative's interpretation of the Will, 
claiming she &as "entitled" to certain monies from the Leonarda A. Cowan 'Trust (hereinaAer the 
"Leonarda Trust"), and that Clause 6 of Mr. Cowan's Will was ambiguous; thus, Plaintiff 
asserted that the court in the probate case should allow andlor consider par01 evidence to aid the 
Court in determining the intent of the testator Mr. Cowan. 
The court in the probate case found there was no ambiguity in Mr. Cowan's Will and 
held that the residue of Mr. Cowan's Estate was to be paid to the American Cancer Society. 
Plaintiff appealed the court's decision. 
On or about September 29,2008, the parties in the probate case entered into a 
"Stipulation for Settlement of Claim of Mary Killins Soignier, Approval of Petition for 
Construction of the Will and Plan of Distribution and Dismissal of Appeal" (hereinafter 
Stipulation for Settlement") 
In consideration for Plaintiff signing the Stipulation for Settlement, she dismissed her 
appeal and received payment from the American Cancer Society in the amount of $100,000. 
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff misstates the nature of the case in her opposition to 
Mr. Fletcher's Motion for Summary Judgment. While it is true that Mr. Cowan had at one time a 
beneficial interest in the Leonarda Trust, Plaintiffs claim that the trust referenced in Clause 6 of 
*Mr. Cowan's Will - that Plaintiff receive "all beneficial interests that [Mr. Cowan has) in any 
trusts - - is actually referencing the Leonarda Trust. Clause 6 of the Will states in relevant part 
that, "[all1 beneficial interests that I have in any trusts I give, bequeath, and devise to Mary 
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Killin[s]." The Will does not reference the Leonarda Trust. Such an inference by Plaintiff 1s not 
supported by the record. Because the Will does not reference the Leonarda rrust, I'1aint1fP.s 
allegations related to the power of appointment or that the Leonarda Trust terminated when 
Mr. Cowan reached the age of 50, are irrelevant and certainly do not create an issue of fact 
related to this Motion for Summary Judgment, 
'The Leonarda Trust could have been one of the trusts in which Mr. Cowan had an interest 
at any given time, but i t  certainly was not the exclusive trust specified in Clause 6 of 
Mr. Cowan's Vc'ill, nor arguably the only trust in which Mr. Cowan may have had an interest at 
the time the Will was drafted or at the time of his death. 
Secondarily, Plaintiff assetis that Mr. Fletcher was negligent in allegedly not reviewing 
the Leonarda Trust document. Again, the Will does not specifically reference the Leonarda 
Trust. Mr. Fletcher's Affidavit on Mr. Cowan's intent is clear - -- upon Mr. Fletcher's inquiry, 
Mr. Cowan told Mr. Fletcher that he did not know if all of the property had been transferred to 
him &om the Leonarda Trust at the time the Will was drafted, and when asked if he wanted to 
leave the language in the Will to bequeath whatever interest he had as a beneficiary in "any trust" 
to Plaintiff upon his death, Mr. Cowan stated that he wanted to leave that language in his Will. 
Plaintitl's supposition is that she should have received something, or that Mr. Fletcher 
had a duty to assure that she received something under the Will, but that is not so. Plaintiff could 
only receive what interest Mr. Cowan may have had in "any trust." It does not necessarily 
follow that Plaintiff is to receive something if she is named in the Will; Plaintiff can only receive 
something if Mr. Cowan had an interest in "any trust" at the time of his death. There is nothing 
specified in Mr. Cowan's Will that he intended Plaintiff to receive any interest specifically in the 
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Leonarda Trust. As set forth below, Mr. Fletcher did not have a duty to assure that Plaintiff' 
would in fact receive "something" under the terms of the Will. 
Mr. Fletcher unambiguously drafied Mr. Cotvan's 'drill its Mr. Cowan specifically 
requested, and Plaintiff has not created any issue of material fact that would prevent this Court 
from making such a finding. The Will is unambiguous, as the Magistrate Judge determined. The 
Will is unambiguous as agreed to by the Plaintiff, when she settled her Appeal. There cannot be 
any "malpractice" when from the four comers of the Will, there is no basis for determining that a 
beneficiary did not receive what the testator intended. 
Finally, Mr. Fletcher cannot be said to have caused Plaintiff to "recover substantially 
less" than the value of the leonarda Trust property, as asserted by Plaintiff, when the 
unambiguous provision in the Will regarding Plaintiff did not reference the Leonarda Trust and 
which provision was specifically kepi in the Will at the request of Mr. Cowan to provide for 
Plaintiff in the event Mr. Cowan had an interest in "any trust" at the time of his death. Of course, 
at the time of his death, Mr. Cowan did not hold or possess any interests in any trusts; thus, 
Plaintiffwas not entitled to any interest under the Will. 
In sum, Plaintiff settled her claim with regard to Mr. Cowan's Estate for $100,000 - - a 
payment of which Plaintiff was arguably not entitled given the unambiguous language contained 
in Mr. Cowan's Will. 
I. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION 
Plaintiff argues that her claim against Mr. Fletcher is not barred by the statute of 
limitation because "(wjhere the existence, or not, of any alleged negligence depends on the 
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outcome of litigation, there is no objective proof of actual damage until the litigation is 
concluded." Memorandum, p. 3. 
Plaintiff asserts that until the Magistrate ruled on September 17, 2007, that Plaintiff 
should take nothing under the Will, any claim against attorney Fletcher for malpractice would be 
"speculative" and the statute of limitations could not begin to run until that date. Memorandum, 
p. 4. PlalntiWs argument is without merit. 
Plaintiffs claim in the probate case was that Plaintiff was entitled to monies yet to be 
distributed to Mr. Cowen from the Leonarda Trust. See claim of Mary Killins Soignier, filed on 
or about January 2, 2007 in Cassia County Case No. CV 06-1234. 
Tellingly, by Plaintiffs own assertion, in drafting Mr. Cowan's Will to include the 
language in the form that Mr. Fletcher did, Plaintiff's beneficial interests in trusts was frustrated 
because the Leonarda Trust had been terminated prior to Mr. Cowan's execution of his Will. See 
Complaint and Demand for Jwy Trial, p. 3, f V. By Plaintift's own account, it was 
Mr. Fletcher's act of allegedly negligently drafting Mr. Cowan's Will that caused her to be 
damaged. Confirmation of that "damage" by a court (to commence the running of the statute of 
limitations) misconstrues the applicable law. 
In the probate case, Plaintiff was seeking a finding from the court that Mr. Cowan's Will 
was ambiguous and that the COW should look to affidavits to determine the intent of the testator 
Mr. Cowan, in terms of what he intended to bequeath to Plaintiff. Quite differently, in this 
malpractice action, Plaintiff is asserting that the inclusion of the provision in Mr. Cowan's Will, 
that Plaintiff be awarded any beneficial interest held by Mr. Cowan in "any trust" at the time of 
his death, was frustrated because the Leonarda Trust was tenninated. These are mutually 
exclusive inquiries. Plaintiffs claim ofdamage in this case and measure and/or extent of 
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damages is .arguably entirely different than I'laintifi's claim of "entitlcment" before the court in 
the probate case. 
The harm to Plaintiff actually occrmed when, according to Plaintiff's allegations, 
Mr. Fletcher negligently drafted the Will, not when the court in the probate case found that 
Plaintiff had no intercst in Mr. Cowan's Estate. Arguably, even if the court in the probate case 
found that there was an ambiguity in Mr. Cowm's Will and that he in fact intended to bequeath 
to Plaintiff certain property of his Estate, the court could not have held that she had an interest in 
the Leonarda Trust, as that trust was terminated at the time Mr. Cowan's Will was drafted by 
Mr. Fletcher; Plaintiff, per her own argument, would still have been damaged notwithstanding 
any finding by the probate court. Put another way, when the court in the probate case dismissed 
her claim that she was a beneficiary under the Will, that holding did not affect her claim for 
damages against Mr. Fletcher. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs assertions, a party does not have to have their claim for attorney 
malpractice adjudicated by a trier of fact to trigger the statute of limitations, and City ofMcCall 
v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656,201 P.3d 629 (2009), does not support that unqualified proposition. 
Mr. Fletcher does not dispute, for the purpose of this motion, that in certain cases a 
determination of actual damages will depend upon that outcome of certain litigation. However, 
where the existence of "some damage" does not depend on the outcome of a lawsuit, the statute 
of limitations begins to accrue. See Buxron at 662, 201 P.3d at 635. 
Plaintiff misconstrues the ldaho Supreme Court's holding in Bmton. There were two 
distinct rulings in Barton, wherein the City of McCall sued its attorneys based on allegations of 
negligent advice. Two counts of the City's complaint were based on allegations of negligent 
advice by the City's attorney pertaining to termination of a contract and the withholding of 
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certain payments to contractors. The Idaho Supreme Court held that until outcome of the 
litigation related to this .'advicew on the breach of contract claims, there could not be a 
determination of damage: that is, the City could have prevailed in the litigation and arguably 
suffered no damage. Id., 146 Idaho at 663, 201 P.3d at 636. The remaining claim of negligence 
in Auxton had todo with the City attorney advising the City to release a lien against J-U-B 
Engineering. The Idaho Supreme COW held that the date on which the City of McCall released 
its lien was the date on which the damage occurred because that was the date on which the City 
of McCall lost its opportunity to recover against J-U-B Engineering. fd. at 663, 201 P.3d at 636. 
Based on PlaintitTs allegations, there was no "speculation" that she had in fact been 
damaged when Mr. Fletcher allegedly negligently drafted Mr. Cowan's Will in 2005; that is 
when Plaintiff suffered some ascertainable damage, as there was objectively ascertainable 
evidence that Mr. Cowan did not have any interest in the Leonarda Trust (which is the stated 
basis of Plaintiffs claim). Alternatively, if there is some question as to whether Plaintiff 
suffered "some damage" when the Will was drafted in May of 2005, there is no question that 
some damage occurred at the time of Mr. Cowan's death in October of 2006, as any opportunity 
to amend the Will would be impossible. 
The outcome of the probate case was not dispositive regarding Plaintiffs claims against 
Mr. Fletcher and Plaintiff suffered some damage prior to the commencement of that litigation. 
Plaintiffs claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
11. 
MR. FLErCHER DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Fletcher's actions, in drafting the Will of Mr. Cowan, fell below 
the applicable standard of care and, therefore, breached a duty of Plaintiff. Memorandum, p. 10. 
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As a preliminar)., breach of the standard of care and breach of duty in an attorney malpractice 
action (panicularly in a claim by a third party beneficiary regarding a Will claim) are mutually 
exclusive inquiries. That is, simply becarse PlaintifPs purported "expert" is of the opinion that 
Mr. Fletcher's actions allegedly fell below the applicable standard of cam, such an opinion does 
not create an issue of fact with regard to Mr. Fletcher's Motion for Summary Judgment on this 
issue. 
As set forth in Mr. Fletcher's opening memorandum on this motion, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has carved out a nanow exception where, ''{aln attorney preparing testamentary 
inshwtlents owes a duty to the beneficiaries named or identified therein to prepare such 
instruments . . . so as to effectuate the testator's intent as expressed in the testamentary 
instrument." Harrldeldv. fiancock, 140 ldaho 134, 139, 90 P.3d 884, 889 (2004). 
A beneficiary will not have a case against the lawyer for not receiving from the 
testamentary instrument (in this case the Will) what they understood the testator had stated or 
indicated they would receive. Id. 
Plaintiff has no claim against Mr. Fletcher for what Mr. Cowen may have told her she 
would receive, whether i t  was from the Leonarda Trust or othenriise. All Mr. Cowan chose to 
express in his Will, in an unambiguous form (according to the court in the probate case), was that 
any beneficial interest Mr. Cowan had in any trust would go to Plaintiff, and if he didn't have any 
such interest, nothing would go to Plaintiff. See Opinion entered September 18, 2007, pp. 10-1 1 .  
As set forth in the affidavit of Mr. Fletcher, prior to finalizing Mr. Cowan's Will, 
Mr. Fletcher inquired about the interests he had in any trust, including the 1-eonarda Trust, and 
Mr. Cowan told him that he believed he had received disbursements from the Leonarda Trust but 
wanted to keep the language in the Will regarding Plaintiff in the event there were other 
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interests. lfthe language of a will is clear and unambiguous, the intent of the testator is derived 
from the w?ll as it reads on its face. Allen v Shea, 105 Idaho 3 1,14 (1 983). rSIe language of 
Mr. Cowan's Will is unambiguous on its face and accurately reflects the intent of Mr. Cowan. 
Arguably, following the rationale of Plaintiffs argument, had Mr. Fletcher learned that in 
fact Mr. Cowan had no further beneficiary interest in the Leonarda Trust, there would be no 
mention o f  Plaintiff in the Will at all, However, Mr. Fletcher believed Mr. Cowan's 
representation that there may be some beneficial interests "out there" and if there were, he 
wanted Plaintiff to receive the benefit of those interests. 
In support of her opposition, Plaintiff submitted the affidavit of attomey John Magnuson 
to opine that Mr. Fletcher's conduct, in preparation of Mr. Cowan's 2005 Will, fell below the 
applicable standard of care because ( I )  Mr. Fletcher refers to a power of attorney held by the 
testator, which power of attorney is not granted by the Trust (referring to the Leonarda T m t )  
which "indicates" to Mr. Magnuson that Mr. Fletcher did not review the Trust; (2) had 
Mr. Fletcher reviewed the Trust, he would have learned that after Mr. Cowan reached the age 
of 50, his mother's trust property would revert to Mr. Cowan; (3) Mr. Fletcher had a duty to 
inquire of Mr. Cowan whether he had reached the age of 50 and to modify the language in 
Mr. Cowan's Will to reflect that he owned property previously held in trust; (4) Mr. Cowan's 
Will references "all beneficial interests that 1 have in any trusts" indicates to Mr. Magnuson that 
Mr. Fletcher failed to inquire of Mr. Cowan how he wanted the property, previously held in trust, 
devised; and (5) the portion of Mr. Cowan's Will that refers to "all beneficial interests that I have 
in any trusts" is of no force and effect given the absence of such vust or trusts. 
In sum, bfr. Magnuson opines that "under these circumstances, drafting a will, a portion 
of which has no force and effect and which fails to effectuate the intention of the testator, 
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constitutes a deviation from the standard of care and falls below the standard of care of attorneys 
practicing in Idaho in 2005. 
Mr. Magnuson's affidavit is not relevant to the pending motion for summary judgment, as 
it creates no issue of material fact which would prevent this Court to grant Mr. Fletcher's motion 
for summary judgment. 
AS previously set forth, the error in Plaintiffs supposition is that the reference contained 
in Mr. Cowan's Will that Plaintiff receive "all beneficial interests that [Mr. Cowan has] in any 
msts", actually is referencing the teonarda Trust. The Will does not reference the Leonarda 
Trust, Notwithstanding that fact, Mr. Fletcher's Affidavit confirms that he discussed the status of 
the i,eonarda Trust with Mr. Cowan and that Mr. Cowan indicated that certain properties had 
been distributed to him from the Leonarda Trust, but he wanted to keep the language in the Will 
pertaining to Plaintiff, in the event there were additional interests. 'There was no indication to 
Mr. Fletcher at any time that Mr. Cowan intended to give to Plaintiff anything other than 
interests that he may have in any trusts at the time of his death. Thus, at the time of his death, if 
there were additional interests in any trust, Plaintiff would receive said interests, and if there 
were not any interests in any trusts, Plaintiff would receive nothing. 
Like Harri&id, supra, a duty may be owed to a named beneficiary of a Will, such as 
Plain~iff in this case, to draft a testamentary document according to the testator's intent. Clause 6 
of Mr. Cowan's Will fulfills any duty owed to Plaintiff because it devises to Plaintiff "[all1 
beneficial interests I have in any trusts" to Plaintiff. Had Mr. Cowan died with any beneficial 
trust interests, Plaintiffwould have received exactly what Cowan intended. The fact that 
Mr. Cowan did not have any interest in any trust at the time of the Will, or at the time of his 
death, is not relevant to the adequacy of Mr. Fletcher's drafting, according to Mr. Cowan's 
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intent. The intent of Mr. Gowan, from the Will, is clear as to the Plaintiff. h4r. Cowan's intent 
as derived from his Will is clear and unambiguous. If Mr. Cowan had any beneficial interest in 
any trust at the time of his death, those interests would pass to Plaintiff: if not, nothing goes to 
Plaintiff. 
Mr. Fletcher breached no duty to Plaintiff and her claim for attorney malpractice should 
be dismissed. 
111. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL 
Through this motion, Mr. Fletcher asserts that Plaintiff settled all claims she had related 
to Mr. Cowan's Will by executing the Stipulation for Settlement in the probate case and is, 
therefore, judicially estopped from pursuing this malpractice action against Mr. Fletcher. 
The language of the Stipulation for Settlement provides that the parties, inclusive of 
W. Kent Fletcher (as attorney for Mr. Cowan's Estate), stipulated and agreed to the following: 
"[a]ll claims of Mary Killins Soignier under the Last Will and Testament of Zachary A, Cowan, 
as heir, devisee, or holder of power of appointment ... ate settled for the sum of One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($100,000)," 
I t  is the position of Mr. Fletcher that by signing and submitting a stipulation to the court 
in the probate case, Plaintiff represented that any claim that she may have as heir to Mr. Cowan's 
Estate was settled. That is, she effectively, and as a matter of law, agreed to settle all claims as 
heir to Mr. Cowan's Estate, which would include her malpractice action against Mr. Fletcher, as 
heir to Mr. Cowan's Estate. 
In opposition to Mr. Fletcher's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff hss submitted an 
affidavit which states that when "she entered into the settlement of her claims against the estate, 
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she had no notice that anyone was asserting that, by releasing her claims against the estate, she 
would dso  he releasing her claims against Mr. Fletcher." Plaintiff goes on to state in her 
affidavit that she "made no statement in court, sworn or otherwise, to the effect that she intended 
to release [Mr.] Fletcher by dismissing her claims against the estate," Affidavit of Mary Killins 
Soignier. 
Plaintiff also claims she received "no consideration" &om Mr. Fletcher for any release of 
claims against him. Id. 
As a preliminary matter, there is no requirement under the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
that there has been consideration for any inconsistent position (including release of claims) taken 
in a preceding case by a party. In this case, Plaintiff took the position that she should have 
received "more" &om Mr. Cowan's Estate, through his Will in the probate case. Plaintiff 
speciiically alleged in the underlying probate case that Mr. Fletcher "made no attempt to 
investigate the extent of mist interests which clearly exist" and that he had actively sought "to 
block the claim of devisee MARY SOIGNIER, and ha[s] refused to consider the intentions and 
the expectations of ZACHARY A. COWAN." See Opposition to Petition for Construction of 
Will and Approval for Plan of Distribution of Estate filed March 25, 2007, by Plaintiff in the 
probate case. Moreover, the court in the probate case confirmed Plaintiffs allegations in that 
case that Mr. Fletcher had drafted an ambiguous Will, and that her entitlement to any beneficial 
interests in Mr. Cowan's Estate were fmstrated, based on the language in the Will. See Opinion 
of September 18, 2007, p. 9. 
Plaintiff clearly alleged and made claims in the probate case that Mr. Fletcher was 
negligent in his drafting of Mr. Cowan's Will, that the Will was ambiguous, and that 
Mr. Fletcher's drafting of Mr. Cowan's Will did not reflect the "true" intent of Mr. Cowan. 
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Through the Stipulation for Settlement, Plaintiff agreed to settle ALL. CLAIMS related to 
Mr. Cowan's Will, as an heir of that Will. Plaintiff agreed to the terns of the settlement, as did 
Mr. Fletcher (who was listed as a party and a signatory), and Plaintiff should be ordered to abide 
by that agreement, as she represented to the court in the probate case that she would, on which 
representation the court relied. t ha t  the representation of Plaintiff was not made in "open court" 
as argued by Plaintiff does not defeat Mr. Fletcher's motion on this issue. Plaintiff clearly 
represented by signing the stipulation to dismiss (and receiving the $100,000) chat she would in 
fact settle all claims related to proceeds from Mr. Cowan'r Estate1 which must include, as a 
matter of law, Plaintiff's claim for additional proceeds due to her from that Estate based on 
Mr. Fletcher's alleged malpractice. 
In sum, Plaintiff is pursuing the same claim against Mr. Fletcher in this malpractice 
action as she was pursuing in the probate case (additional proceeds from Mr. Cowan's Estate) 
- - which she agreed to settle, Plaintiff should not be allowed to take a position inconsistent with 
that position she took in the probate case, wherein she agreed to settle "all claims" related to her 
claim as heir to Mr. Cowan's Estate. 
Plaintiff's motion under the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel should be granted as a matter of 
law. 
1 Plaintiff has cited no authority to support the proposition that judicial estoppel does not apply 
if a party signs a written stipulation and performs the terms of the stipulation. Nor is there 
any requirement that Mr. Fletcher "detrimentally relied" on any representation made by 
Plaintiff in the probate case in order to pursue a claim of estoppel or judicial estoppel. 
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IV. 
CONCI.USION 
'There is no issue of material fact that Plaintiff's Complaint is barred by the applicable 
statute of limitation, that Mr. Fletcher did not owe or breach any duty to Plaintiff in his drafting 
o f  the Will of  Mr. Cowan, and that Plaintiff's claims are barred under the doctrine ofjudicial 
estoppel. Mr. Fletcher respectfully requests that the Court make these findings as a matter of law 
and dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice. 
i hl; 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS day of August, 2009. 
.HAWLEY LLP 
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CEKrIFICAJE: OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that an this caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing REPLY TO TO DEFENDANT'S MOr10X 
following: 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
Allen B. Ellis U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
ELLIS, B R O W  & SHEILS, Cf IARTERED f-Iand Delivered 
707 North 8th Street O v e r n i g h t  Mail 
P.O. Box 388 E-mail 
Boise, ID 83701-0388 ~ T e l e c o p y :  208.345.9564 - 
[Attorneys for Plaintiffj 
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ilL.LE,hlB. ELLIS 
ELLIS, i3ROk-N & SIiCtLS, C'Nr\K?ERED 
Attorneys-at-Law 
1 7  i0,  North 8th Street 
P O .  Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(20%) 343-9564 f?acsimi!e) 
ISB No, 1626 
Attornej:: for P!e~ntltf 
IN THE DIS'PRICT COURT OF THE FiF'ftl JUC)ICIAL D'STRICT OF TEIE 
STATE OF lDAH0,TN AND FOR THE COUh'lI'Y OF CASSIA 
M a y  Killins Soipier, 
Plaintiff. 
W. Kent Fletcher, 
Defecdant. 
1 
) Case No. CTri 2009-51 7 
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT 




Comes now plaintiff May  Killins Soignier, through her attorney of record, and moves the 
Court for ,ul order striking the afitiavit of W, Kent Fletcher, 'This n?otii.ln is made upon the griiwds 
that the affidavit attributes certain statements to the decedtnt'tesrator Zachary A. Cowfin which 
statements are ina;lmissible for each of the fotlowiny reasons: (1 ) such statements are irrelevant to 
the issues presented in thcsc sumnary judgment proc~~xdings ( tazute of limitations, estoppel and 
d~ty) ;  (2) !here is no ambiguity in the subject Xiill whlcll would justiQ tke aadrission of extrinsic 
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF W. KENT FLETCHJ2R - t 
evidence (see Opinion Rrgadtng Sunlmary Judgnet~i filed Sep~emher 18,2l)07, in the Matter ofthe 
Estare of';lachuy Cow:m, decrased (Cassia County 5Jcr. CV 2OCl6- 1234). and (3) in m:ilpr,~cticc 
actions, an attorney cmwt be "subject[ed] to laww~iis" based upon what a pl~tative br.r~eFciuq. 
"understood the testator had stated". finrrig/i!ld v. ,Ycincock, 140 Idaho 134, 139, 90 P.3d 884 
(2004). Ilerefore, in the n m e o f  consistency and fairness, attorneys cannot claim that thc)'did not 
breach a duty ton named 3encficiai-y by testi3iny to "%hat they ztider:3tood ?he testator bad stated 
or indiczted" a beneficiup should rcccive. Id. 140 l&ho at 139. 
This motion is based upon the Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the at'fidavit of Allen B. Ellis, the pleadings : i d  records in this action, and such other oral 
and doc~unentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing. 
DATED this 6Ih day of ilugust, 2009. 
MOTION r(O STRrKE AFFIDAVIT OF 'rV KENT FLET('I-IER - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CkR I'IFY That on thls 61h day of August, 2009,I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the fotegoing docu~nent by the method indicated below, and &dressed to the 
Michelle R, Pointv 
Craig L. Meadows 
Hawley, 'koxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Id&o 337131 -1617 
-- U.S. hlail 
Eland Delivered 
-- Overnight M:Gl 
-X Teleccpy (FAX) 
954-5238 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN A FOR CASSIA COUNTY 
COURT MINUTES 
Mary Killins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher 
CV-2009-00005 17 
Hearing type: Motion for Summary Judgment 
Hearing date: 811012009 
Time: 10:02 am 
Judge: Michael R Crabtree 
Court reporter: Denise Schloder 
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson 
Party: Mary Soignier, Attorney: Allen Ellis /Jeffrey A. Strother 
Party: W Fletcher, Attorney: Michelle Points 
Jeffrey A. Strother addresses the Court; cites Counsel would like to address the Motion 
to Strike the Affidavit of Kent Fletcher prior to arguing the Summary Judgment Motion. 
The Court has not received its copy of the Motion to Strike. Counsel provide the Court 
this morning with a copy of the Motion to Strike (previously filed on August 06, 2009). 
Time: 10:04 a.m. 
Jeffrey A. Strother addresses the Court; argues the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affidavit of 
Kent Fletcher; cites considerations. 
Time: 10:09 a.m. 
Michelle Points objects to the Motion to Strike Affidavit; cites untimely filed; cites 
considerations for the objection. 
Time: 10:12 a.m. 
Reply by Jeffrey A. Strother, 
Bailiff returns to Counsel the copy of the objection to the affidavit 
Time: 10:13 a.m. 
Michelle Points addresses the Court; argues the Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment; cites considerations. 
Time: 10:22 a.m. 
Court inquires of Counsel re: issue of what facts are in dispute and what facts are not. 
Time: 10:23 a.m. 
Response by Michelle Points. 
h.Wy K~Ihns Sulgn~er vs W Kent Fletcher 
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Time: 1027 a.m. 
Response by Jeffrey A. Strother re: issue of facts; offers plaintiff's response to Motion 
for Summary Judgment; cites considerations. 
Time: 10:50 a.m. 
The Court inquires of Counsel for clarification re: duty 
Time: 10:51 a.m. 
Jeffrey A. Strother responds. 
Time: 10:52 a.m. 
Reply by Michelle Points. 
Time: 10:56 a.m. 
Court inquires re: Supplemental Briefing 
Counsel have no request for supplemental briefing 
The Court takes this matter Under Advisement. 
Time: 10:57 a.m. - Hearing concludes 
ME.MORt\NI)C'M DECISION GIZtINTINt; 
1)EFENDAhl"S .MOTEON F0I t  SUMMARY .IUI)(;MISN? 
For the I'laintiff: Allen B. I3lis offhe fir111 lillis. l 5 r 0 ~ 1 i  ilnci Shcils, 
Ch:~rtercd: and Jctfiey ;\. Strothcr. 
13t \c~K<;I~ot~ND 
Ihis c:lsc is :In action by 54s. Soignicr  g gain st Mr. I:Ietcher. :~llcging that blr. 
I'Ict~'11cr \\:IS ~ ? ~ g l i g e ~ i f  ilncl co11111litted ~nalpracficc in the prepitration 111'fhc Will of' 
/.~zli;~ry i 'o \ \ ;~n.  (lcccase~l. \Is. S o i g ~ ~ i c r  \\:is :I n:~~nerl hc~icticiar> i n  the L V i l l .  l71lt did i~ol 
l i ;~ \c  ;I ilirect ;Ittornc) -clien( rc l :~t i~~~is t i ip  ,+ith l l r .  I. 'Ic~cl~cr. I t s .  Soig~iier ;~sscrts 11i:it slit 
\\:is rccciic it gifi i~ntlcr the \Vill. hut th:~t i l r .  I~Ictchc.r's ~ i e g l i g e ~ ~ c c  in <lr;~liing the 
Will precluded l ~ c r  from i-ccci\ ing f l i t  gift. 
llierc :ire t\\o liinttcrs hefiirc the ~ C I L I I - ~  at t l~ i s  tirnc. I l r .  ):letclicr tiler1 ;I niotio~i 
t i~ r  surnliiary j r~dgmc~i t  :12:1in.;t I l s .  Soignier on Sunc 1 %  2000.  \Is. Soigriicr filcrl ;I 
\,lotion lo Strike S,lr. I~'lctc.licr's i\f'fici;~vit in support of' liis ~iiotion lbr siimm;iry ju i lg~ i ic~~t  
o n  August 6. -700'). 1Ie:lring o n  both riiotio~is \\:IS held on :\r~giiusr 10. 3009, :I! $\liich ti~rie 
the C ~ I ~ I I - I  took tlic iliatter i111dcr nil$ isc~rient. 
f l ~ e  jlidge dssigncd to the i~isvilnt C:ISC in the district ct~urt  was, hcf;,rc b t c o ~ i i i ~ i g  3 
J'. 1htr1ct . j ~ ~ d g e .  the nit~gistr:~tc i ~dgc assigned to Iic:lr thc prohate c;lsc involi-ing the list:~tc 
o f  %:~cllary ('o\\::~n. 
FACTS NO'I' IN DISI'U'I'E 
'I 'l~c f i~l lowi~ig  1'~cts are not in dispute. and arc rclcv:int to tlic motion for summ;iry 
jr~dg~iicnt: 
%:~cliar) C<~w;ln \\a5 Mr. I:letcIicr~s client. (I:lctchcr ;ill: -7.) 
Mr. I:letchcr drafted a Will f i ~ r  Mr. Cowan. (f;lelclicr Aff. $ 2.) 
Mr. Co\v:~n cxecr~tcd liis Will un May 24. 2005. (l.:lst Will mil i^cstarncnt of' 
%:~cIi;~ry i\, ('o\v:~n. I l c f  's liu. A, p. -3.) 
During Iiis lili: tinic. Clr. i 'ow:~n \\;is tlic hc~ictici:~ry o f t h e  I.co~i:~rJa A. <'O\Y:II~ 
' I 'rst.  (I.con:~rda A. ('o\v;~n 'Trust. 1'1,'s Ex. I ; I:letclier At'f. 'T 2 . )  
~ < I ~ ~ I I S  ~ ' t l i e  t r u t  \\:IS cl is~rihi~te~l 1 0  Xir. C ' O \ \ : I I ~ .  ~ I . c ~ ~ I I : I ~ L I ~ I  .\. <'o\\:111 l ' r ~ ~ s t ~  1 ' 1 . ' ~  I < Y .  I ,  
ill>. 5. x-c) , )  
l ' l ;n~se  Six of  \ I r .  ( "o\ \ ;~n 's  \+ ' i l l  st;trcd ";III hcnctici;~l interes~s that I h ; ~ \ s  i l l  ; I I I ~  
\Ir. C'c)r\;ui Jicil o n  October 70. 2006. (Opinion lleg:~rclirig, S~~ni~ii : iry Suclgnicnt. 
1'1,'s liu. 3. p. -3: 1:Ictchcr .\f!: 7.) 
Llr. CO\\:III's %'ill \\:is a~i~iiitfecl t o  i ~ ~ ! b r ~ n a l  prob:~tc on Xove~iiher 3, 2006 in 
i s  ' ~ i  Idaho in c:tse 1il111iber CV-2006-1234. (Opinion llegar<ling Sumni:~ry 
Sud~nle~ir .  1'1,'s 1;s. 7 .  p. ?: Fletcher :iff 8.) 
At 111~' f inis  01'Iiis tle:~tli. Mr. C'ow:ln did not possess an!. benctiei:~l interests in :III> 
tnrsts. (Opinion i<cg:~rding Summary Jl~dgmcnt. 1':s I-u. 3. p. 6; I:letchcr Alf: *: 17.) 
I'hc I'crsonul Representative of Mr. Cowan's cstnte proposed th:~t 1111. residue o f  
the cst:~tc sliou!d be distributed to the American G ~ n c c r  Society as dircctctl by the ternis 
i i l l  (Opinio~i Kcg:~rding Sunini:lry Judgment. 1 '1 . '~  lir. 3. p. 6: 1:letchcr .4tf: ': 
I?.)  
Ms. Soignicr :~ppc:~rcd in tlic pl.obatc procccilings :~nd ~ontcs ted  tlic 1'erso1ii1l 
Rrprcsc~it:~ti\~c's propowtl ~iistrihution off l ie  est;ltc. Neither 3'1s. Soig~iicr  i io r  any otlicr 
person ob.jec~cd to. or co~itestccl. tile \.;llidif) ot'thc Will 011 a ~ i y  I~:~sis. i n c l ~ l i ~ i g  Ili:~t !vIr. 
C'o\\;~n  IS i~icompctcnt <)r that he elid not possess tcsf:~me~it:~ry c:~pacity ;I( the time lie 
signed the Will. (Opi~iion Regarcling Summ:iry .ludgnicnt. 1'1,'s Ex. 3 p. I ;  flctcher il!'!'. F 
13.)  I:urthcr~iiorc. thcrc \\:IS no objection offered th;~t the Will was inipr<~pc.rly ccscuted 
\Is. S o i g ~ ~ i c r  olijectcd I O  the prc~poscd distribuli(111 of the est;~tc on llic g r o u ~ i ~ l s  
tI1;1t !lie i \ i l l  W:%S i~nibig.uou~ o n  it's t ~ z c  regarding thc bcnetici:il intcrcsts in trusts, th:~t 
\Ir. ('on;tn intcnilcd to I 1 i t  to her in i s  ii!ill. therct;.~rc the court sh(1c1ld 
tlelern~ine t l i ; ~ ~  I I I C  \ \ ' i l l  W:IS : I I ~ ~ ~ ~ L I O L I S  :~nd perniit pitrol c \  iiience to he prese~ited I i ~ r  the 
pi~rpose 01' intcrpreti~lg the Will. ( O p i ~ ~ i c ~ n  l<eg;~rtling Si~n~mar!. .iudg111cnt. 1 ' 1 . ' ~  Is. 3 p, 
0: I'letclrcr ' tK *i l j.) 
I 'he court issl~cd a decision that rejected Mr. St'ignicr's cI:~i~lis :~nd  detern~ine~i  
that tlie Will 51.3.5 not ; ~ n i b i g u o ~ ~ s  on its fhcc. (Opinion Regnrd i~~g  Su~nm:try Judgment. 
1'1,'s 1:s. 3 pp. 8-13.) 
Ms. Soignicr r~ppcaled the cot~rt 's  decision. (121etcher All: 5 15.) 
I'rior to a decision in the appeal. Mr. Soignier entered illto n ~ c t t l e ~ n c n t  agrcelncnt 
and <lisn~isscd her appeal fi)r consiclerntion. (I'lcrcl~er I 'i I . '  (Stipulatic>~i for 
Settlen~cnt of C'l;~in~ <>I '  M:~ry Killins Soignier, .\iipni\al of l'ctiti(in for (:onrtruction ilf 
Will :rnd I'lan of 1)istribution and Dismissal of'Appeal. l)ef.,'s Ex. R p. 2. )  
SLIIMMAI.lY .JliDCMEKT STANI),%IZDS 
Sunin la ry j~~dgmcnt  is proper only if"thcre is no gc1111ine issue :IS to any m:~tcri;~l 
t:~ct :lnd tllc 1110~ing p:lrty is entitled to j ~ ~ d g ~ n c n t  ;IS a matter of law." llZ.C'It M ( c ) ;  111~11: 
is. St6lht,i,i.k.v, 11'2 ltlaho 570, 541. X O X  P . l d  $70. 878 ( I O O I ) .  
WIicn a court :lssesscs a motio~i filr summary judgment. a11 contro\crted 1:.1cts ;Ire 
to bc liberally construed in 1':rvtir of'thc non-nio\~ing p;lrty. (; X. .W /+;1rt17.~ I,, l.>ir?k 
I h c  i~urdcn of. pro\ i11g tlie :lhscncc of' :in issue of ~ir:~fcrial fict rests ;rt ;111 tit11cs 
up011 tlic t~?o\irlg p;lrt).. .\I',( '(I!, I.. I.J<JII.Y. I20 lcl;~li(? 7 0 5 ~  709, 820 lj,2d 300 ( l c > O l  1: (; LC 
. \ /  F<ll.tll.~ :It 5 17, 
Nc\erfl~clcss. \\hen :I motio~r thr sun1m:lr). i u ~ i ~ ~ i i c r i f  1i:ls hccn pn7perly scll>ported 
with ~lsidcncc inllic:~lilig tlie ; ~ b s c ~ i c c  of m:itcrial !:~ctual issues. the oppcwing p:~rty's c:~se 
11111sf not rest on mere spcct~lation. :~nd a mere scintilla of'cviJrncc is 11111 c n o u ~ h  to crc:Itc 
;i g c l i i ~ i ~ ~ c  issue of' f;ii.t. ,\/c,( '(I! :II 709; G & .\,/ b2trr11.r :it 5 17. 
When :I rnotio11 ti>r suniliiary ;udg111ent is made and supportcci as provided in the 
Idaho ilulcs of Civil Proccilurc, "an adverse party niay not rest upon the liltre alleg:itions 
or ilcnials o f  th:it p;irty's ple:ldings." IIZCP 56(c). Rathcr. thc advcrse party must sct f'ortli 
spccilic ficts slio\\;ing lh;~l  there ic a gcnninc issue filr fri;ll. If the p:lrty docs 11c>I so 
rcsp017d. ';i~m~iiary ,jl~dgmcnt. if':ippropriate, shall be entered agxinst the ad\,crsc party. 
IItCI' 56ie) .  
I.:\.idcncc prescnfcd in  support of or i l l  opposition to a rnotiol~ !;)r snmm:II.y 
ju~ lgn~en t  must bc :~Jn~iss ih le .  I I c ( ~ l ~ i  .\f tti17,~ (? I .  kS.  S ' ; ~ I Y - , \ ~ O ~ I I ~ I ~ ~  1fit1i11,q ( ' t ) .  122 ld;~lit> 
- 7  7 X 8 .  8 I .  I I I .  Sapporting and oppostng ;~f!~~da\'its to sclnlnlnry 
judgnicnt n~otions "shall be iiiadl: on personal knowledge. shall set f i~rfl i  suc.11 fiicts :IS 
\vould be ndnlissihle in c\:idencc. and h a l l  sl~o\v :i!'!irn~ati\~cly that the ;~tli;lnt is 
co~~ipctcnt  to testif! to the ~ii;ltter-s r;~tecl ihcrei~i." I 5 .  Illis f l i~~csl io l~l  q ~ ~ c s t i o n  f  
:~cltnis.;ibiiit~ 01' c \ i d e ~ i c e  11111st he t lc~i(lcd "bcti)re proccciling lo tlic ulfiliiatc issue, 
.. v\lietlrcr strnrm:lr) jc~~iy~iicri t  is approprintc. 4,.~i17 1. Ilc~i.rr~er. 123 Id:rho 47. 45. 844 i'.'il 
4 7 I : .  0 i ' l ~ e  ge11~'r:il r l~ lc  fhat :ill i~ifi 'sc~ices ilrc drav\~i in f:~vcir o f t h c  no11- 
moving part! clots 1101 apply to the initi:tl question ol';~dniissihility. f I ( I .  :I( 
- 
i 8 i .  
I)ISC'1~SSION 
. Mettion to Strike 
11s. Soignier filcd a i l o t i o ~ i  r(1 Strike hfr. I~lctchcr's l\f'fiJ:~vir ill sc~ppcirt of'his 
Lfotion li)r Sunlniary Judgmcnr. Specifically, she objects to any litatcrncnrs in rllc 
affidavit that purport to recollnt sl;lfements niade by Zachnry Covvan ro Mr. Fletcher. 
I'lie ( ' o ~ ~ r f  finds tlint it is unnecessary ro reach :I decision on Ms. Soignier's 
3lofion to Strikc the l~letclicr ;~l'fidnvit, for the reason that. ;IS set fbrtli bclovv, the court 
has not based ils sr~mniary j ~ ~ ~ i g m c n t  decision on any o f f l i e  contesteci evidence proff2red 
in the Fletcher :~t'fidavit. 
13. Summaw .fudement 
A caltsc of action by a named beneficiary i l l  a Will against thc attorney vvho 
prcpared rlic Will \\-as rccr)g~iizcd by rhc id:Jio Supreme Court in /Jrrri,yf?/~/ v. ffut7cock. 
1-10 l(l;~lio 4 139. 00 P.3d 884 (7004). 'The cle~iienls of s ~ ~ c l i  a lcy:xl nialpracrice 
~icgligcncc cl:~ini arc: "(a) tlic exisrc~icc (if an ;ittorney-client rclationsliip; (b)  the 
cristcnce o f a  duty OII rhe part o f t h e  lawyes: ( c j  Plilure 10 pcrICLr~n the dut?: ;111d (dl  rhc 
.. ~iegligc~icc oftlic lawyer must 11;1vc been a pn1rini:lte cause o f t h e  d a ~ n a g c  to the client. 
f i l  ;tt 136. I'liis represcnfs a very nzirrow dc.p;~rrurc fLom the gc11er:)l rule that an ;ltfoniey 
rnay l i i ~ \ e  li:lbility ftrr his o r  her negligence only to his or her client :old not 111 a pcrsoil 
\\i l l] \\Iit~rn rile ittturnc) do's inot li;i\-e an ;ttt\lrney-clieni relationship. Id. ;lr 137. 111 the 
l imitei l  L ' x c r p t i o ~ ~  :it issue IlL're is the SII~~CIIIC ('ourt's (I~'tei.i i i ir~ation th;tt '.;III ;111t1r11c!, 
prep;ii.ing testalnentcu.y instruntents os\e.s ;i eluty to the he11eIici;iries r l i~nled or itle~ltili '(i 
tllercin to ~ w e ~ > a r ~ '  sticli instruments "so as to ell'ectu:~te the testator's intent as expressed 
., in the testai1ient;iry i ~ ~ s t r ~ u n e n r s .  Id at 138. 
I l ie  cindisputcd ~nnter ia l  fhcts i n  this case Ie:~d the court to cor ic l~ ide as a mattcr of 
law. \\it11 respect to the l i rst two  elcmeitts o i  the cause oC action, tliat ti1 tile extellt 
1.cct1gnizeil b j '  /i~irrig/i~lu'. t l ier~. \\.as LIII attorney-client rclarionship bet\\.ec.n L f r .  I'letcher 
and Soignicr that ;irose Srcirn M r .  1:letcher's prcparaticin o f  Zachary Coi ian's U'ill in 
\ \ . l~ ich  Mr. Soignier was a named beneficiary. M r .  I:letcher cl\ved Ms. Soignier n duty as 
a result o f th i s  relntionsliip. 
'1-l~e nest c l e ~ n e n ~  o f  the cause e l f '  action is whether this duty was breached. I ' l i e  
coiirt detern~ines that the relevnr~t material tkcts are undisputed and that these Facts do not 
establish that M r .  Fletcher breached the professional duty lie owed to Ms .  Soignier. 
ff(i~.ri,qfk!~ii established 3 \,cry narrow and l imi ted cause of action. I 'he S~~pre rnc  
Cour! discussed the paralneters o f  this canse o f  action at length and in  great detail. The 
Supreme Court \,cry narrclivly i l e f i ~ l e d  the scope of the attorney's duty to the beneficiary. 
I 'he eluty is .'very lirnited" and "the attorney . . . has no duty to see !hat the testator 
cl istr ih~~tes his or her propert). anlong the ~ x ~ ~ n e i l  bcneliciaries i n  any particular inanner. .. 
1 .  i t  I - I .  I'urtl~ermore. t l ~ e  Supreme Court stated that .'this extension o f  an 
attonrey's duty \\.ill ~ i o t  sub.je~.t ;ittoriieys to l i l \ \ . ~ u i t ~  b y  persons . . . \4ho simply d id  not 
recei\e ill the testanicI1t:Ir! ins1r11111~1its \\Ilat tlicy c~i ider~tc i~~i l  !he testator li:~il sttttecl t>r 
illilicatcJ  hey \\,111IcI ~cce ive . "  hi. at 13% 
I he nrtc~rney's tlut? to a heneLiciary ci;~mccl or identitirrd in thc instl-ulneiit is: I ) to 
~""P;Iw t!te t~,stalncntat? instrunlent; ~ lnd  7 )  it' recj~~ested by the testator, to have the 
i~~s t r tnne~i t  properly escctlted so as to el'fectunte the testnt,ir's intent as t.upressed in the 
t tr tantentury instrument.  /I/. :it 1-38 icmphasis nddctl], I'he S~lprernc C'ocrrt li~uiteil the 
nieaus of ascert:iining tile t~'s1;itor.s inle~il lo  3 revie\? of tlic tes ta~l~e~l tary  instru~lle~lr. 
\\.llicll \\ 'o~ild 110t illcl~lile t111y \ \ . i l l .  codicil or other i1is11.1111icnt that hod hcen re\cihcel. 
~neaniny that trnly a \ ;~lidly escctited instru~i~ent is to he examined. Id. 'Slie Supreme 
Co~rrt dstcrmined that a person \\.lie has the i n e ~ ~ t a l  capacity to make a valid \ \ i l l  knoivs 
the names and identities ol'the persons who are the vbiccts ol' his boclnty. \\,ri~lld also 
knoiv \\hethcr or ilor scich persons are included as benelici;~ries iinder the test3mentary 
instrument hefore cseeuting them, and can ~111iIerstand hoiv his or her property will he 
ciisti.ihuted cinder the testamentary documents. I r i .  
'She undisputed material hers and ir~ferences establish thnr Zachary Cowan \\.as 
colnpetcnt to lnake his Will. that he possessed test;lmentary capacity. that he signed ri11d 
declal.ed the Will in rhe ibrm in \\,hiell it h:~d been prepared by his attorney. Mr. t:letcl~er, 
lliat the \vitnesses to his U'ill attested to his conlpetency and his cleclar;tticin, and that the 
Will \?as  lid and hail leg:~l cft'cct. As the Idaho Sl~prenlr  Court ~ ~ i t e d ,  it is tlicrejore 
presumed that the Will \vos as he ivailrcd it to be. Id. at 138. 
I'lle rele\.;~nt llndispurcd 1:,1cts hcfi~re the court nor establish a ge1111inc dispute 
that the Will that Mr. 1:letcher prepareel in any way l ius t r~ted %acI~:lry Cclwan's il~tenr, as  
Mr. <'o\van's intent \\as expressed in Will. The facts (lo not establish a genuine dispute 
rhclt rile prcpnratiun oSthe Will \ \as negligelit selch rllnt rlie i~lstr~iment \\:is inialid. I t  ma) 
\\ell he rhur k.2.;. Sslignier (lid not rr.cei\,e ;I giti o f  \ \hat  die LIIWIC~S~OOJ inchary C'o\\an 
may ha\,? srnretf or tlthcr\tisc indicated that he iioultl g i \c  ro 11i.1'. I l o \ \ ev~~r .  hcr 
e x c c t ~ r i o ~ i  a l t~ne tltles not %nisi) the r f l  s t  regnrtlit~g \\hether t,r not i l r .  
Iblcrehcr breached llis duty I ~ I  l ~ e r .  
I'lie corlrr c o n c l ~ ~ d c s  at; a inarter ol 'ln~v that k,Zr. 2:lercher ditl nor hreach llis \.cry 
n;lrro\\ and limited t l e l t \ -  ro M s .  Soignier. 
CONCLCfSION 
I-or the reasons set Sort11 ;lbove. [lie I )eSe~l~la~~r .s  Motio~l 1;1r S L I I I I I I I ; I ~ ~  J~ilglilelit i s  
granted. I'laintilf's claim is dislnisscd. 
C'oonsel Ziir the 1)efendant \ \ - i l l  please prepare an Order consisrenr with the 
Soregoing and present the same to the coe~ri for sigli:~t~lre. 
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Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher 
M THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
MARY KILLMS SOIGNIER, 1 
) Case No. CV 2009-5 17 
Plaintiff, ) 
) ORDER .4ND JUDGMENT 
VS. 1 




The Court having granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing 
Plaintiff-s claim against Defendant, 
NOW. THEREFORE, BASED UPON TI-IE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant W. Kent 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT - I 
Fletcher. and that the claim of attorney inalpractice against Defendant and rhe Complaint in its 
entirety, is hereby dismissed with prejudice, and with Pfaintiff taking nothing thereby, 
d 
DATED THIS day of September, 2009. 
Michael R. Crabtree 
District Judge 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT - 2 
3 
g i CLERK'S CERTIF1C:VTE OF SERVICE 
I HERkBY CERTIFY that on t h ~ s a d a y  of September, 2009, 1 caused to be sewed a 
true copy of tke foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT by the method indicated belovr and 
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877 Main Street, Suite 1000 -Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 1617  E-mail 
Boise, lD83701-1617 - Telecopy: 208.954.5252 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT - 3 
<'raig L. tlcatlo\ts, ISB No. 108 1 
Michelle R .  Points, ISR No. (1224 
t1ALVLEY I'ROXELL ENNlS di HAWI-EY 1.1-P 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 16 17 





Attorneys for Defenclant W Kent Flclcher 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAIIO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
MARY KILLINS SCIIGNIER, ) 
) Case No CV 2009-5 17 
Pla~nt~ff ,  ) 
) MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF 
vs ) ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
W. KENT FLETCHER, 
Defendant 
Defentlant W Kent Fletcher, by ;md through his counsel of record, Hawley Troxell Enn~s  
& tlawley I.f.P, respectfully submits this motion for his attorney fees an3 costs incurred in 
defending this tilatter. 
This motion is brought pllrsuclnt to Idaho Rules of C:i\,il Procedure 54(d) and 58,  and 
1.C. 5 12- l20(3). 
The basis of this motion is that Defendant is the prevailing party, as per the Order ;md 
Jutlgrne~~t entered September 22, 2000, and PI:iinriff s C'cimplaint was tlisir~issed with prejudice. 
000218 
bfO'110N FOR A N  AWARI? OF ATTORNEY FI.33 AND C'OSIS - I 
04!884070 l f i 7 7 R R 7  
This m o t i o ~ ~  is supportctl by  the Altitlavit oSIlichclle R. Points in Si~pporc of 
Ilernorancitlm of f'osts and rlttorney F:ecs :111d the Z Z ~ . ~ i ~ u r a n t l ~ ~ ~ n  in Support of  htotion Li~r  C'clsts 
t1<4WLEY TROTELL ENNIS & tl.?lWLEY LLP 
:\ttowr Defcntlant \": Kent Fletcher 
00023.9 
MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF A ITORiXEY FEf:S AND C'OSfS - 2 
I tIEREB't' CERTIFY that on Scptenthcr. 7009. I caused to he sewcd ;I 
true copy of the fu~.cgoi!ig M07'IC)h' OF .A.f'TORNEY FFES AND C'OS'TS 
by the 111et11i~d ilidiciited below, I I I I ~  iiddressc(I to each ot'the follo\ving: 
Allen 8. Ellis G .~ .  Mail, Postage Prepaid 
ELLIS. BROWN & SfIEILS, CfIi\RTEREII -- fla11d Delivcreii 
707 North 8th Strcct ____ Ovenlight Mail 
P.0. Box 388 Epniail 
Boise, 11) 837U1-0,388 Tclecopy: 208.345.95(~4 
[Attorneys for PlailitiftJ 
Jeffrey tt. Strothcr 
STKOTHEK LAW OFFICE 
200 N. Fourth Street, Suitc,3(? 
Boise, 11) 83702 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff1 






MO'I'ION FOR A N  AWARD OF AI'TORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 3 
C'raig I.. htcadows, IS13 No. 108 1 
~~l ichc l lc  K.Points, ISB No. 6224 
I IXLVI.EY 1'KOXI:I.L. liNNlS Sc I IRW1,IIY 1.I.P 
877 Main Street. Suite I000 
P.0. 13ox 16 17 
13oisc, ID 83701.~ 1617 
'I'clephone: 208.344.6000 
l ~ s i ~ i i i l e :  208.954.5238 
IImail: cmeadows~hawleytroxeII.com 
mpoints@ha\~leytroxeIl.com -- 
,Attome?s for Ilefendant Vv Kent Fletcher 
IN I f lE 1)ISTKICT COtJRT OF TtIF F1FTI.I JiJDIClAl IIIS I'KICT 
OF 1 11E S'fArE 01: IDAIiO, IN AND FOR SliE COUN I Y  01. CASSIA 
IMAKY KII,I.INS SOIGNIEK, 
Plaintiff. 
VS. 
U'. KEK7 FI,L?TCI IEK, 
) 
) Case No. CV 2009-5 17 
) 
) MEMORANIIUM I N  SUPPOK~ OF 
) MO'I'ION FOR COSTS AND 




Defendant W. Kent Fletcher ("Ilefendant"). by and through his attorneys of record, 
Eiawley 'froxell Ennis K: tlawley L1,P. submits this Memorandum in Support of his Motion f o r  
an Award of :2ttorney Fees and Costs in connection with his successful defense of this action. 
A. Background 
This is a legal malpractice action. IIcfcndant Zachary C'owan was retained to perform 
professional lcgal services. as his attorney in the underlying case. In this case, I'lainti~fallcgcd 
that 1)efendant committed an act of malpractice in drafting Mr.  C o w n s '  WIII. 
M1~MORANI)UM IN SUPPOIZI' Of: MOTION I'OK COS'SS ANI) A'I"I'0KKliY 1:l'l:S - I 
0 0 0 2 ~ ~  MI880070 1872401 1 
On Septanbcr 9, 7009 this Court entered its Memorandum 1)ecision Granting 
1)cIkndant's Motion for Summary Judgment and entered corollary Order :~nd Judgr~icnt on 
Septcrnber 22, 2009, dismissing I'laintiffs Complaint, 1:or the purpvsr ol'an attorney fce and 
cost determination L)c.fendr?lnt is the prevailing p'arty. 
I)el;.ndant, through this mution, requests an award ol'attorncy fees and costs incurred in 
defending against Plaintitf's claims pursuant to I.K.C.1'. 54 as the prevailing party. and 1.C. 
4 12- 120(3), as the prevailing party in a commercial transaction. 
B. Attorney Fees %lust Be Awarded Under I.C. tj 2-120(3). 
ldaho Code 5 12- 120(3) provides a basis for an attorney fee award in this case, 'I'hat 
statutory provision mandates a fee award in cases based on a "commercial transaction." Before 
the ldaho Supreme Court's recent decision in Blimka v it@ FVeb F'h<~lescrler, [,LC, 143 ldaho 
723, 152 1'.3d 592 (2007), however, section 12-120(3) had been interpreted not to apply in 
"commercial transaction" cases in which the theory of recovey was a tort theory. In Blimka, the 
court ovcnulcd all prior decisions prohibiting fee awards in such cases. Id One decision plain11 
overruled by Blimka, is Fzrller v. Wolrers, 1 19 ldaho 415,423, 807 P.2d 633, 643 (1991). 'I'here. 
the court refused to award fees under section 12-1 20(3) in a legal malpractice case simply 
because such a case is a tort case, "even though the underlying transaction which resulted in the 
malpractice was a icommercial transaction.'" Id '['here is no doubt that the Defendants' 
attorney-client relationship with Cady is a "commercial transaction..' t\ccordingly, on its face, 
section 12-120(3i applies. and it mandates an award ofattorney fees. 
In a recent attorney malpractice case. District Judge McLaughlin held that given the 
Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Blin~ku, S U ~ C U ,  an attorney fee award was appropriate under 
I.C. $ 12-120(3). Judge blcl.aughlin's Decision (('ity cf~2lc('ull v. Buxton, rr 01.) is attached 
hercto as Exhibit :\ ti)r the  court',^ review, Judge Ilc1,aughlin specitically held that a contract 
for attorney senices was a commercial transaction. and. ..the ji~ct that the contract was fix 
attorney services, nut any other service, docs not change the nature oi'the transaction into one fur 
either personal senices or household scwiccs," 1:xhihit A, p. 5. 
More recently, District Judge Copscy also held that attorney fees are a~vardable under 
I.C. 12-120(3) to a prevailing party in an attorney malpractice case because the underlying action 
is based on an attorney-client relationship. a contract to perform professional services. A true 
and correct copy of Judge Copsey's decision (C'udyr. ./ones, el iil.) is attached hereto as 
Izxhibit R. 
Given the elcar applicability o f  I.C. 5 12-1?0(3) to the facts of this case, and because 
Ikfendant is the prevailing party: attorney fees should be awarded to Defendant incurred in 
defending this action - 
KESPECTFU1,LY SUBMITT13D Tlfl ay of September, 2009. 
I IAWLEY 'TKOXELL ENNlS & IIAWLEY LLP 
All mey tor Defendant W. Kent Fletcher k2" 
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000224 
MI:;L1OKANl)\jM IN SIJPI'OK'T 01: hlO'l'lON FOR COS.1.S ,4NC, Al"SORNI.:Y 1:liliS - 4 
041880070 7672901 1 
1 
2 





For Plaintiff: Allen 8. Ellis of Ellis, Brown & Sheils, Chartered and Jeffrey A. 
17 
Strother of Strother Law Office for City of McCall 
For ~efendant's: Craig L. ~ e a d o i s  and Jason D. Scott of Hawley Troxell Ennis 
& Hawley LLP for Susan E. Buxton and Moore. Smith, Buxton & Turcke, 
19 Chartered 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Matthew L. Walters of Elam & Burke, P.A. for William A. McCurdy and Brassey, 




CITY OF MCCALL, a municipal 
corporation, 
This matter came before the Court on September 18, 2007 upon the Plaintiffs 
Motion to Disallow Fees. Following oral argument by counsel the Court took the matter 
25 
Case No. CVOC0608079 
under advisement. 
000225 








MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
vs. 
SUSAN E. BUXTON. MOORE, SMITH, 
BUXTON & TRUKE, CHARTERED, a 
professional sewice corporation. WILLIAM 
A. MCCURDY and BRASSEY, 
WETHERELL, CRAWFORD & GARRETT, 
a limited liability partnership, 
THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR COSTS AND ArrORNEY 
FEES AND PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO DISALLOW 
ArrORNEY FEES 
II The claims of malpractice allegedly occurred while the Defendants were representing 
1 
2 
4 /Ithe City of McCall during a course of events leading up to and throughout the litigation 
e+2 
BACKGROUND 
This litigation arises out of allegations of legal malpractice by the Defendants. 
involving Employers Insurance of Wausau and the construction of a wastewater storage 
lagoon. As a result of this alleged malpractice, the Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit on 
' //May 3, 2006, filing a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. On June 15, 2006. the 
11 Plaintiff filed their First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. On November 
13,2006, Defendants William A. McCurdy and Brassey, Wetherell, Crawford & Garrett, 
10 
filed their Answer to First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. And on 
12 
November 14,2006, Defendants Susan E. Buxton and Moore, Smith, Buxton & Turcke, 




Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees on July 23, 2007. Also on July 23, 2007, the 
Defendants Susan E. Buxton and Moore. Smith, Buxton & Turcke filed a Memorandum 
21 
Chartered filed their Answer to First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. 
Subsequently, on January 17, 2007, the Court entered an Order Denying 
Plaintiff's Motion to Hold Matter in Abeyance Pending Completion of Ninth Circuit 
Appeal and Motion for Protective Order. The Defendants separately filed motions for 
of Costs and Attorney Fees, which was followed by a Supplemental Memorandum 
asking for an additional $2,819.00. The Plaintiff filed the present Motion to Disallow 
Fees on August 3, 2007. The Plaintiff also requested that the Court 
25 reconsider the original decision granting summary judgment and the Court issued a I1 
ll MEMORANDUM DECISION. CASE NO. CVOC0608079. PAGE 2 
LEGAL STANDAROS 
#'4&* 
. , ;t$&+d* 
3 11 The Plaintiff claims that the Defendants are not entitled to the attorney fees 
I 1 
4 they have requested under the following statutory provisions: 
3 w*$ 
Q&* ,<+* 
Memorandum Decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration. 
11 I. Attorney fees for civil actfon to recover fn commercfal transaction 
@ 11 A trial court may provide for attorney fees to the prevailing party when there is a / I  nexus between the lawsul and a commercial transaction, under ldaho Code 3 12- 





1 1  
12 
(Iprevailing party where it finds that the case was "broughi. pursued or defended 
15 
120(3). Cantinenfa1 Cas. Ca. v. Brady, 127 ldaho 830, 835, 907 P.2d 807, 812 
(1995). A commercial transaction is defined as any transaction that is not for 
"personal or household" purposes. ldaho Code 5 12-120(3). 
II. Attorney tees for claim defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation 
Ilfrivolous&, unreasonably or without foundation." Bums v. Baldwin, 138 ldaho 480, 
16 
$7 I t  486,65 P.3d 502,508 (2003). However, if any alternative legal basis can be found to 
support the opposing party's claims, attorney fees are unwarranted under this rule. 
Hanf v. Syn'nga ReaNy, Inc., 120 ldaho 36.4, 370, 816 P.2d 320, 326 (1991). This 
20 l(determination rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, but any such award 'must 
be supported by findings and those findings, in turn, must be supported by the 
record." Sunshine Mining Co. v. Metmpolifan Mines Corp., 1 1  1 ldaho 654, 659, 726 
000227 
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1 
mean that the lawsuit is not a "commercial transaction" under ldaho Code 3 12-120(3). 
9 I Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728-729, 152 P.3d 594. 599.600 
Ill. Attorney fees for party adverse to a state agency that dld not act 







10 11(2007). Prior to Blirnka, the ldaho Supreme Court did not award attorney fees for 
ldaho Code 5 12-1 17 provides that if a state agency against whom the 
judgment is rendered acted "without a reasonable basis in fact or law," the prevailing 
party shall be awarded attorney fees. ldaho Code § 12-1 17(1). 
OlSCUSSlON 
The fact that the Plaintiff3 lawsuit is one in tort, rather than contract, does not 
20 statement by the Court indicates that, had the Court been able to award attorney fees 









* / I  transaction - a contract for attorney services - was a cornmemial ope. Tr~e Court has 
professional malpractice cases because the theory of recovery was in tort. See Fuller 
v. Woifefs, 119 ldaho 415, 424-425, 807 P.2d 633. 642-643 (1991). Since Fuller and 
the cases that followed no longer bar recovery after Blirnka, the on& issue is whether a 
contract to provide attorney services is a "commercial transaction." 
The ldaho Supreme Court has, in dicta, addressed this issue. In Fuller, the 
Court held that "an action for legal malpractice is a tort action, and even though the 
underlying transaction which resulted in the malpractice was a 'commercial transaction,' 
attorney fees under 12-120(3) are not authorized." Id. at 425, 807 P.2d at 643. This 
articulated this same reasoning in other cases that follow Fuller. See 6.g. Brooks v. 
Gigray Ranches, Inc., 128 ldaho 72,79, 91 0 P.2d 744, 75 1 (1 996). 
25 
26 ll The Defendants are the prevailing parties in this action, which is not an issue 
000228 
MEMORANDUM DECISION. CASE NO. CVOC0608079 - PAQE 4 
/I that Plaintiff argues otherwise. The record demonstrates that this transaction is a 1 
I1 contract for attorney services and therefore was a commercial transaction. The fact 
that the contract was for legal services, rather than another type of services, does not 
change the nature of the transaction into one for either personal sewices or household 
5 services. Since the two requirements set forth in section 12-120(3) have been fulfifled, It 
the Court is compelled to award reasonable attorney fees under that statute. 
7 The Defendants have also argued that they are entitled to attorney fees under 
The record does not reflect any objection to the amount of attorney fees or costs 




1 1  
12 
15 Wetherell, Crawford & Garrett have asked for $58.00 in costs as a matter of right and 
1% $30,285.00 as reasonable attorney fees. The Defendants Susan E. Buxton and Moore, il 
Idaho Code $5 12-121 and 12-1 17. While the Court does not necessarily believe that 
this lawsuit was without foundation or without a reasonable basis in fact or law, the 
Court need not continue analysis under either sections 12-121 or 12-1 17 since attorney 
fees are both appropriate and required under section 12-120(3). 
l 7  Smith. Buxton &'Turcke have asked for $58.00 in costs as a matter of right and 
18 I/ $26,731.00 as reasonable attorney fees. Based upon the sworn affidavits of 
l9 II Defendant's counsel the Court finds that the attorney fees incurred by the Defendants 20 /I were reasonable considering the time and labor involved in this litigation. The Court will 
21 11 award the Defendants these costs and reasonable attorney fees. as requested. 
22 
CONCLUSION 
24 The Court will DENY the Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Attomey Fees and will 
25 11 award the Defendants William A. McCurdy and Brassey, Wetherell, Crawford & Garrett 
ll MEMORANDUM DECISION. CASE NO. CYOC0608079. PAGE 5 




costs as a matter of right in the amount of $58.00 and reasonable attorney fees in the 








Moore, Smith, Buxton & Turcke costs as a matter of right in the amount of $58.00 and 
reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $26,731.00. Counsel for the Defendant 
William McCurdy will prepare a judgment with an IRCP 54 (bf certification that comports 
with the Court's decision. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this day - of Septernbe 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Ckrk of the District Court 
9 .  . . . .  
9 .  1 '  
3 
4847 *&ic .,~ 
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRl 
6 
STEVEN P. CADY, et al., I 
7 I /  Plaintiffs, I Case No. CV OC-2007- 13830 I 
VS. 
RORY R. JONES, JONES, HESS, 
FC'RHMAN & EIDEN, P.A. 
17 
11 filed their Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs as the prevailing party asking the Court to award I 








/I attorney fees under I.C. 5 12-120(3). The Plaintiffs never replied or opposed. The Court heard / 
Defendants. I 
On July 10, 2008, the Court entered final judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs' case with 
prejudice having granted summary judgment to Rory R. Jones, Jones, Hess, Furhman & Eiden, 
P.A. that same day. On July 17,2008, Rory R. Jones, Jones, Hess, Furhman & Eiden, P.A. timely 
amount thereof, shall be made in the same manner as an objection to costs as provided by Rule 
22 
54(d)(6)." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6) provides that "[alny party may object to the claimed costs of another I 
19 
20 
argument on August 2 I, 2008. The Plaintiffs did not appear. 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6) states that "[alny objection to the allowance of attorney fees, or to the 
25 
/I Failure to timely object to the items in the memorandum of costs shall constitute a waiver of all I 
23 
24 
26 11 objections to the costs claimed." I 
party set forth in a memorandum of costs by filing and serving on adverse parties a motion to 
disallow part or all of such costs within ten days of service of the memorandum of costs .... 
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By failing to respond at all or to appear at the oral argument, the Plaintiffs thereby waived 
their right to further contest the amount of the award of anorney fees. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6) and 













notes that both the Defendants and the Plaintiffs clearly requested costs and attorney fees in their 
respective pleadings and that the Defendants requested attorney fees pursuant to I.C. 5 12-120(3). 
Based on the following, in an exercise of discretion, the Court awards $216.75 in non- 
discretionary costs! and grants an award for attorney fees in the amount of $1 9,144.50. The Court 
denies any award for discretionary costs because the Court does not find these costs 
e~traordinary.~ 
ANALYSIS 
In Idaho, parties pay their own attorney's fees unless a statute or contract provides 
otherwise. Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 137, 91 1 P.2d 133 (1 996); Owner-Operator hdependent 
Drivers v. Idaho Public Utilities Corn 'n, 125 Idaho 40 I, 87 1 P.2d 8 18 (1 994); Matter of Estate of 
Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 882 P.2d 457 (Ct. App. 1994) (also called the "American Rule"). The 



















parties permitting such an award; if the party does not point the Court to a statute or contract, 
attorney fees may be denied. Fournier v. Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 74 P.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Rory R. Jones, Jones, Hess, Furhrnan & Eiden, P.A. moved for attorney's fees and costs 
pursuant to I.C. $12-120(3), I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) and 54(e)(l). They cite to no other statutory 
authority in support of the requested fees. They further contend they are the prevailing parties and 
that the gravamen of the case was a commercial transaction making attorney's fees proper under 
I.C. 5 12- 120(3). 
' While the Defendants request an expert wimess fee of $9.320.51 as a cost pursuant lo I.R.C.P. 54(dXIXC). only 
expert wimess fees may be awarded as a matter ofright when the wimess either testified at trial or in a deposition and 
the amount is limited to $2.000.00. I.R.C.P. . 54(dXIXCX8) reads as follows: "Reasonable expert wimess fees for 
on erpert who tesf$es at o deposition or a1 a friol of on oction not to exceed the sum of $2.000 for each expert 
wimess for all appearances." (Emphasis added.) Since there is no evidence that Dennis Reinstein either testified at 
trial or in a deposition. the Defendants cannot get these costs as a matter of right. If the Defendants provide evidence 
that Reinstein testified. the Court will reconsider. 
Rule 54(dXI )(D) governs discretionary costs and provides in relevant p m  as follows: 
Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of that listed in subparagraph 
(C) YCosts as a Mancr of Right"], ggy be allowed uwn a showinn that said costs were necessary 
- and exceotional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against 
the adverse party. The trial court, in ruling upon objections to such discretionary costs contained in 
the memorandum of costs, shall make express findings as to why such specific item of discretionary 
cost should or should not be allowed. 
The Court recognizes this issue as one of discretion. Although the cosls may be reasonable and necessary. the Court 
cannot find that these arc "exceptional" costs as contemplated by lhc Rule. 
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The PlaintitTs did not oppose. However, the fact that the Plaintiffs failed to timely object 
oes not absolve the Coutt of its responsibility to independently review the legal basis for the 
ttomey fee award or the amount of the award; whether a statute authorizes an award of fees is s 
uestion of law. See Security Pacrjc Bank of Idaho, F S. B. v. Curtis, 123 ldaho 320, 847 P.2d 
18 1 .  1 189 (Ct. App. 1993); Devine v. Clujj; 1 10 ldaho I, 71 3 P.2d 437 (Ct. App. 1986); Fearless 
hrris Wholesale, Inc. v. Howell, 105 Idaho 699, 704,672 P.2d 577, 582 (Ct. App. 1983).' 
.. THE DEFENDANTS ARE THE PREVAILING PARTIES. 
The Court finds Defendants are the prevailing parties. The determination as to which 
uty, if any, prevailed is within the Court's discretion. Holmes, 125 ldaho at 787, 874 P.2d at 
>8 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Budell v. Badell, 122 Idaho 442, 450, 835 P.2d 677, 685 (Ct. 
pp. 1992)). In determining whether there is a prevailing party, the Court first looks to the Idaho 
ules of Civil Procedure. Rule 54(e)(l) incorporates Rule 54(d)(l)(B) which provides in part: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, 
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of 
the action in relation to the relief sought'by the respective parties, whether there 
were multiple claims, multiple issues, counterclaims, third party claims, cross- 
claims, or other multiple or cross issues between the parties, and the extent to 
which each party prevailed upon each of such issue or claims. 
e also Jerry J Joseph C. L. U. Ins. Associates v. Vaught, 1 17 Idaho 555, 789 P.2d 1 146 (Ct. 
The Plaintiffs prevailed on no issue, and the Court finds in an exercise of its discretion 
tt Rory R. Jones, Jones, Hess, Furhman 62 Eiden, P.A. are the prevailing parties in this matter. 
n Fearless Farris, the coun wrote as follows: 
Failure to timely object to a rnemorandum of costs and attorney fees constitutes a waiver of the right 
to contest the requesting party's entitlement to the fees sought. Conner v. Drake, 103 ldaho 761, 
653 P.2d 1173 (1982). Thlr doff not mean the trld coun automaftcaNy must award the fuU 
amount specified in the memorundurn See Uperuring Engineers Loco/ Union 3-17 v. Goo&;" 
Construction Co. of B lac~oo t  104 ldaho 83. 656 P.Zd 144 (Ct. App.1982). But it doe3 mean that 
the party who fails to object has waived its right to contest any award within the amount sought. 
Therefore, we hold that, having failed to object to Fearless Farris' memorandum in support of an 
award of attorney fees, the Howells cannot now be heard to complain either concerning the form of 
the request or that the court erred in failing to make a written finding as to the basis and reasons for 
awarding such fees to Fearless Farris. 
imphasis added.) 
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2 11 statute applies to its request. 
I The Court therefore finds they are entitled to a reasonable award of attorney's fees provided a 
7 





I/ for the application of this section is "whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen 
8 
B. THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES UNDER LC. 512- 
120(3). 
I.C. § 12-120(3) provides that the prevailing party in an action based upon "any 
commercial transaction" is entitled to recover attorney fees. The statute defines "commercial 
If of the lawsuit, that is, whether the commercial transaction is integral to the claim and constitutes 
9 
rn )I the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover." Spence v. Howell, 126 ldaho 763, 776, 
- -  ( 1  890 P.2d 714, 717 (1995). The term "commercial transaction" is defined in I.C. $12-120(3) to 
I I 11 mean "all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." Thus. by the 
12 
13 
11 plain terms of the statute, "[wlhere a party alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of a 
[Tlhe award of attorney's fees [under § 12-1 20(3) 1 is not warranted every time a 
commercial transaction is remotely connected with the case. Rather, the test is 
whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit. 
Attorney's fees an: not appropriate under I.C. 4 12-120(3) unless the commercial 
transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party 
is attempting to recover. 
Id. (quoting Brower v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 1 1  7 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 349 
(1 990)). This case is a legal malpractice case. 




24 decided "that an action for legal malpractice is a tort action, and even though the underlying /I 
type embraced by section 12-120(3), . . . that claim triggers the application of the statute." 
Continental Casualty, 127 ldaho 835, 907 P.2d 812. However, there must also be a nexus 
between the commercial transaction and the lawsuit: 
27 present statute, 'tort actions are essentially actions in which the parties bear their own attorney's II 
25 
26 
28 / I  fees, regardless of [who] prevail[ed]."' Id. The Fuller rule has been continuously applied to 
transaction which resulted in the malpractice was a 'commercial transaction,' attorney fees under 
12-120(3) are not authorized." Id. at 425,807 P.2d at 643. The Fuller court ruled that "under our 
29 /(reject claims for attorney fee awards in legal malpractice actions. See Rice v. Litster, 132 ldaho 
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897, 901, 980 P.2d 661, 565 (1999); Smith v. DavW S Shrrrrleff& Assoc., 124 ldaho 239, 858 



























The Defendants cite the recent Supreme Court case, Biimka v hfy Web &Rolesaler, LLC, 
143 ldaho 723, 152 P.3d 594 (2007). for the proposition that because the underlying relationship 
between them and the Plaintiffs is a commercial transaction, anorney fees are authorized. 
However, a close reading of Blimka and its recent progeny suggests otherwise. In Blimka, the 
Fraud arose in the commercial transaction itself. In Blimka, the Supreme Court observed that I.C. 
5 12-1 20(3) does not prohibit attorney fees for commercial transactions involving tortious conduct 
when "the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, constitutes the basis upon which 
the party is attempting to recover." Id at 728, 152 P.3d at 599 (quoting Brower v.  E.1 DuPont De 
Nemours & Co., 1 1  7 ldaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 349 (1990) (emphasis added)). In this case, 
the commercial transaction, the parties' attorney client relationship, is integral to the Plaintiffs' 
claims. Absent an attorney-client relationship, there can be no malpractice claim. 
The Supreme Court's recent reading of Biimka in Lee v. Nickerson, -1daho.189 P.3d 
(2008) suggests that where the nexus of the claim even where it sounds in tort is the relevant 
inquiry.4 In Lee, the Nickersons hired Lee to construct a level barn pad and do some work on a 
pond on their property. Lee filed suit against the Nickersons. Lee's complaint contained claims 
of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and implied contract. Lee also filed a $20,000 tort claim 
based on the Nickersons' alleged rehsal to allow Lee to retrieve his equipment left on the 
Nickenon's property. The district court entered judgment in favor of the Nickersons after a jury 
trial. On the question of anorney fees, the district court stated that I.C. $12-120(3) did not entitle 
the Nickersons to attorney fees on the tort claim. Based on its reading of Blimka, the ldaho 
Supreme Court vacated the district court's award of attorney fees and held that the Nickersons 
were entitled to reasonable attorney fees relating to their defense of Lee's tort claim. The 
Supreme Court stated that the commercial transaction, the parties' contract, initiated the presence 
of Lee's equipment on the Nickerson's property and was integral to Lee's claim. 
29 
30 
The Coun recognizes lhat ihe Honorable Judge Michael McLaughlin's decision awarding anorney fees in CIry rf 
h.Ic('uii v. Buxron, el a/., (a legal malpraclice case) is cunenlly on appeal. 
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Lre seems to create a "but for" standard for determining whether a civil action is "to 
recover. . . in any commercial transaction" for purposes of LC. $ 12-120(3). In other words, but 
for the contract or commercial transaction between Lee and the Nickersons, Lee's equipment 
would not have been on the Nickersons' property and no tort could have been committed. Under 
this standard, most, if not all, legal malpractice claims would fall within the scope of 1.C. $12- 
120(3) since legal malpractice can only occur where the parties have entered into an attorney- 
client relationship, which most often involves a contract or commercial transaction. In short, Lee 
greatly expands the scope of I.C. § 12-1 20(3). 
In this case, the commercial transaction, the contract or attorney-client relationship 
between the parties, gave rise to the attorney's duties and obligations to his client. But for the 
underlying contract, no legal malpractice could have occuned. Therefore, Plaintiffs were seeking 
recovery of damages sustained as a result of a commercial transaction and the prevailing parties, 
the Defendants, are entitled to attorney fees under I.C. 5 12-120(3). 
The Court finds there was such a nexus. Clearly, the contractual relationship was central 
to all the Plaintiffs' claims and attorney fees are awardable. 
C. ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF S19,144.50 ARE REASONABLE. 
The Defendants sought an award of $19,144.50 in attorney fees. Determining whether the 
amount of an attorney fee award is reasonable is within the Court's sound discretion. P.O. 
Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 ldaho 233, 159 P.3d 870 (2007); Cra j  
Wall of Idaho, Inc. v. Stonebroker, 108 Idaho 704, 701 P.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1985). What 
constitutes a reasonable fee is controlled by the criteria of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). See Sanders V .  
Lanyord, 134 ldaho 322, 1 P.3d 823 (Ct. App. 2000); Kelly v. Hodges, 119 Idaho 872, 876, 81 1 
P.2d 48, 52 (Ct. App. 1991). "These factors are applicable wherever they would not conflict with 
the contract or statute upon which the award is based. See Rule 54(e)(8)." Bank of Idaho V.  
Colley, 103 ldaho 320, 326,647 P.2d 776, 782 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Court is "permitted to examine the reasonableness of the time and labor expended by 
the attorney under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A) and need not blindly accept the figures advanced by the 
attorney." Cafc WaN, 108 ldaho at 705-706, 701 P.2d at 325. In this case, Cady does not contest 
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2 //However, the Court independently examined the bills. 
. , 
1 
3 / /  The Court finds that fees charged by each individual attorney given their respective 
the reasonnblencss of the claimed attorney fees and, in fact, waived any objection to the amount. 
4 experience and the prevailing fees for similarly experienced attorneys are reasonable. The Court I/ 
5 ( 1  further finds that the number of hours claimed are reasonable. 
6 / /  ARer considering all the factors listed in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). L e  Court finds. in its 
7 ildiscretion, attorney's fees in the total amount of $19,144.50 are reasonable fees and awards the 
8 Defendants $1 9,144.50 in attorney fees. /I 









Cheri C. Copsey ' 
District Judge 
Jones, Hess, Furhman & Eiden, P.A. are awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $19,144.50 and 
costs as a maner of right in the amount of $2 16.75. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
15 
16 
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Dated this I 1' day of September 2008. 
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Craig I . .  X,icado\\.s. ISI3 No. I081 
L~ficllcllc 11. I'oitlts. ISI3 No. 6324 
Il/\WI,I:Y '1'KOXI:'I.I~ 1:IC'NIS & II/\WI,I.:Y t.LP 
877 Main Street. Suite I000 
l'.(>. 13os 161 7 
f3oise. ID 83701-1617 
I'elephone: 108.344.6000 
F ] . .  c csimile: 208.954.5238 
Izmail: crneadows@hawleytrox~II.com 
n~points/@ha\vlcytroxeII.com 
Attorneys for Ilefeildant W. Kent I'lctcher 
IN T I E  DISTRICT COUKI' OF I f  IE FIFTFI .IUflICIAI, I)IS'I'KIC?. 
OF 'I'HE S'I'A'I'C OF IDAIIO. IN AND FOR 'SFIF: COUNTY OF CASSI/\ 
MARY KI1,LINS SOIGNIEK, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
W. KENT FIX I'CIIEK, 
I 
I Case No. CV 2009-5 17 
I 
) AFFIDAVIT OF MICHEL1,E K. POINTS 
I SFI'TING FORTI{ MEhfOKANDUM OF 
1 COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
) 
Ilefendant. ) 
- -- -- -I 
hlichclle 11. Points, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1 .  m. I am an attorney with the law firm ofkIawley l.roxell Ennis & Ilawlcq 
1,I.P. which represcnts Defendant W. Kent l~lctcher in this action. I am licensed to practice la\$ 
in the state o f  Idaho. I'his attidavit is submitted in suppon ot'Defendant's inotion for attorney 
lkes and costs, lilcd concurrently herewith. I t  is intended to coinplv with provisions of Idaho 
Ilulc of CiviI I'rocedurc 54, including but not limited to Idaho Rule of Civil I'roccdure 54(d)(5) 
and 54(c)(5). 
000240 
1 -. 13asis of :\flidawiJ I'he inattcrs set hrth in this irllidavit arc based upotl my 
personal kilo~vledgc, tllc nark records ortny law tirm. and a revie* of those records made by me 
and other persons with kno\~ledge. I'he records were nude contcmporaneottsly with the events 
set forth in the records. wcre made in the ordinary course. and were regularly kept by llawley 
'I'roxell I'Znnis & I Iawley LI-P, counsel l'or I'laintiff. 
LLS and Costs Claimed. Accompanying this aflidavit is Exhibit A, which 3. -
itemizes the requested attorney's fees and costs: organized in a manner which details the nature 
and amount of attorney's fees and costs sought by Ilefendant, based upon Defendant having 
successfully defended against all claims asserted by Plaintifl: I am familiar with the fact of, and 
the necessity for, such attorney's fees and costs having been incurred in this case. Such fees and 
costs were actually. necessarilv, and reasonably incurred. To the best of my knowledge and 
belief, the items are correct and the costs claimed are in compliance with Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(d)(5). The attorney's fees claimed are for work actuaIly performed in this action 
and represent time which relates to Plaintiffagainst whom Defendant seeks recovery of fees and 
costs. The costs are claimed in compliance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(I). 
Defendant is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code 5 12- 120(3) as Defendant is the 
prevailing party in this case, the underlying case of which was a commercial transaction. 
4. Parties Aeainst Whom Ilefendant Claims Fees and Costs. Ilefendant W. Kent 
1-letcher seeks recovery of Sees and costs from Plaintiff Mary Killins Soignier. 
I3asis for Claim Against Plaintiff. 'I'he basis for Ilcfcndant's claim arises from 5. 
this Court's finding that Defendant is the prevailing party in the Order and Judgment entered 
September 22,2009. 
Al'l'll>i\VI?' 01: b1ICIlELI.I~ 11. I'OIN'I'S SE'tI'INCi I:OICI''1 MItMOIUNDtJh.1 
o~:  C ~ S ' I ' S  ANI) nr"roRNI-:Y FHES - 2 
6 .  -- 1:~lctors S m n s h e  I~easonablencssclf: IIcSendant's CIi~ini fix :\ttorncv 1:ces. 
1:actors that the Court shot~ld consider in iicter~tiining the rcasonablencss of l)el?ndant's claim 
(i)r attorney fees are set forth in ldaho Rt~le  of Civil I'rocedure 5J(c)(3).  'I'hose factors are 
individually discussed in the fullowing paragraphs ol'tliis altidavit. 
I'he ' l ' i~~le  and 1,:lbor Re~ui red .  Idaho Rule of Civil I'rocedure SJ(e){i)(:\) 7. - 
provides that the Court shall consider the time and labor required. I'herc \vcrc sever;tt 
characteristics about this case which required substantial tinre and labor in order to Sully and 
fjirly pursue and obtain Defendant's complete defense in this case. In addition. thorough 
evaltlation of client documents, Court filings, as well as applicable law was required. 
8. I'he Novelty and Dil'ticultv of the Ot~estions. Idaho Ilule of Ci\#il Procedure 
54(c)(3)(H) provides that the Court shall consider the novelty and difficulty o f the  questions. As 
discussed in the previous paragraph, i t  was necessary to review voluminous documents and 
research applicable law to evaluate the case and craft a successful Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
9. I 'he Skill, Exnerience and Abilitv of the Attorney. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
5 4 ( ~ ) ( 3 ) ( C )  provides that the Court shall consider the skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly and the experience and ability ol'the attorney in the particular field of law. 'I'he laulvers 
primarily involved in this case are: Craig Mcadows, ISB No. 108 1 .  Partner, and myself; 
Michelle K Points, ISB No. 6224, Associate. Mr. bleadows and I have the requisite skill and 
expcricnce to properly and efficiently handle this case. 
10. 'l'he Prevailins Charges. ldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3)(D) provides that 
the Court shall consider the prevailing charges for like work. Throughout the course o f th i s  
AI:I:IDhVl'I' 01: MIC~III~I.l.I1 I<. I'OIN'I'S SI3"I'ING 1:OKTI-I MIiMOII~ZNI>Ubl 
0 1 :  COSTS ANI> :\~I"I'ORNLiY l:I:I<S - 3 
litigation, I believe that [he charges billed l'vr ia\\yers i t ~ ~ d  litigation :tssistance ~ta l ' f ' l~ave b en at 
the prevailing charges L>r like work 
I I .  @fandatorv l:osts. Mandatory costs, as outlined in ldiho Rule of Civil I'rocedttre 
54(d)( 1 )(C) are as t'ollo\vs: 
I R C I' 54(d)(l )(C')(I) Court f i l~ng Sces $ 58 00 
12. 1)iscrctionarv Costs. I>iscretionarx costs, as outlined in Idaho Ilule o f  Civil 
I'rocedure SJ(d)(I ) (D)  are as fitllo\\s, 
I'hotocopies (at 18#:pg): 
Assisted Legal Ilesearch (Westlaw) 
Total 
13. &tors Su~por t ing  the Reasonahletless of 1)eScndant's Claim for Custs. 
Del'endant is claiming costs as a matter of right pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil I'rocedurr: 
54(d)(I )(C), and discretionary costs pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 53(d)( I)(I)). 'I'he 
date set forth to each cost, on the exhibit attached hereto. is the date the cost was posted to the 
accounting records of Ilawley Troxell Ennis & Hawlev LI-PI and not necessarily the date the 
cost was incurred 
SUMMARY OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES REQUESTED: 
Attorney fees $10,914.00 
Mandatory costs (1.Il.C.P 54(d)(I)(C) 58.00 
Discretionary costs (1.R.C.I' 54(d)(l )(D) $ 732.04 
'I'otal $1 1,704.04 
1)Al'lf 1) this September, 2009. 
i\FI:II>AVIT 01: MICIIEI.I.Ii Il. I'OIN'I'S SII'1"I'INCi I'OK'171 MtfMOIblNI>IJICf 
O F  COSTS AND A'II'OKNliY F E I 3  - 4 
s.r,nr'E or: IIIAIIO 
) SS. 
County uf t\da 
SUBSCRIBID AND W O R N  bcli>rr me this g d r i  nfScptonbcr. 2009 
Notary Publie fvy Idaho 
Residing at 
1 I IIIKlfl3Y ('1SIZ I'Il:Y that i!n thi &Septc~~lbcr. XiliU. I caused to h. scried a 
true copy ol.tlic lbrei?oint! .1I:I'lDAVI'f 01: iLII(~IItiI.I,E I t .  I'OIN'I'S Sl;'!''IIN(i 1;OK'I'I f ~~- - 
h ~ l t : k l t i k ~ N ~ t ~ , 2 , 1  ($1: C?)S.I'S AND ;\~I"I'OIINl~Y I:IiES by the nlethod indicated beloxv, and 
addressed to each orthe ibllowing: 
Allen B. Ellis 4 . S .  Mail. Postage Prepaid 
ELL.IS, BKOt4W &: Sf 11-11,s. CI IAK'I'E KI'I) I land 1)clivered 
707 North 8th Street -Overnight Mail 
P.O. Rox 388 - E-mail 
Boise, ID 83701-0388 -- 'Telecupv: 208.345.9564 
[.4ttorneys for Plaintiff1 
Jeffrey A. Strother -- J U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid 
S'iKO'I'l1EK LAW OITICE - Iland Delivered 
200 N. Fourth Street, St~ite 30 .- Overnight Mail 
Ibise,  ID 83702 -- E-mail 
[Attorneys for Plaintiffl 
I\I:FII)AVI'!' O F  MICIIt:'I.l,f:' K. I'OIN'fS SETTING FOKT'tI MEMOKJ\NI)[JM 
0 1 :  COS'I'S AND tY1'7'0IINILY I:IZItS - 6 
.ewe 
f*$# ,-- 
"""i : ,> 
FEES FOR 41 88-070 
Date Initials Hours 
4/3/2009 CLM 3 5 
4/3/2009 MPOl 0 8 
4/6/2009 CLM 0 4 
4/6/2009 MPOl 1 5  
4/7/2009 MPOl 1.5 
4/8/2009 MPOl 0.8 
4/9/2009 CLM 0.2 
41912009 MPOl 0.3 
411012009 MPOl 0 5  
411 512009 MPOl 0.3 
4/16/2009 MPOl 1 3  
Amount Description 
612 50 E-mail w~th attachments from) J Ries, revlew 
letter from K. Fletcher: revlew complaint 
with attachments, telephone call wlth J 
R~es, telephone conference with K Fletcher, 
revlew Idaho Supreme Court case on duty owed 
lo benefictary by scrivener of will: e-mall 
lo J. R~es; telephone call wtth A Ellis 
116 00 Conference wtth C Meadows re factual htstory 
of cla~ms and e-mall exchanges wlth cl~ent re 
same research most recent Supreme Court 
dectstons re statute of l~mltat~on a d "some 
damage" rule 
70 00 Recetpt of acknowledgement of servtce from A 
Ell~s, conference w~th  M Polnts re 
stlpulatlon to move malter to Cassla County 
217.50 Create caption and draft stipulation and 
order re change of venue; call to court re 
assigned judge: review civil rule for 
provision for transfer outside of judicial 
district review recent cases on standing and 
statute of limitation issues. 
217.50 Draft answer with affirmative defenses 
responsive to Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand 
for Jury Trial. 
116 00 Final edits to answer and forward to clients 
for review: brief conference with C. Meadows 
re additional affirmative defenses. 
35.00 E-mail from K. Fletcher: e-mail to K, 
Fletcher regarding documents to be copied 
43.50 Review and execute stipulation for change of 
venue and final edits to answer, both for 
filing today 
72 50 Brlef revtew of cltent file, exchange calls 
wlth court clerk re check for change of venue 
to Cass~a County 
43 50 Draft amended com~laint to include citation to 
applicable statute o f  limitation; exchange 
e-mails with client re case file. 
188.50 Identify potential estoppel issue re 
Plaintiffs settlement of claim with American 
Cancer Society; begin review of deposition of 
EXHIBIT ! I 
1666420-1 XLS I 
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-. ,~ FEES FOR 4188-070 
K Fletcher 
4/ l i /2009 MPOl 0 2 29 00 Call from court clerk in Cassta County re 
change of venue Issues and filtng of answer 
4/22/2009 MPOl 0 2 29 00 Revtew exh~b~ts to deposttton of K Fletcher 
4/27/2009 MPOl 0 8  116.00 Finish review of clients deposition and 
exhibits and outline potential summary 
judgment motion. 
4/28/2009 MPOl 0.5 72.50 Begin review of deposition of Stephen 
Westfall. 
4/29/2009 MPOl 0 7 101 50 Cont~nue to revtew depos~t~on f S Westfall 
511 112009 MPOl 1 3  188.50 Continue to review client file and outline 
potential issues. 
511 312009 MPOl 0.8 116.00 Exchange e-mails with client re documents and 
pleadings from underlying case; brief 
research re Idaho cases on relevant duty 
issues. 
511 312009 DBRO 0.4 22.00 Retrieve docket; edit docket for specific 
document requests and supply to Clerk of the 
Court for processing. 
5/14/2009 MPOl 0.3 43.50 Review stipulation re settlement of 
underlying case and brief conference with C 
Meadows re the same. 
~*-f 
511 812009 MPOl 0 2 29 00 Follow up wtth D Brown re obtatntng Genqw f & ~ ~ ~  
County records 
5/19/2009 DBRO 0.2 11 0 0  Receive documents from Court, copy, supply 
set to M. Points. Draft and Finalize Letter 
to Clerk with Payment and Mail. 
5120i2009 MPOl 1.3 188.50 Review underlying will contest pleadings from 
Cassia County. 
5/21/2009 MPOl 0.3 43.50 Drafi e-mail to N. Trammel re research on 
issues of duty and statute of limitation 
regarding Plaintiffs claims. 
5/27/2009 MPOl 0 3 43 50 Conference with M. O'Dowd re research on 
statute of limitation and duty issues; 
research case law re estoppel argument. 
5/27/2009 MOD0 2.6 325.00 Read and review project assignment from M. 
Polnts regarding attorney malpractice case 
1666420-1 XLS 
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611 112009 MPOI 
6/12/2009 MPOl 
including complaint, will and w~ll  construction 
opinion; email M points regarding research; 
find and pr~nt recent Idaho cases regarding 
statute of limitations for attorney 
malpractice; meeting with M. Points regarding 
project. 
387 50 Telephone call w~th reference attorney at 
Westlaw research caselaw regard~ng duty to 
th~rd party benefic~ar~es read and revlew 
caselaw regard~ng statute of limitations 
217 50 Draft motion for summary judgment and begin 
draft of memorandum and affidavit of K. 
Fletcher in support of motion. 
375.00 Drafting argument outline for statute of 
limitations issue, 
300.00 Drafting statute of limitations section of 
motion for summary judgment brief. 
43.50 Draft e-mail to client re issues for 
potential motion for summary judgment. 
962.50 Complete drafting argument section for 
statute of limitations: draft argument 
section for breach of duty owed to named 
beneficiaries in testamentary documents. 
350.00 Finish draft of brief; review and make 
corrections suggested by 0. Smethers; meeting 
with M. Points. 
261.00 Meet with M. O'Dowd re research on issues for 
motion for summary judgment; continue to 
draft motion and memorandum in support of 
motion for summary judgment. 
246.50 Continue to draft and edit all pleadings in 
support of motion for summary judgment 
29.00 Exchange e-mails with client re motion for 
summary judgment. 
58.00 Exchange e-mails with client re motion for 
summary judgment and issues re deposition; 
e-mail J. Ries re the same. 
116.00 Call to court clerk re hearing on motion for 
summary judgment and draft notice of hearing; 














? a $ $  """ y3 
FEES FOR 4188-070 - *, i"
afftdav~t, final~ze all pleadtngs and 
exhtbtts for fililg tcday 
0 4 58 00 Revtew motlon and proposed order on motron to 
dtsqual~fy Judge Crabtree exchange e-malls 
wtth cltent re same and related matters 
0 3 43.50 Review pleading from counsel vacating motion 
to disqualify and forward the same to c l~ent  
review notice of hearing on motion 
0 5 87 50 Telephone call from A Ell~s, emat l  from A 
Ell~s, conference w~th M Po~nts on Issues 
ra~sed by A Ellts tn response to motlon for 
summary judgmenf and product~on of K 
Fletcher's w~l l  ftle 
1 2  174 00 Call from counsel for Plaintiff re deposition 
of client and related 56(9 motion; 
conference w~th C. Meadows and calls with 
client re the same; review of client file in 
anticipation of providing file to counsel for 
Plaintiff and call to the same re arranging a 
time for tnspection. 
0 3 43 50 Br~ef conference w~th A Ell~s re cltent 
f~le, draft e-mall to cl~ent re case status 
and related matters 
1 175.00 Conference with A. Ellis; produce K. Fletcher 
documents to A. Ellis: arrange for copying of 
K. Fletcher documents; conference with M. 
Points. 
2 3 218 50 Scan. process, bates number documents 
electronically in preparation for production. 
5 475.00 Continue to bates number documents 
electronically in preparation for production 
1 4  245 00 Rece~pt and revtew of Reply Memorandum 
Aff~dav~t and exhtbtts in response to Mot~on 
for Summary Judgment, e-mall materials to M 
Polnts, e-mall to K Fletcher 
2 350.00 Research issues raised by Response Memorandum; 
review of will for Cowan; e-mail research 
issues and thoughts to M. Points on motion for 
summary judgment. 
1 5  217.50 Review and outline opposition of Plaintiff to 
motion for summary judgment. 
1666420-1 XLS 
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319 00 Begcr draft of reply brcef 36 motcon for 
summary judgment 
464 00 Contcnue to draft reply to placntcffs 
opposctcon to motcon to summary judgment 
402 50 E-mail from M. Points, review and revise 
Reply Memorandum on Motion for Summary 
Judgment; forward to K. Fletcher and file 
with Court. 
43.50 Follow-up on service and filing of reply 
brief and review association of counsel. 
43 50 Conference with C Meadows re argument in 
motion for summary judgment. 
130.50 Prepare materials for upcoming motion for 
summary judgment and outline argument motion 
to strike client's affidavit; conference with 
C. Meadows re the same. 
130.50 Prepare for hearing on motion for summary 
judgment. 
609.00 Travel to Burley, continue to prepare for 
hearing, meet with client and argue motion 
for summary judgment to Judge Crabtree. 
87.00 Review decision on motion for summary 
judgment; exchange calls and e-mails with 
client and J. Ries re the same. 
58.00 Exchange e-mails with J. Ries and client re 
potential motion for attorney fees and 
settlement issues. 
43 50 Draft e-mall to counsel for Placnttff re 
proposed settlement of case re wacver of fee 
motcon for agreement to not appeal recent 
motcon for summary judgment deccscon 
58.00 Call from judge's clerk re order and judgment 




f&t$ ~*- ** \$ tg$ COSTS FOR 4188-0070 
I Date Initials Qty. Rate 
4/6/2009 HTEH 2 0 18 
4/9/2009 MPOI 1 55 
4/9/2009 HTEH 24 0 1 8  
4/10/2009 MPOl 1 9 
4/15/2009 HTEH 
4/15/2009 HTEH 











5/19/2009 HTEH 578 0 18 
5/19/2009 HTEH 3 0 18 
5/21/2009 HTEH 22 0 1 8  
5/27/2009 HTEH 31 0 18 
5/27/2009 MOD0 1 13374 
5/27/2009 MPOl 1 2166 
Amount Oescriptlon 
0 36 COPYING USERz454 UNIT=13 TIME=l2 OC PAGES=2 
58 CLIENT CHARGES -ADA COUNTY CLERK Fllcng fee 
for Answer 
4 32 COPYING USER=493 UNIT=13 TIME=I 1 32 PAGES=24 
9 CLIENT CHARGES - CASSIA COUNTY Fee for transfer 
of venue to Cassia County 
100 26 COPYING USER=? 11 UNIT=11 TIME=08 03 PAGES=557 
57 96 COPYING USER=? 11 UNIT=9 TIME=08 38 PAGES=322 
89 82 COPYING USER=111 UNIT=? 1 TIME=08:57 PAGES=499 
11.7 COPYING USER=111 UNIT=13 TIME=15:18 PAGES=65 
2.52 COPYING USER-454 UNIT-13 TIME=15:23 PAGES=14 
1.08 COPYING USER=493 UNIT=13 TlME=10:59 PAGES-6 
1 08 COPYING USER=493 UNIT=13 TIME=11:08 PAGES=6 
8.28 COPYING USER=? 11 UNIT=13 TIME=10:54 PAGES=46 
4 MESSENGER 
7.2 COPYING USER=111 UNIT=13 TIME=16:01 PAGES=40 
0 1 8  COPYING USER=401 UNIT=13 TIME=15:47 PAGES=l 
40 32 COPYING USER=I 11 UNIT=9 TIME-13:27 PAGES=224 
288 CLIENT CHARGES - CLERK OF THE COURT For Records 
of the docket of Zachary A. Cowan 
104.04 COPYING USER=474 UNIT=?? TIME=10:15 PAGES=578 
0.54 COPYING USER=474 UNIT=13 TIME=1439 PAGES=3 
3.96 COPYING USER=111 UNIT=13 TIME=12:31 PAGES=22 
5.58 COPYING USER=111 UNIT=13 TIME=17.15 PAGES=31 
133.74 COMPUTER ASSISTED LEGAL RESEARCH WESTLAW 
RESEARCH. 















74 14 COMPUTER ASSISTED LEGAL RESEARCH WESTLAW 
RESEARCH 
0 54 COPYING USER=401 UNIT=13 TIME=10 49 PAGES3 
21 36 COMPUTER ASSISTED LEGAL RESEARCH WESTLAW 
RESEARCH 
0 54 COPYING USER=111 UNIT=13 TIME=10 36 PAGES-3 
16.2 COPYING USER=493 UNIT=13 TIME=16.08 PAGES=90 
0 36 COPYING USER=493 UNIT=13 TIME=13 34 PAGES=2 
0 36 COPYING USER=493 UNIT-13 TIME=13 55 PAGES=2 
13.5 COPYING USER=493 UNIT=13 TIME=15.16 PAGES=75 
2.7 COPYING USER=111 UNIT=13 TlME=09:59 PAGES=? 5 
13.68 COMPUTER ASSISTED LEGAL RESEARCH WESTLAW 
RESEARCH, 
93.5 OUT-OF-TOWN TRAVEL - MICHELLE POINTS 
Reimbursement for mileage to Burley, ID for 
Motion hearing on 8/10/09 (Miles 170) 
4 MESSENGER 
0.18 COPYING USER=401 UNIT=13 TIME=09:44 PAGES=l 
CLIENT NAME: 
- -  . , a  c r y s t a l  S e v e r s o n  Hawley T r o x e l l  
.q& 
Page 2 
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*&&& 
Craig L. Meado~s. LSD KO. 108 i 
Michelle R. Points, ISB Po. 6224 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & KAWLEY LLP 
877 Main S t m f  Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 8370 1.16 17 
Telephone: 208.344.600i3 
Facsimile: 208.951.5238 
Email: c m e ~ o w s ~ a w l e ~ o x e l l . w m  
mpoints@hau/leytroxelI.com 
Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher 
IN THE DISTRICT COL'RT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI-IE CO 
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER, ) 
) Case No. C 
PlaintifC 1 
) NOTICE 0 
VS. 1 
1 
W. KENT FLETCIIER, 
Defendant. 
TO: ALL PARTIES AND TIIEIR COWSEL OF RECORD 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above-named Defendant will call up for hearing his 
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs on the 25th day of November, 2009, at 9:00 a.m., or as soon 
thereafter as counsel may be heard, at the Cassia County Courthouse, before the Honorable 
Michael R. Crabtree Burley. Idaha. 
The parties have stipulated to conduct the hewing telepho 
NOTICE OF HEARING - I 
- - .. crystal Saverson 
&#+. 
H j u l e ~  Troxelr 
*@** Page 3 fggg ,> %*$:* 
+>m 
DATED THIS --- day of October, 2009. 
NOTICE Of: Hk,%Kfl\l(i - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HFKEBY C t R l l t Y  that on :his October, 2009.1 caused to be serted a m e  
each of the follow~ng. 
cup) of ihe forego~ng N O  1 ICE OF HEARKG by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
Allen B. Ellis - U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
EI.I.IS. BROWN Bc SHEILS, CHARTERED f Iand Delivered 
707 Sorth 8th Street - Overnight Mail 
P it. Box 388 E-mail 
Boise, ID 83701-0388 Z ~ e l e c o p y :  208.345.9564 
[Attorneys for Plaintiffl 
Jefeffrey A. Strother 
STROTHER LAW 0I'FIC:E 
200 N. Fourth Streer, Suire 30 
Boise, ID 83702 
[Atromeys for Ylaintiffl 
- U S Mail, Postage Prepad - Hand Delivered - Overnight Mail 
E-NIII 
Telecopy: 208.342 2429 
ALLEN B. ELI IS 
CLLIS, BROWN & SHE11 S, CWARrERED 
Attorneys-at-law 
707 North 8th Strect 
P O  Box388 
Boise, ldaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
JEFFREY A. STROTIER 
STROTHER LAW OFFICE 
200 North 4" Street, Suite 30 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 342-2425 (Telephone) 
(208) 342-2429 (Facsimjle) 
ISB No. 2014 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
M THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF T I E  
STATE OF IDAIIO, M ANI) FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
Mary Killins Soigrier, 1 
) Case No. CV 2009-5 17 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 MOTION TO DISALLOW 
) COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 





Comes now the plaintiff, through her attorneys of record, and moves the Court for an 
order disaflowing a portion of defendant's cIairned costs and the entirety of the claimed attorney 
fees set forth in defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees and 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS ANI> ATTORNEY FEES - 1 
000259 
skipporting affidavit, both dared September 30,2009. Tlus nlotion is made upon the following 
grounds: 
(I) Plaintiffs complaint is not based upon a contra~t with the defendant nor is it based 
upon a "commercial transaction" with defendant. Accordingly, I.C. $12- 120(3) does not entitle 
defendant to attorney fees. 
(2) Unlike City ofMcColl v. Buxfon, 146 Idaho 656,201 P.3d 629 (2009), the underlying 
matter here, in which the alleged malpractice o c c d ,  was not a commercial matter. 
(3) Even if this action is deemed to arise from a commercial transaction, the commercial 
transaction is not essential or integral to plaintiffs cause of action. 
(4) Portions of defendant's claimed attorney fees are service fees for work which may 
have been performed by persons who are not licensed attorneys; and 
(5) With respect to the claimed discretionary costs, defendant has failed to demonstrate 
that these costs were "necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred" and "in the interest 
ofjustice he assessed against" the plaintiff here. See Rule 54(d)(l)(D), I.R.C.P. 
This motion is based upon the Memorandum of Law filed herewith, the pleadings and 
records in this action, and such other oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the 
hearing. 
DATED this 13" day of October, 2009. (gAL 
Allen B. El 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
, 
MOTION TO IIISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 2 
0002t;O 
I &REBY CERTIFY That on &IS 13' day of October, 2009. I caused to be sewed a true 
and comect copy of the foregoing document by the method mdicatrd below, and addrrswd to the 
followng 
Michelle R. Points 
Craig L. Meadows 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701 -1617 
- U.S. Mail - Hand Delivered 
- Overnight MaiI 
X Facsimile 
954-5238 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AM> A'M'ORNEY FEES - 3 
800261 
ALLEN B ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROKW & SHFILS, CHNZTERED 
Anorneys-at-Lrtw 
707 North 8th Street 
P 0 Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701 -0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
1SB No 1626 
JEFFREY A. STROTHER 
STROTHER LAW OFFICE 
200 North 4* Street, Suite 30 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 342-2425 (Telephone) 
(208) 342-2429 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 2014 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
Mary Killins Soipier, ) 
1 Ca~e NO. CV 2009-51 7 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) OF MOTION TO DISALLOW 
) COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 




Basis of motion: Defendant's claimed attorney fees should be disallowed for each of the 
following reasons: 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OP MO7TON TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 1 
0002fPZ 
(1) Pla~ntil'fs  omp plaint 1s not based upon a contract with the defendant; nor is it based upon 
a "commercial transaction" wid, defmdwt. Accordingly, 1.62.9 12- 120(3) does not entitle defendant 
tu attorney fes  
(2) Unlike City af'McCuN v. Btalon, 146 Idaho 656,201 P.3d 629 (2009), this action does 
arise &om a commercial matter 
(3) Even if this action is deemed to wise h m  a commercial transaction, the commercial 
transaction is not essential or integral to plaintiffs cause of action 
(4) A portion of defendant's claimed attorney fees are service fees for work performed by 
non-attorneys; and 
(5) With respect to the claimed discretionary costs, defendant has failed to demonstrate that 
these costs were "necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred" and "in the interest ofjustice 
be assessed against'' the plaintiff here. See Rule 54(d)(IKD), I.R.C.P. 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DID NOT ENTER M10 A CONTRACT OR 
COMmRCIAL TRANSAWON WITH EFEBDANT, DEFENDANT IS NOT 
ENTfTLED TO ATTORNEY FEES UNRER IDAHO CODE 612-12013) 
Plaintiffs status in this matter is as a named beneficiary in the W~l l  of Zachary Cowan. She 
never enjoyed an attomeylrelationship with the defendant Fletcher. The duty owed to plaintiff 
Soignier arose out of the common law as articulated in Harrigfeld v. Hancock; not out of an 
attomeylcfient relationship with defendant: 
Considering these factors we hold that an attomey preparing 
testamentary instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named or 
identified therein to prepare such instruments, and if requested by the 
tcptator to have them properly executed, so as to cffectuate the 
testator's intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments. 
Harrigfed v. Hancock 140 Idaho 134,138,90P.3d 884 (2004) 
8 
MEMOKANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 2 
This duty was identified by the Court in its h.lemonmdum Decision (p. 7). 
Because the plaintiff and defendant never entered into a contract or commercial transaction, 
Idaho Code $12-120(3) is simply not applicable: "In any civil action to recover on a . . . 
contract . . . and in any commercial t m c t i o n  . . . the prevailing party shall be allowed 
a ~ a ~ o n a b l e  attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs." The statute 
requires that there be aconfract or commercial transaction. City ofMcCa11 v Bwton, supra In this 
case there were no dealings whatsoever between the parties, commercial or otherwise. 
Plaintiffs "civil action" against defendant is based upon the common law duty articulated 
in Hanigfeld, not upon a "contract" or upon a "commercial tmmction". Accordingly, defendant, 
as prevailing party, has no entitlement to attorney fees. 
A s  DISTINGwD FROM CITY OF MCCALL v B U X T O L  
W E R L Y I N G  MA4R HERE WAS NOT A C R  RIAITE_R 
Cify ofMcCall overruled Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 807 P.2d 633 (1991). Fuller 
held: 
We now hold that an action for legal malpractice is a tort action, and 
even though the undedyiug transaction which resulted in the 
malpractice was a "commercial transaction", attorney fees under 
12-1 20(3) are not authorized. 
The City ofh4cCall case does not hold that all actions for legal malpractice qualify as actions 
to enforce a "commercial transaction". Notably the defendant in his brief eschews refereace to the 
Supreme Court's language in the City ofMcCall but references the district court's statement, which 
is the holding in Cify of McCaN: "The record demonstrates that thts transaction is a contract for 
attorney services and therefore was a commercial transaction". See Exhibit A, p. 5. Rather, City 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ArrORNEY FEES 3 
ctf~i'1IcC'i~ll holris that: "It [I.C. 5 12-120(3)] mandates the awarding ofa reasonable attorney's fee to 
the prevailing party "in any commcrrial transaction"," (d., 146 Idaho at 665. Chat is a far cry fram 
stating that every time someone hires an attorney, he hiis entered into a commcrcial transaction. 
InCity of ..LfcGull, the underlying transaction was aconsmction contract between the City and 
a general contractor. Ihe matter was "commercial" in nature from its very outset. The allegedly 
negligent advice, I e , to terminate the general contractor, was with respect to a commcrcial matter. 
Likewise, in Fuller v Wolfem, now o v e d e d ,  the clients hired the aitomey to represent them in a 
lawsuit arising From the purchase and sale of farm equipment, clearly a commercial matter. Id, 1 19 
Idaho at 4 18. 
In the case at bench, the underlying matter was with respect to the drafting of a will and 
plaintiffs status as a beneficiary, clearly not a commercial inatter. Idaho Code $1 2-1200) excepts 
"personal or household" transactions from the scope of the statute. 
THE GRAVAMEN OF PLAINTIFFS CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT IS NOT 
COMMERCIAL IN NATURE. RENDERING IDAHO CODE 6 12-120631 INAPPLICABLE 
In Brower v E.I. DuPonfde NewmowsandCo., 1 17 Idaho 780,792 P.2d 345 (1990), Idaho's 
Supreme Court made clear that Section 12- 120(3) applies only when the essence of plaintiff's claim 
is commercial in nature: 
These cases [dealing with section 12-120(3)] lead to the conclusion 
that the award of attorney's fees is not warranted every time a 
commercial transacrion is remotely connected with the case. Rather, 
the test is whether thecommercial tramaction comprises the gravamen 
of the lawsuit. Attorney's fees are not appropriate under I.C. $ 12- 
120(3) unless the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, d 
constitutes the basis upon which the party is aflempting to recover. To 
hold otherwise would be to convert the award of attorney's fees from 
an exceptional remedy justified onIy by statutory authority to a matter 
. , of right in virtually every lawsuit filed. (bracketed material 
MEMORANDUM M SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 4 
00026.5 
explanatory) 
1 17 Idaho at 784, parlially quoted in Blimh, 143 Idaho at 728, 
In AG Services ($America v. Kechter, 137 Idaho 62.44 P.3d 1 1 17 (2002) 
The statute [section 12.120(3)] does not authorize the awarding of 
attorney fees every time a commezcial transaction is connected with 
the case. Binghm v. Montane Resource Assoc., 133 Idaho 420,987 
P.2d 1035 (1999). The test is whether the commercid hansaction 
constitutes the essential part of the lawsuit. (bracketed material 
explanatory) 
As indicated above, the transaction between the City of McCall and its attorneys was 
inherently commercial in nature from the beginning. That is not so in this case, where plaintiff had 
no relationship of any nature with defendant. That a third party attempted to name plaintiff as a 
beneficiary in his will did not give rise to any commercial relationship between plaintiff and 
defendant. Even if there were such a relationship, it was hardly essential to plaintiffs claim, which 
m s e  under common law not the Uniform Commercial Code. 
DEFENDANT APPEARS TO BE SEEKING ATTORNEY FEm 
FOR SERVICES PERFORMED BY NON-ATTORNEYS 
In her affidavit, Ms. Points recites that the fees identitied in Exhibit A retlect "attorney fees 
claimed for work actually performed". These fees include fees for legal work performed by 
"MODO", i.e., 23.4 hours ($29 17.50). Although "MODO" is not actually identified, an entry dated 
6/2/09 states: "Meet with M. O'Dowd re research on issues for motion for summary judgment". 
Neither the ldaho State Bar website nor The Advocate (2009 -2010), identify an attorney with the 
surname of "O'Dowd" as an attorney licensed by the State of Idaho. Plaintiff requests the Court to 
take judicial notice of this fact. Rule 201@), Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
Also, on page 4 of Exhibit A there are entries for bates numbering documents by "CWAM", 
MEMORANDUM M SUPPORT OF MOWN TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 5 
totaling 7 . 3  hotus ($693.50), apparently secretarial work charged out at $95 per hour. 
Assumingsttomey fees axe deemed appropriate, these fits ($361 0) may not k n o t  recovcrabIe 
as attorney fees. 'lhese fccs are not claimed as paralegal fees. In the case of MODO, these fees m y  
not be chamctcrized as "attorney f ~ s "  if M O W  is not a licensed attorney. In the case of bates 
stamplng documents, if this work ww done by a paralegal, he or she was severely underemployed 
and the client was overcharged (at $95 per hour). 
Wmi.KlSPECr TO l)lSCREE1'I0~~RY L'OS'TS. 'TJIEU IS NO EVIIIENCij 
PRfiSEN'l'ED 'THAT THESE C:OSl'S WERE 'NECESSARY k % D  EXCEPTIONAL" 
See Rule 54(d)(l)@), I.R.C.P. 
CONCLUSIOU 
hIao~licabilitv of Idaho Code 612-120(31: This malpractice action is not a "civil action" to 
enforce or collect damages in a commercial transaction, i.e., section 12- 12q3) is not applicable. The 
herein matter is a suit for damages arising h m  breach of the attorney's common law duty to a person 
(the plaintift) to whom a duty of care was owed. Unlike City ofMcColl and Fuller v. Wolters, the 
underlying matter was not commercial in nature. 
The inspiration for the Ciry ofMcCa1l decision was Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 
Idaho 723, 152P.3d 594 (2007) which stood for the simple proposition that tortious conduct arising 
during a commercial transaction does not disqualify that transaction from treatment under section 12- 
120(3) because of the tort. The defendant now seeks to consme City ofMcCall as holding that (1) 
because all attorney/client relatio~~ships arecommercial relationships, and (2) because Blimka  allow^ 
attorney fecseven where there is tortious conduct in a commercial transaction, (3) therefore, attorney 
fees are moverable under section 12-12q3) in all malpractice actions. 
MEMORANDUM M SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY PEES 6 
Rrst, I NJ of .MCUIIN does not hold that the pccva~hng party m d l  legal malpractice tases IS 
entitled to attorney fecs. Defendant cited the district court's opinion, ignoring the language in l.?ity 
0J"tbic~hll. 
Secondly, no attomey/client relationship existed between defendant and plaintiff, the district 
court's c~nclusion notwithstanding.' 
Thirdly, in addition to the absence of a relationship with the plaintiff, defendant was 
performing services of a"personal" nature for the testator. See the "personal or household" exception 
in I.C. $120-120(3), i.e., it was not a "commercial transaction". 
Finally, plaintiffs entitlement to non-negligent conduct on the part of defendant is not 
grounded on the terms of or course of dealing in a "commercialn matter; rather it is based upon the 
common law of rdaho respecting the duty of an attorney to his client and others. Harrigfeld v. 
Hancock, 140 ldaho at 138. That is, in contrast to the language of LC. $12- 120(3), this is nota "civil 
action" to enforce a commerciaf transaction. There is a consistent line of cases which holds, that in 
order for a “commercial transaction" to qualify the prevailing party for attorney fees, "the commercial 
transaction is integral to the claim and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to 
recover", e.g., BIimko v My Web Whoiesaler, 143 ldaho 723, 728, 152 P.3d 594 (2007); Lee v 
Nickrson, 146 ldaho 5, 12, 189 P.3d 467 (2008). Such is not our case. 
A pottion of the attopev fees claimed avaear to be services bv non-attomevs: If "MODO" 
is M. O'Dowd, plaintiff can find no evidence that this penon is a licensed attorney. Attorney fees 
I Had an anorney/client existed between defendant and plaintiff, defendant would have placed 
himself in a conflict of interest given his relationship witb tbe testator. 
MEMORANDUM iN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 7 
lncuntrd as a result of serviees by "O'NAM" appear to secretanal services billed at $95 00 per hour. 
Tbere 1s no -t the cltumed discretionary costs are "necessarv and 
e x c . e a t t c l n a l " ~ ~ n : d  by the Rules. 
DATED t h ~ s  1 3'h day of October, 2009 
-- 
Allen B. EkG' 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 13"day ofOctober, 2009,I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Michelle R. Points 
Craig L. Meadows 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLp 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83 70 1- 141 7 
- U.S. Mail 
- Hand Delivered 
 Overnight Maii 




MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 8 
0002G9 
AILEN R ELI,IS 
ELI-IS. BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys-at-Law 
707 North 8th Street 
I P 0 Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701 0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
IS8 No. 1626 
JEFFREY A. STROTHER 
STROTHER LAW OFFICE 
200 Notth 4" Street, Suite 30 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 342-2425 (Telephone) 
(208) 342-2429 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 2014 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
LN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FDTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
Mary Killins Soignier, f 
1 Case No. CV 2009-5 1 7 
Plaintiff, 1 
) NOTICE OF mmG 
1 
W. Kent Fletcher, 1 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Please take notice that a hearing on Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees 
will be held on the 25* day of November, 2009, at the hour of 9.00 am., before the Honorable 
Michael R. Crabtree at the Cassia County C o h o u s e ,  Burley, Idaho. 
DATED this 13" day of October, 2009. 
Allen B. Ellis 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I IfEREBY CERTIFY That on this 13" day of October, 2009,I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addrvssed to the 
following: 
Michelle R. Points - U.S. Mail 
Craig L. Meadows - Hand Delivered 
Hawley, Troxell, Emis & Iiawley, LLP - Overnight Mail 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 _ZL Facsimile 
P.O. Box 1617 954-5238 
Boise, Idaho 83701 -1 61 7 
- 
Allen B. Ellis 
NOTICE OF H E A W G  2 
1II.I.IS. 13KcIWN & SllEll..S, C'L-I~\RI'I:RI?I) 
;\irurncys-at-l.aw 
707 North 8th Street 
1' .0.  13t)x 388 
I3oise. 1d;lho 83701-0388 
(708) 345-7832 ('Selephone) 
(1108) 345-9364 (F;fcsil~lile) 
ISB No. 1626 
JEFI'REY A. STRO'rf.iER 
S'I'RUTI-lI1R 12, W OFf:lCE 
200 North Street, Suite 30 
Hoise, Idaho 83702 
(308) 342-7425 (Telephone) 
(208) 342-2479 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 3014 
i1ttorne)s for PlaintiffJAppellant 
IN THE DISI'RICT COC'RT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAI. DISTRICT OF TlfE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ili AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
Mary Killins Soignier, 1 
1 Case No.CV 2009-5 17 
I'laintitf;'Appellant, 1 
) NOTICE OF APPEAI. 
1 
) 
W. Kent Fletcher, ) 
TO: 'Tk1E /\BOVE-NAMED DEFENDAN'I'. HIS ATTORNEY OF KI:C'ORD, ANDTtfE 
Cl.tlRK OF TfiFi ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NO'IICE fS I IERTiBY GIVEN I'HAT: 
I .  The above-named plaiatitl?, Mar): Killins Soignier, appeals against the ahove-named 
I tor Si~mrn.~r\, Sudgnietrt entered Septenihcr 21. 2009. tile flonor:~ble M~chdcl R Crahtree 
7 -. '1-he appelli~nt has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme C:ot~~"c a t~d  the Order ;ind 
luiig~i~ent identified in paragraph 1 is appe:tlable undcr and pursuant to llule 1 1(3)(1). I.;Z.I<. 
3. h prclimi~iary statement crf the issues on appeal which the appellant intends to assert 
in the appeal is as fi)lla\vs: 
a. LVhether the district court coinntitted an error of lzw in ruling that defendant 
J:letcher did not breach the professional duty he owed to plaintiff. to wit. 
that defendant Fletcher was t~ot negligent; 
b. Whether the district committed an error of law in ruling that defendant 
Fletcher, in drafting the testator's Will. did not frustrate the testator's intent: 
c. Whether in granting summitry judgment based upon issues (a) or (b) above. 
the district court committed reversible error given the existence of 
genuine issues of material fact. 
4. There has been no order entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript: that hearing held on August 10. 2009. 
6 .  The appellant requests those portions ofthe clerk's record automatically included 
undcr Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as the following: 
a. blemorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; 
b. Affidavit of W. Kent 1:letcher; 
c. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment: 
d. Affidavit of  hfary Killirls Soignier: 
c. Anidavit of John F. hlagnctson; 
t : .Affidavit ot':\llcn B. Illlis; 
E. blotion to Strikc Affidavit of W. Kent IFletcher: 
h. Fvlemumndum Decision Gmnring Defendant's Mtn. For Summar). Judgme~~t: 
I .  Order and Judgment. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of 
the reportcr's transcript. 
(b) lhat the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid 
(c) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(d) 'That the court reporter has been served pursuant to Rule 17(k)(I). I.A.R. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20. I.A.R. 
Dated this 22""day ofOctober. 2009 
-. 
- 
Allen B. Ellis 
Attorney for Plaintiff: 
I liliRt-f3* CIX'l'fFI '1-l~at on this 22N d g  i ~ f ( ) ~ t o h e ~  2009. 1 ciUsl.d be 
COPY of'thi. bregolng docu~nent by the mvthd  indicated &lnix ;tnd rddrmid lo ,,,. 
fi)llow~ng 
Michelle R. I'oints 
C'rciig I... M e a d o ~ s ~  . 
IJ:lwl~!. 7'rosell. Ennis & t+awlcy. ~ 1 , p  
877 Main Street. Suite 1000 
P.0.  Rox 161 7 
Boise, ldaho 83701.1 61 7 
Denise Schloder 
Court Reporter 
Cassia County Courthouse 
1459 Overland Ave. 
Burley. ldaho 833 1 8 
-u s 1Va11 
-- Iland Ueli~ered 
(hernight iLlail 
- X- Facsimile 
954-5238 
-- U.S. Mail  Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
_ _X.- Facsimile 
878-9503 
/ &-77 - 
Allen 8'ms - 
Craig L. Meadows: ISB No. 1081 
Michelle R. Points. ISB No. 6224 
E(AWI.EY TROXELL E W I S  6: IIAWLEY LL? 
877 Main Street. Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 1617 





Attorneys for Defendant iV,  Kent 1:letrher 
IN T H E  DISTRICT COURT OF T!IE FIfTH JUDICIAL DIS'TXlCI 
OF THE ST.4TE O F  IDAIIO. M "tN FOR 'TBE COUNTY C)F C:4SSL9 
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER. i 
L'S. j RI3PLY TO PL .4n\JTIEF' S M0TIOI.J ' T O  
) DIS.4iLOW C3SfS $.I\I:, A.'I'TOK\IE\' 
W. KENT FLETCHER. i f'z'j:s , ., 
) 
Defendant. ) 
- -- 1 
Defendant U'. Kent Flrtct!er, b> and t t  mugh I I ~ S  :::m~st'I of rei:ord. k .v~ley  '1'1-orell 1:nr.i:: 
& tfawley LLP, rrspectfirlly submits this resl13nse to Pl&illtirTs "Motion to l)isz.l?ovv C'csts and 
Attorney Fees" filed on or about October 13.2u09. 
As the Court is aware. thi:, is a lejal nliipractize i~ction. Deferdant v;ic reta.1ed to 
pcrform profes.riond legal :ier:ic!rs. ~s 11is att4lr;lt.:~ irl  the .~ntlcrlying case. 111 this s?;;?, I'lanrifr 
alleged that Defendant committed an 3ct of m; lprirctice by act~ng with negligence In perfom.ini: 
Ihe professional service of draftin;; Mr. Cowar ' s  IVill. 
On September 9. 2003, this Court en!-red its Memorandum Decision Crantiny 
Defendant's Motion for S-tmmary Judpmeri' and ectcrei :.c!rollary 0-der ant1 IL.%~::- ien: oil 
September 12, 2009. dismissing Plaintiffs ('m[rlaiiit. For the purptse of ail atto-nr!, ke aiid 
cust determination. Defendant is the prevailiiig p a y ,  
Defendant. throagh this motion, reqL1:sts ail ;~wtrd  cf attome:, fees aiul cc:i!:: in:tlr:e<i , r  
defending against Plaintift's i l ~ r n s  putsum to I R.(:.P :I4. a d  I.C. 12-1 ZCl(3). th: 
prevailing party, as the underlying case invol*,ed a comnercial transection. 
1. That Plaintiff Did sot Conttnct With 51.fc.ndant is Not IDispositiri Of 
Defendant's Motion For i t r?~rncy Feet.. 
I he underlying transaction involved t'ackary C c v m  retaining the prol~ssic~nal jeriicei 
of Mr. Fletcher. I t  is the commercial transaction at issue in the underlying action thlt dictates 
whether attorney fees sh*?uld be nurardsd uricl?r I.C. !i I:!-',,20<3); thu:, it is ir-eiev;ult to h i s  
motion whether Plaintiffa.so had a aotirract ii.th De.'zn~?itiit. 3laintifCcanno- :t>mot.c her 
malpract~ce claim outside of the underlying c.,mmercial transaction based an hcr reusorting that 
Defendant only had a d11q to 'ier as a teneiic ru:~ o- that .he was not a part cf {he coniineic a1 
transact~on as betu,wxi l>efmdan: and klr. Cowan. Plaintir'f's claim i :  based or th: :c,n~m,:rciil 
transaction as between Defendanr and Mr. CIILVW' 
As set forth in Defend.mtSs opening nimorandwn or. this motion. ldahc Co,:e 
$ 12-120(3) mandates a fee a\vartl in cases hr;:ed 3n t. ccrumercial naisactior. Befi~re the 1c:ahc 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Biilnka .; t& Wen Wlic/lcsaler, LLC. 143 Id&o "'23 
152 P 3d 592 (2007). ho.&ever, section 12-12 )13) had bu:n :nterprete;i not to zjrply n 
"commercial transaction" cases iri which the : . I C O I ~  of recrpv~:ry was a ton theary I-  fVmiu ,  ,lit: 
court overruled all prior decisions prohibiting fee awerds ii i  such cases. Id. Chi,: desisicn pluinl:~. 
overruled by Blinzko is I.Ifiirr r.. Iz:oiier,s, I I9 dato415. 425. 807 P.2.1 633. 643 (19-21)  'Th.:re. 
the raun refused to ail.:i~-d fees under section 12-1 2Olj) ia a !;gal ma:pracric- 1 tise :;!m 
hecause yuch a c a e  is a tun case. "even thoulh the undtriying transaction which resulted in  rhc 
malpractice was a .commercial txnsaction."' Itf Ihert: s 113 doubt hat tlle dikridar,t::' 
attomey+client relationctiip w.th Cad.  is a .(t):nrletc ial 11 :xslction." :\cc~nlit,gly. its .';r-., 
section 12-1 ?0(3) applies. and i t  mandates an award of :~norney fees. 
AS also pointed cut in Defendax's ollilnir~g n1en11:xandum on this mn:i:n, I I I  a r:cco: 
attorney malpractice case. Uisirict Judge .Mctaug:hlil~ hol.1 that given the I ~ , I I I )  Sup??re  Ci ur:',; 
holding in Blimka. sztpru. an attorney fee award in a malpractice case was afqsopri;ite incer 
I.C. 3 12-1 20(3). See Cify of .WcCaN v Burtcn, rt af. Plain~iff attem?ts to dis?ingdisb t l i 0 3  ,,f' 
,'4cCaN by asserting tliat t l e  ~3n::aetio11s at i:;w in tilirt c :,st: i~~volvetl a conr+.c:t tfow:.<:r. 
Plaintiff ignores judge McLaughiin's plain satetnent rhat a contract for atto1xt.y selvlces a 
commercial transaction. and. "the fact &at the contract w,?s for attorney sewic,zs, not a y  ctl~er 
service. does not change the natx-e of rnz t ra~sac~ion  i t ~  -3ne for either persrriil sen  iccs rTr 
household services." Exhibit A to Defendant's Opening Xlemorandu~n, p. 5. :i?e .-liso, C0@11 v 
Jones, el ai.. Opening Memorandum. Exh. B. 
Plaintiff in this caice is sui-~g Defendant fo: hit; pfr:ormance of profi:s:ior$al :;:rir ce:; b r  
Mr. Cowan. The gravamtn of the ufidcrlying zase on which Plaintiff,:omplains was 3 
commercial transaction. Given the applicability of I.C. $ 12-120(3) tc the fact:: of this case, and 
because Defendant is the prevaili~~g party, att,?mey fe4s :houId be awrrded to f)efertlan: inc .irrc.l 
in defending this ant' c 103. 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIOh' TO DIS4I.IX)\V C'OSTS AND ATTOf:i\EY ::llIlS. 3 
2. Mr. Fletcher Can Seek Feeee, For Non-~t~:tc~rneys. 
Pursuant to the Supplemzntrl Affida. i t  ,lf '\iichel.c R Points In S11ps);t r~t '?dct(c~ I 
.-\ttorney Fees and Costs. submitted hcrrwit?. thr fees c.1' .'MODO" and "CV:.!%Ss :in 
recoverable and should be awarded to Deferulant 
3. There i s  SuEcient Evidence For CIaitns Of Discretionaw  cost^. 
f'laintiffassrrts. In a heading, that tt.:re is "11s e.iidence presented ihr~t ihese a s t s  &ere 
'necessary and exceptional' ,and therefore. shjuld not bt messed against Pit intiff." 131aintitT 
then states. "[slee Rule 44,:d)i l)(D), 1.R.C.I' '. D$fe:~ldav requested !,732.131 i: :il:;,:reti3niu\f 
costs. consisting of $457.46 iri photocopy w,ts and '26-1 58 in assistt:d legal resetrl:h. 
Paragraphs 3 and 8 of the Af f id~~r i t  of h.fichcile R. Pi)in..s Setting Forh Mernot3ndum c.f C'csu 
and Fees address the ntxessit:? :'or the costs <:aimed. 
Discretionary costs may inciude photc copying. i f i d e n  Lake Fire Ptot?cliun fijsisi v 
Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307.3 14. 109 P.3d 161. 168 (2005). The use ofassisted 1t:g:iI resew:h :n tni:; 
case, given the breadth of legal issues pattic~larly cuiltained in Defen3antnt's !.lc tion fcr Sunnr;ry 
Judgment. was minimal. Given the complex.:); ofthe is:ri~:s subject r f  tllis li.igaiior. 5 e  
amounts sought for discrctioniiry costs are m.:re than reasonable. The discretio l'ary cuss soug,~: 
were necessary and exceptional. :md wcre rezr:onhbly inclrrc!d in the defense sf this :as: atlcl 
should in the interest c'fji>s!ice he assessed 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMI?TED 
I - 
R1IPI.Y 'SO PI.AIEo'TIFF'S M0l'lON 7'0 DIS.lLI,OW COSTS AND ATI'OF3EY I'EES - 4 
CER'rlFICirrF OSSI!RVICE 
~lP,ft,, 
I IIEREBY GEKTIFY that on this&)&y o!'N~~vcrnbcr, 2009, t ca~iscl  to k ser.e,l a 
true copy of the foregoi~g RFDL*r. fO P L A ~ ~ ~ T I F F ' ~  hf(.)Tli>N TO DISAI.,LOW ::I:)!,_'< .!i.\ 1) 
ATTORVEY FEES by t i ?  rneti11)d imlicated ie1c.w: mr :~dtlrrssed to each o . J I ~ .  ii).:or.ir:;: 
:%lien B. Ellis U.S. Mail. Pcsragc J'rtp; id 
ELLIS. BRONX & SHEILS. CHARTERED H a d  Deli>eted 
707 North 8th Street .- OW might !v!a:l 
P.O. Box 388 .- E-mail 
Boise, 11) 83701 -0383 b /~e l t : co~)  : 2:6.3:k5.9.i64 -- 
[Attonleys tor Plaintiff 
Jeffrey A. Strvther 
STROTHER LAW OFFICE 
200 N. Fourth Street, Sultc 30 
Boise. ID 83702 
[Attorneys for Plalntl f f  
- U.S. Mail. ?:stage PrsPiti 
Hard Delivered 
.- Ovc might l4;il 
REPLY '1 '0  Pl.i\lNl'lFF'S MOTION i'i) I!I!I:kB.LOU' ,lO!;'?S A ~ ' ( ) R ~ < F Y  ~:&E.c;. j 
Craig L. Meadows. ISR N s ,  ii)$l 
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
tIAWLEY TROXELL EhYIS & 11.4A'LEk I . L I "  
877 Main Street. Suite lOC@ 
P.O. Box 1617 





Attorney for DeTendant W. Ken. Fletcher 
IN THE DlSrRlCT COUIIT O : TI-IE TII-"H JC'DICIAI, DIS-'RICT 
OF THE S?'AI'E OF D_%HCt, IN .il\il'> 1:#3R TIIE COUNrY 01' C:.ISSI,I 
MARY KI1,Ll;"jS SOICNIER. 
Plaintiff. 
VS. 
W KENT FLETCHER. 
Defendxt 
1 
) Case No. CV 2009-5 17 
> 
) SI!:?DL EMEN? AI, A:"I [>A'+'!'T 0'
) M CI-IELLE R. PORJ'IS w :;ciwxr 
) OF M I ~ T I O N  FOR xrroK.x :'I FEES 
) M4DtOSTS 
-. 
MICI-1ELLE R. POINTS, bcing l'irst ct.~iy :;vit3m 'i,:oxl r,ath, de3ses  U I ~  : mtet: 2: fi:llc.~,:: 
I I am an attorney with t-e law firm c f  f lawley T-ortell E r r ~ s  6c Hawb:) 
LLP, counsel of record for W. Kent Fletcher. Ilefendmt ir. the above-referenced matter. I make 
this affidavit based upon m:i own personal kni .*ledge, i u ~ i l  c.m testify as to $!I: t n~ th  :.i'the 
matters contained herein ifcalied upon a Skitness at tht: rriztl of  this :&on. 
7 -. LiC)E~O, wt-o is listed i l t  E x h b ~ r  A to the previous affii!ea.it I sub~nit:cA in 
support of this inoiion ant1 trhc i c  fees CL: chal i:n&ed :~y 7!ii:~ri:t: is iv cyan 0'I:otrtl. tuilo 
SUPPI.EMFXTr\L AFFIDAVIT OF .CflCHEI l,E R. 'O!I-'TS M SUPPORT 13i: 
MO'fION FOR A'lTOXfdEY' FEES AUD C0:;TS - 1 
wtes a t o  r?.:sr:,' 
000281 
... - e v e r s o n  Haw l ey  Troxe 11 Fag% 3 
worked in thi8 o%ce as a second )car Summ:r Ass0:ia.e attorney. tler fees arr pt:p,:rl;. 
documented. Ms. O'Dowd w ~ ~ r k e d  un this c f s c  at a ioa.c:r t.ourly rat,, in an iff  XI tc ionser:e 
costs. but did perfom1 attorney fiinctions. 
3. C:WA.M, who iu  also liited in Exhibit ,4 to the previous tffid6v:t 1 
submitted in suppon of this motian and w h ~ i :  fees are ~:tsl..enged b~ Plaintjl: is <:Iristian 
\xjamhoff, who is 3 mernber orthe Litigation Suppon C:oup at this firm and url~o tcrfoonns 
paralegal functions, including those listed in ;!*hibit A. h.lr WrufihoTs fees arc pr-:perly 
documented. 
Further. your affiant say& 
STATE OF IDAHO I 
1 ss 
County of Ada f 
I SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this ! * 5 '  day of November. 20051. - 
-- .. - - -. -. ---. - --- - - - -. . 
- - . - - -- -- - - - - .. 
'!))tag' F'ub i i  i,r ldaho 
5.csiding at ?h& , , i d  
.\ly com-mission expires 
SUPP1,EMENTAL .4FFIU:\VII' OF MICHF.I.I.11 R. POI-<17S IPv SUI'PORI'C) ' 
MOT'ION FOR ATTOR:\:EY LFEI:S Xhi) CCrj'TS - ;? 
000282 
wise M ? O ' ? Z S ~  t 
I HEKEBY CERTIFY thtt on 20C9. I ca~ls<,l to 11e ser\eJ 2 
true copv ofthe foregoing 4.. P(, '1'~- . ':j I?J 
SUPPORT OF MO'TrON I'OR /.'1'I'OIZNE\r. 2-'F 1:s ,\UCt CCSTS by the c~.: l..~.:: i1tii:1:t:(, 
below. and ;Iddressed fc. each oiihe following:: 
Allen H. Ellis - U.S. Mail. Pcsrrige Prepirjtl 
ELLIS. BROWN 8: SWEILS, CIIARTEREL) Efmd I>eli\er:d 
707 North 8th Street . Uvc might lv:c:ti 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, ID 83701 -0388 relccopq: ?:&365,?:i64 
[..\nomevs for Plaintiffj 
Jeftiey A. Strother - U.S, Mail. Postage Pr:psid 
S?'ROTUER LAW OFFICE Hard Deliever-d 
200 N. Fourth Street, Su.,te 3C -- 0vcmigt.t ?Aiii Boise. ID 83702 
-7- 
E-n ail 
[Attorneys for Plaintifq 
/ 
SliPf'l.%MEKfAL. AFFIDAVIT OF MICHE1,I.E R. POfiTS SUppORT 0': 
MOTION FOR A T T O K ~ E Y  I:FES r \ ~ 3  cc:;.rs- 3 
ObU283 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CASSIA COUNTY 
COURT MINUTES 
CV-20094000517 
Mary Killins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher 
Hearing type: Motion for Fees and Costs 
Hearing date: 11/25/2009 
Time: 858  am 
Judge: Michael R Crabtree 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson 




Michelle Points argues Motion for Fees and Costs; cites considerations. 
Objection by Allen Ellis; cites considerations. 
Reply by Michelle Points. 
The Court takes this matter Under Advisement. 
9:09 a.m. Hearing concludes. 
I ' LFC . .". - 
2i89 DEC 29 PH f : 03 
'L1:'iIIY KI1.I.INS S(.)ICiNII:II. ) 
J 
l'I:~intilf', 
) C'i\SI' NO.  C'V 2000-51 7 
vs. ) 
) 
IV. E;I;NI~ I:I,!.:'I.(:I.II:II, i 
ICIE:&lOItANDI'M OPINION C;ILZNTIEG IN PART AN!) DENYING IN PART 
DEFk:NI)AN'l"S MOTION FOR A STOItNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
!:or thc i'I:~i~itilF i\llcn B. 1:llis ol'the firm t',llis. I3ro\vn and Sheils. Chartered: :rnd 
Jefliey A. Strothcr. 
For rlie llcfe~l<lant: ;ClieheIIc I'oints of tlic firm I I:l\vley. l'rosell, I<rlnis and l~lawley 
I*l , l ' .  
O n  S~.ptcnther 23, 200c). rlic c'oilrt entered an Order disn~issing thc 1'IaintiI'l"s (hcrcaficr 
bls. Soignicr) <'rimplaint alter granting the I)cl;lrldnnt's (liercalier Mr. l~lctcl~cr) i iotio~~ r t ~ r  
summary jildg~ilcnt. S u b s c ~ ~ i ~ c ~ i ~ I y .  Mr. IYlctchcr lilcd a ~llc~l~ornnilurn of costs ~lttd attorncy's 
IIic ~oi l r t  ook the ~li.ttte~ I I I I ~ ~ I  .id\ ~ ~ e r l i c ~ i t  
2lr. 1:lctclicr :Irgucs th;tt l l~c  ('oi~rt sIioi11~1 enter 211 a\\;~r<l of cl>its .i11d ;it[orncys IGCS i ~ t  
its l:ivt>r, pttrsti:ilit to I . ( ' .  $ 12-1 30(.3), :i~id l . l < . C ' i \ ~ . l ~ .  5 4  (d )  and 54(c). 
31s. Soignicr opposes nri i~\vasd !)I' either costs or nttoruc)~ I s  bccai~sc: I )  tlie 
dis'rctio~inry costs subtiiittcd h!- Mr. 1:letcIier are 1101 cxceptio~ial. illid thercIi)rc 1101 a11tlio1-ilcd 
h! I.l<.('i\,.l ' . 54-1((1)( Ii: I )  attt~rney's lG~,s arc Ilot ni;~r~dat<~ry tinder I.(' .  5 12-120(3) h e c . 3 ~ ~ ~  the 
~111dt.rlying action i r i  this ctise \\as nt)t a comniercial transaction: and 3 )  M r .  1:Ictcller rcqlle.;ts 
attor~icy's I>cs l ; ~ r  \vr)rk pe~.li)r~iied hy riur1-;ittor1ieys. 
I)IS(:L'SSION 
:I. COSTS 
I.I<.Civ.P. 54(d)( I )(.4). pr~)vidcs that except as otlier\visc l i~~ii ted by tlic llulcs, certain 
costs are allo\\cd as a iiiatter of r~ght o the pre\ a ~ l ~ n g  party 
l'revailing party is dclir~cd at I.K.<'i\-.l'. 54(d)(1 )(13). In  reaching tliis detcrniinati~~n, the 
coilrt is to exercise tliscretion a id  consider the linal result 01- the case in rclatio~i to tlic relic[' 
o ~ i .  In tliis case. Mr. Flctclier is tllc prevailing party heca~~sc  the c o ~ ~ s t  granteti his rnt~tio~i 
Tor summary juclgmclit :i~id tlie claims ag:~i~ist l i i ~ l i  were disriiisscd with prejudice, tliereb\, 
illli~rdi~lg him co~iiplete relief i l l  tlie actit~n. I'Iiereli)re, costs arc awarded tt) Clr. I:lctclicr as set 
I;)rtli helow. 
1. Costs 21s :I %Ti~ttcr of Hirrht. 1.R.Civ.l'. 54(d)(l)(C) 
' i l r  l:lc~chcr c l a i~ i~s  the lblIo\ving costs a5 a iiiattcr of rigllt. I'he coi~rt 's  dispositiori on 
eacli ire111 clairned is set l;)rtli belo\v: 
C o ~ ~ r t  l;ili~ig 1 : ~ ~ s :  S58.00 
' l ' o t ;~ I  c t~sts  a\\:irJcO to \lr, I'lctclicr as a rnatti.1. ol '~.igl~t:  558.00 
2. 1)iscrctioo;tn <'ruts. l.St.Ci~.l'. 54(d)( I ) (I) ) .  
\lr. l~ l c t c . l~c~~  1.l;lirns certain cr>st.; :IS ~liscr~.tion;lr! ct~sts. I'lic colll.t has iliscrcti(~n to 
c~~~is i<Icr  L I I ~ ~  ;lllo\v costs :IS ~liscrctio~l;~ry costs 111)on >I S!ILI\\~IIL tli:~t tlic cost C I ; I ~ J I I ~ L I  \\ere 
necessary :IIICI cxctptiorii~l costs rc;~so~li~hly inci~rr'~i, :i11c1 s110111~l i n  t l~c  in~erest ~ ~ ' ~ L I S I I C ~  1)e 
~ tss~ssed  ;tgaillst tlic ad\ t rse  p;lrt> 
111 s ~ ~ p p o r t  ol.111~ cI:ii~ii liv ~ i ~ s ~ r c ~ i o ~ ~ ; ~ r ! ,  costs. \,lr, i.'letcl~tr argL1es 111;ii t l~c  rccji~ire~iie~lt 
ll1:it tlir cost i)e exccptionril \ \as satislied irec:~~~se of the c<rmplcxit? of' tllc legal i s s ~ ~ c s  in this 
c:lse, 
Not~vitIist:i~idiig this argLlnicnt, tlle court tletcrrni~~cs that Mr. 1:letcher 112s not I I I ~ I  its 
burtlcn to slloiv tllat either r~l'tlie t\vo req~~ests  Tor discretionary costs i t  claims \\'ere necessary 
and esceptior~al, reasonoblx incurred \ v i t l ~ i ~ ~  the rne:i~ling ol'l.l<.('i\.l'. i J ( d ) (  I ) (I ) ) .  
I'hc discretionar_\' costs cl:~imcd by Mr. l~lctcl~er arc: 
1 .  $467.46 ti)r photocopies. Mr. I:lctchcr (lid [lot inake a sho\ving that tl~esc cop!. 
charges \vere cxceptit)nal. ('opy cllarges arc. usili~l costs of litig;~tion, 'I'lie court is tlot 
convinced that the interest of' iustis~. rcqi~ires that tllrse copy charges should be assessed 
agxinst %Is. Soignicr. 'l'l~erclbre, this cost is denied. 
1. 164.58 l i)r assisted legal rescarell (Westlaw). Mr. 1:letclier (lid not tilake a sho\vilig 
that these costs \\.ere esception:~l. Mr. l-Ietcller nlade a strategic decision lo argilc several legal 
theories on slllnlllary jucigrllent: eacli ~rf'tl~cse ~heorics 11ecess:irily rcil~~ircd rcsearcli. I.he collrt 
is 1101 con~inced t I i ; ~ t  the i~iterest ol'.justice rtquires 11131 111ese c ~ s t s  Ii~r legal rcst;~rcl~ sl~ould be 
~ s s c  i i  I s  S o r e r .  I11crcli)rc. this tost is denictl. 
set I ) \  the c.011r.1." ;\ comnlcrci:i1 trn~iincti~~n is any tr:ln%ictio~~ that is not fi)r ..])crkollal t j r  
1louscliol1.l" I I I I~~IOXS.  I . ( ' .  $ 12-130(3). Clr. I:lctcllcr asserts t h ; ~ t  IIL, is entitleti to ;~ttt)rncy's 
Fees u~aier this statlltc. bcc~luse 11s. Soignier brollght the case :IS 1111 ; ~ t t o r ~ ~ c ! - ~ l l i ~ l ~ ~ r : ~ c ~ i c c  actioli 
t~tnsaction tretiveel~ Illr. i.lctcher and %acl~rlr)- ( ' t~\\an, \\lie liirccl kfr. I.Ictc1lc.r to lrali  his \ \ i l l .  
\Is. Soignier nrg~1c.s t h ~ t t  11c.1. cIi1i111 against %{I-. 1:Ictclicr sou~lds rolely in tort. a11d arclsc fro111 a 
that all :lttorne: preparing tcstanlelltar). instn~rne~its 
owes a cluty to the beneficiaries named ot. identified 
therein to 1)rep;lrc such irlstrumcnts, and it'rcqucsted 
by the testator to li:i\c then1 prt~perly cxcc~~tcd. so as 
to cL'f2ct~1~1te th testator's itltcnt as expressed in the 
tcstamel11;1r)- instrut~~mts,  
I40 Idaho 134, 1.78. 00 I'.M 88-1 (100-1). 
111 determining \vliether to a\vnrd attorriey's I'ecs ~lnder I.C. 3 12- 120(3), the test is in 
t\vo parts. "1:irst. there nillst br a conlrllcrcial tmllsaction that is illtegral ro the claim. Sccolid. 
rather tll;u~ c011lmet. tloes riot yreclude lhc prc\aililig I);lrt); lyom collecti~ig ;Ittcrrncy l>es ilntlcr 
I .  I -  0 (  1 I 1 k  . .I/y 1li.h lf77o/c~.s~1/er, l.L('. 1-13 Idaho 71;. 728-72'). I52 lJ.3~1 504 
( 0 0  foreovcl-. the prevailing pnt-I!. in an attor~lcy malpractice Ia\vstlit [nay ct)llect attorney 
;\ coninicrcial transaction occllrrcd hc.t\vee~~ Rlr .  l~lctclicr alltl %;~ch:~r? (~o\ \ar l  \\llc11 
Mr. l.o\\:111 co~itr:~ctecl \\it11 \Ir. 1 ~ l ~ ' t c l i ~ r  10 ~ircparc his \ \ i l l .  \Is. Soig11ic.r \\as a iranietl 
kcnclici;~ry in  the \ \ i l l  tliat M r .  l:lctclier pl.cp:ireii liir M r .  (.'o\\;tn. :ill! cliii~it tI1:1i X!s. Sc)igtiicr 
Ii~rtli 1)) tlle lO;11io Sirprcnic C'otlrl in //~IW;,L~?/G' ). ili~rii.ot.k. as  cited :il)o\,c. 11s. Soigl~ier \\;IS 
IIOI Xlr. I.'Ittcli~.r's cIicllt. nliil the t \ \ t )  ditl no1 !i;l\c a eonrr<~cti~al :c :itir~nshi~). l io\\c\cr,  \Is, 
Soignicr is. it1 maliner 01' spc:ikilig. 3 tllinl-party bcncliciar! 0 1 .  the c<~ntr:lct iret\iee~i /.acli;~r!, 
< ~ o \ \  :iri L I I ~ ~  \ l r .  l~'letclic~-. 
In tliis c;csc. tlic cr)mmcrcial tr;111sacti011 lietnccn %ac'li31.! C'o\\:in and \ I r .  I'lctclier is 
both integ~.al to L'ls. S~iignicr's c l : ~ i ~ ~ i  ;itid the basis upon \vliicli she so~~gl i t  recovery h~.cailse 
\vitho~lt that trallsaction. she \vt)~~ld iiot 11:ive ally s~irt  {)I' claim agailist blr. I'lctclicr. 
Acc~irdingly, a11 a\\;ard ofattor~icy's 1;lc.s iltider I . ( ' .  I?-120(3) is ilppropriilte i r i  this c;ise. 
2. Amount of :\ttornev's Fees ~rndcr I.K.<liv.I'. 54fe)(Z) 
I'lic a ~ i i o i ~ ~ ~ t  t~l 'ana\vard of:lttorliey k e s  is n discreti,>~iary matter liir tlle trial ccriirt, alicl 
tlie court perceives i t  ;IS S L I C ~ .  S'III~ /'d,'c~~ / 'o/~~lo ( ; ~ ~ o ) i ~ v ~ . ~ ,  Inc, )., TC.X-LI.Y / ? c ~ / ; n ~ r ~ ~ ~  ('orp.. 1 ?,') 
Idaho 761. 760. 86 1'.3d 475. 483 (2004). IIic ho~lrltls ol'tl~c court's discretioli :ire n ti~~lction 01' 
the "reasonableness" of all atttrrricy fee claim. :lrid is colisiclcred by the court based on tlic 
iactors in I.IZ.Ci\~.l'. 54(e?(3). 10. ]:or an a,2-arcl based ilpoli I.(' .  3 13- 120(; ). i t  is not necessary 
tliat tIic co~lrt ;id(lrcss all ol'the l.li.('iv.l'. 54(e) ( i )  Pdctors in writing. liowe\~cr the record must 
clcnl-13 indicate tlie court ~{~ns idered  all tlic I:rictors. I.ee I.. ,jlick~,~.xon. I40 ldalio 5. I 1 .  180 l'.3~l 
467 (2008). 
I.li.('iv.I', iJ(e) l?>) states: 
In tile e\etlt lilt' collrt gr;Irits 11ttorncy I>es 10 ;I p;irty or pilrties in a civil actioli i t  
shall c<insidrr tlic lirIlv\\,ilig Illctors in determining tlie a~iio~lllt o f s ~ ~ c l i  ibes: 
in) IIlc tilllt' and labor reqilired. 
1.13) 'l'lic novelty and difficulty oftlie ~]ucstions. 
((') I'lie skill rcqilisite to perI;)r~ii tlie legal service properly nlicl the 
c.cpcricncc ;ind ahilit!, ol thc attortle! in the ]):II-tici~lar licld oI'Itb\\ 
l'lle prev:lili~~g cI1:irgcs Vor like \\ark, 
\\'l~ctllcr the I2c is lis~,tl or ct)ntingcnt. 
1 ' 1 1 ~  i i ~ i ~ c  li~liit:ltio~lz inil)o\cd 1)). tile clie111 or l i l t  ~ i r ~ i ~ ~ ~ i ~ t : ~ r i c c  of  ~lle 
'.a.w, 
l'lic ; I I ~ ) O L I I I ~  in\oI\cti ; I I I ~  file rcsi~lts o1)t:tinc~l. 
I llc ~ ~ ~ i O e s i ~ ' a ~ ~ i l i t ~  ol~tllc :lse.
I IIC 11~ i1 re  :111d Icngtl~ ol'tRe prol'cssionnl rcliitio~~ship \\ it11 the 1.Iicnt. 
:\\\arcis i n  sintili~r c:~scs. 
'the reaso~iat)lc cost (11' autorn:lted lcgz~l rc.ea~.cl~ ( ( ' ~ ~ n l p ~ ~ t c r  /\ssiitcrl 
I.cg:~l Ilcscarl~li). i l '  tllc court finds i t  \\a?; 1r~aso11;lbl) neccs.i.lry i l l  
l~repnring :I parl!"s c:~se. 
.in)' ~ ~ t h c r  filetor ~vliicli tllc collrt dccnls ;~l~])roprintc in tllc p:~rtic~~lar 
c:1sc. 
siipl)lcnlcntai nl'li~iavit in sllpport of tile n ~ < ~ t i t ~ n .  \vhich tlie ccrilrt 11~1s dilly considered. ]'he 
;~flidavit and ~ i l e n ~ ~ ~ ~ . a n d i ~ ~ i i  r ~ l '  kes :ind costs addrcssetl several of tlic i;ictors listed a1)oi.e. 21s. 
St)ignicr spcciti~\i~ll!. d i s / ~ ~ ~ t c J  tile rc..~]~~csted l'ets incl~rrcd by n second year S L I I ~ ~ I I ~ ~ I -  i\sst~ci;~te 
attol-ney, and a pnrrtlegnl. \ \ l ~ i c l ~  arc dvc~~mc~i ted  in tile ;~flitia\.it and rne~iiorandun~. and 
cs1)lainc~i n thc s ~ ~ p p l e n i ~ ~ i t a l  aflidavit. I t  appr:lrs that the work perl;~rmcd by the second !.ear 
Surii~iier ,\sscrciate Lvas billed at only a sligl~tly lo\ser hourly rate ($125.001 than the work 
pcrfi)rrncd 1 ) )  tlie atto[-ncys in this c:~sc ($143.00]. 'I'llc court, in its discretion. linds tllat this 
ratc is dispropo~.tioni~te. htr. I'lctchcr did not oflkr a basis Svr \vhich the court s l io~~ld co~lsicler 
the IiigR rate attributed to the Su~iicr i\sa~ciatc and paralegal as tlir un~a l  rates charged i n  this 
jl~risdietion. l'hc c o ~ ~ r t  considers a lo\\;er rate t ; ~ r  [lie work pcrli)r~tied by ~ I I ~ s c '  individl~als 
more aj~pruprinte gi\.cn tlu:~t the!  re not licensed legal pr~~l>s?;ir)nals. and \\.ill thcrcti~re redl~cc 
illc amount o f  attorncb 's k c s  rcqi~csted b). Llr. 1:lctclier accordingly 
CONC'I.I!SION 
'l'lic court llercby :i\v;~rds ~ w s  :111d :~ttorn~ys 1>cs agi~itist the I'laintill'and in h\.or 01' 
t o t  I '  r i g :  $58.00 
.Attor~ic!~'s I>c. total: S8~22.i .O(~ 
('oill~scl l i ~ r  thc I ) ~ ~ c I ~ ~ ~ ; I I I ~  \ \ i l l  I)IC;ISC s11l111lit ;[tl Onle~. : ~ n r i  , \~llcrltlc~l l ~ l ~ ~ l l L 3 1 1 t  to tllc 
C(TLII.I for s ig~ i~ i t t i~~c .  ~ o ~ ~ s i s t c r ~ t  \\ ,111 :ll?t~\ c. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby cert~fy that on th~s 1 day of December, 2009. I caused to be 
senred a true and correct copy of the forego~ng document, by the method 
lnd~cated below and addressed to the following 
1. Allen B Ellis 
Ellis. Brown & Sheils 
P.O. Box 388 
707 North 8th Street 
Boise, ID 83701 
-, 
2. Michelle R. Points U.S. Mail 
Craig L. Meadows 
Hawley. Troxell, Ennis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
Boise. ID 83701-1617 
D@puW Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 'PIIE FIFTH JC'DICi,-\L I>ISTRICT O F  THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF C,':4SSi.A 
\I:IQ Killins Soigtiicr, ) Si~prenie C'o~lrt Case 50. 37 l23-:iJ(J9 
I 
f'laintiSt:J<esponde~~t, I 1)istrict C'at~rt C':ISC Yo. C'\? 2009-5 I7 
) 
I CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
VS. ) 
1 
\4'. Kent l:Ictchcr,. 1 
ijefendani:\ppellant. f 
I .  Stella Sutherland, Deputy Clerk ol'the District Cot~rt ol'thc t:ilih Judici:~l District of the 
State of ldaho. in and for the C o ~ ~ n t y  ul'C'assia, do hereby ccrtif:\. that I have pcrsclnally sencd or 
mailed, by Linitcd States mail. -hand ciclivery. one copy ufthc Clcrh's Ilccord :ind Court 
Keportcr's Tr:mscript to the li)llo\ving ittturney's in this cause as follows: 
Allen 13. Ellis !vlichclle I'oints 
tlllis. Brown & Sheils. Chartered f iawley. 'Troxell, 1:nnis & li;~wIcy, 1.1.1' 
PO Box 388 PO Box 1617 
Boise Idaho 83701 Boise Idaho 8370 1 
IN LVl'fNf:SS WfiIIKEOF. I haw hereunto set m). hmd the aftiscd se:ll ol'thc said Court 
.-$.- 
this -@day u 
I.:\KKY :\ ~lI<'KtI.SlIS. C'1el.k ofthe Ccit~rt 
IN THE DISTRICT CO1:llT OF 'I'HE FIFTH JC'DI<'IAI, 1)ISTRICl' 01' ?'HE: 
STATE OF II)AHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
Mary Killins Soig~~ier,  1 
) Supre~ne <:ourt C'asc No. 37123-2009 
PIaintiff/I<cspondcnt, 1 
1 Ilistrict C:ourt Case No. CV 2009-517 
vs .  1 
1 
W. Kent Fletcher, 1 
1)efendant'Appcl lant. 1 CLERK'S CE:RTIFICATE \ 
I,  I.,arry A Mickclscn, Clerk ofthc Ilistriet Coilrtl ofthe I'itih J~~dicial District ofthc State of 
Idaho, in and fbr the County ofCassia: do hereby ccrtif). that the fhrcgoing documents in thc above- 
entitled cause wcre compiled under my direction and are true and correct copies ofthe pleadings, 
documents and papcrs designated to bc included under R~llc 28, Notlce of Appeal and the cntrrc 
reporter's transcript ofthe Summary Judgmcnt Motion 
I do further certify that all cxhibits orrered or admitted in thc ahovc-entitled cause and 
confidential exhibits will be lodged with thc Clerk of thc Suprcme Court. 
$ 
IN WI'fKESS Wl-II;Rl'Ot:, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the Seal ofsaid Court on 
CLERK'S CER'l'lFlCA1'11 
IN THE 1)ISTRICT COlIRT OF I'Hfr: FIFTH Jt'DtCliiL 1)ISTRICT OF IIIE 
STATE OF ll)t\HO, l?i .\NU FOR THE COL'NTY OF C'ASS1.Z 
Mary Killins Soignier, 1 
Supreme Court Case KO. 371 13-2000 
I'laintiff"Ilespondcnt, 1 
) District Court Case No. C'V 1009-5 I7 
vs. ) 
1 
W. Kent Fletcher. 1 
Defendant/Appel lant, ) CLERK'S CISR'TIFICATE 
I .  L.arry A Mickclsen, Clerk of the District Court, of the Fifth Judicial Dlstrict ofthe State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Cassia, do hereby certify that the foregoing doculnents in the above- 
entitled cause were compiled under my direction and are true and correct copies of the pleadings, 
docunlents and papers designated to be included ~lnder Rule 28, Notice of Appeal and the entire 
reporter's transcript of the Summary Judgment Motion 
I do further certify that till exhibits offered or adm~tted in the abovc-entitled cause and 
confidential exhibits will be lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
IN WFINESS WI-IEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed thc Seal of said Court on 
the day of ,2010. 
L AKRY A MICKEISEN 
CLI'RK OF 1.1 { I ?  DISI'RIC?' COUK I 
1 3 ~  - 
Stella Sutherland, D e p ~ ~ t y  Clerk 
